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THIS criticism is not written in a spirit hostile to the
doctrine of Evolution, considered as a development ac
cording to natural orders of sequence from the more
simple to the more complex, nor to the theory of the
development of the higher organisms from the lower.
Free from all bias, it is simply intended to be a
logical examination of an important theory which has
been placed before the thinking world for its acceptance.
This criticism I present in the following manner :
First, I ask what Mr. Spencer means by Philosophy,
and what is the problem it involves. I find, according
to him, that Philosophy is completely unified knowledge,
and that
THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY
is
To state an intelligible formula, which, ly its application
to the Homogeneous, will explain, and enable us to construct,
ideally; all the changes of the universe.
I then enter upon an inquiry into Mr. Spencer s For
mula of Philosophy, which, though intelligible, appears
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to me insufficient, inasmuch as its two factors, Matter
and Motion, do not afford an explanation of the facts of
life and mind.
I then attempt to amend the formula by the introduc
tion of the term Force, which Mr. Spencer largely employs
in his preliminary exposition, but which he has after
wards allowed to drop out of the formula, and I then
find that the amended formula, though sufficient, is
unintelligible.
I next endeavour, from a study of Mr. Spencer s ex
position, to frame a formula which shall be a true repre
sentation of it, but which, at the best, I am only able to
make a sufficient formula by making it vague, and to that
extent unintelligible.
From which it results, that although the changes of
the universe, in all its departments, conform to certain
general processes of development or Evolution, and thus
present a general similarity in the order of their changes,
yet we cannot state an intelligible formula, which, by its
application to the Homogeneous, will enable us to account
for and construct, ideally, the changes of the universe.
From this it follows, that however much I may ad
mire, and however much our thinkers may value, some
of Mr. Spencer s great generalisations, we must come to
the conclusion that he has not succeeded in solving the
main problem which he submits and sets down as the
aim of his work.
The implication is that no such problem of PhilosophyINTRODUCTION. vii
can ever be solved, and that there is in the universe a
factor which is more than Matter and Motion, and more
than Force considered as the sum total of them.
This factor, and its import as a matter of science and
of individual personal value, is reserved for considera
tion in the fifth and concluding portion of this criticism.
As a matter of interest to the student of Mr. Spencer s
Philosophy, I append the results of a task which I
lately undertook for my own instruction. This consists
of a statement of the principal criticisms affecting the
essential theories involved in the work, so far as they
have come under my notice.
This work is an elaboration of papers read before the
Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool, Sessions
1877-78 and 1878-79. The references are to &quot;First
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. 264SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION
PART I.
THE PROBLEM OE PHILOSOPHY.
To frame an intelligible Formula, which, ly its applica
tion to the Homogeneous, will explain and enable us
ideally to construct and account for all the changes of
the universe.
WE have before us &quot;A System of Synthetic Philo
sophy,&quot; vol. i. &quot;First Principles,&quot; by Herbert Spencer,
and our first object is to understand it. We approach it
as students critical students
; we come to learn, but
we must understand as we go along. And the first
question that naturally occurs to us is,
&quot; What does Mr.
Spencer mean by Philosophy ?
&quot;
In part ii., ch. i. 37, we find Philosophy defined as
&quot;




Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unified knowledge ;
Science is partially-unified knowledge ; philosophy is
completely-unified knowledge.&quot;
Is philosophy, then, only the summary of our know
ledge, or is it a representation of the changes of the
universe ? is it limited to our knowledge, or does it
A2 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
express the whole course of the history of things ? Does
it relate to the subjective or to the objective or to
both?
In sect. 1 8 6, &quot;Summary and Conclusion,&quot; we find a
reply to this question
:
&quot; In commencing our search, ... it was shown that a philo
sophy stands self-convicted of inadequacy if it does not formu
late the whole series of changes passed through by every
existence in its passage from the imperceptible to the per
ceptible, and again from the perceptible to the imperceptible.
If it begins its explanations with existences that already have
concrete forms, or leaves off while they still retain concrete
forms, then, manifestly, they had preceding histories, or will
have succeeding histories, or both, of which no account is given.
And as such preceding and succeeding histories are subjects of
possible knowledge, a philosophy which says nothing about
them falls short of the required unification. Whence we saw it
to follow that the formula sought, equally applicable to exist
ences taken singly and in their totality, must be applicable to
the whole history of each and to the whole history of all&quot;
Here we have, then, an explanation of the phrases,
&quot;
knowledge of the highest degree of generality,&quot;
&quot; com
pletely unified knowledge,&quot; and find the statement im
plied that philosophy, to be adequate, must express in a
formula
&quot; the whole series of changes passed through by
every existence in its passage from the imperceptible to
the perceptible, and again from the perceptible to the
imperceptible.&quot; And we note in the first place an
ambiguity from not terminating the explanation at the
word
&quot;
existence,&quot; for the succeeding part of the sentence
introduces the term
&quot;perceptibility.&quot; This is, however,
corrected in the following sentence, which, independently
of perceptibility, speaks of preceding or succeeding histo
ries, and therefore comprehends all changes previous to
or succeeding to the existence of an organism to whichTHE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 3
such changes are perceptible, but to which they are
nevertheless subjects of possible knowledge.
Philosophy, then, must express in a formula &quot;the
whole series of changes passed through by every exist
ence.&quot; To guard against misunderstanding, it is to be
presumed that the word &quot;existence&quot; includes not only
concrete bodies, such as solids, liquids, and gases, but
every form of matter and motion. What these latter
words mean will come under our consideration in due
time.
The Formula of Philosophy.
&quot; The law sought must be the law of the continuous
redistribution of matter and motion. The changes every
where going on ... are changes in the relative positions
of component parts, and everywhere necessarily imply
... a new arrangement of motion. Hence we may be
certain, d priori, that there must be a law of the con
comitant redistribution of matter and motion, which
holds of every change, and which, by thus unifying all
changes, must be the basis of a philosophy.&quot;
In what terms, then, must the formula be propounded ?
In terms of the continuous redistribution of matter and
motion.
&quot; It could be no other than one defining the
opposite processes of concentration and diffusion in terms
of matter and motion, ... a statement of the truth
that the concentration of matter implies the dissipation
of motion, and that, conversely, the absorption of motion
implies the diffusion of matter&quot; (p. 542).
Here we note that the formula does not take into
account the existence of an organism to which these
changes are perceptible, but, quite independently of any
such relation, it is applicable to all changes of matter4 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
and motion. This in corroboration of a previous con
clusion that the formula of philosophy is to be freed
from relation to perceptibility.
This is an important point, for if matter and motion
were the two original factors, then they existed apart from
perception, and the latter was either added afterwards,
or was a natural sequence from them. If added after
wards, the formula containing the two factors is only
good till the third is added. If a natural sequence, then
it is not to be included in the formula, but is to be ex
plained by it. But if not in it, then the formula must be
understood apart from perception and consciousness, which
can be done. And though we are obliged to say that
there can be no conception of matter and motion without
a perceiving body, yet a perceiving body can conceive of
what existed before it came into existence from concep
tions derived from present experiences, and thus we can
conceive of the two factors, matter and motion, and their
changes and combinations anterior to the existence of a
perceiving body.
But if all this is denied, and it is stated that matter
and motion could not exist without consciousness, then
we have three factors which have to be included in the
formula, and we have to predicate matter and motion
and consciousness as the factors of Evolution.
As, however, Mr. Spencer includes only two factors in
his formula, to these two factors we limit our considera
tions in Part II. of our criticism, however much we may
enlarge the scope of our speculations afterwards.
But we will pause a moment to consider the meaning
of the word
&quot;
existence.&quot; I presume an atom of gold is an
existence. I presume an atom of hydrogen or of oxygen
is an existence. I presume that all the so-called ele-THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 5
mentary substances are existences. I suppose, also,
they would be held to be perceptible, since even in the
gaseous state, although invisible, they are capable of
manipulation, and therefore afford knowledge to the
mind. According to the passage before us, we are re
quired to explain their passage into these differentiated
conditions, i.e., how gold became gold, and hydrogen
became hydrogen. As concrete existences, they must
have had preceding histories, which are subjects of pos
sible knowledge, and which histories a formula of philo
sophy is required to include.
And we are obliged, further, to conclude that the word
&quot;
existence&quot; comprises those experiences which we term
heat and light, electricity, magnetism, &c., which are all
decidedly perceptible.
Also, does it not include gravitation ? and we might
ask, if it were not for introducing an element of confusion
prematurely into our studies, does it include conscious
ness also ?





express in a formula.&quot; Does it mean the construc
tion of a formula which shall, by its generality, comprise
the description of every change knowable by us ? or does
it mean a statement that shall explain the sequences of
all phenomena in intelligible terms ? The former does
not account for sequences ; it only characterises the
totality of the changes. The latter claims to show the
nature of the relation of antecedent and sequence, so that
from any given state or condition of things (given the
requisite knowledge), we may be enabled to work out
all future sequences. The former is a loose and vague
generality, descriptive of the general character of changes;
the latter is penetrative and constructive. The latter is6 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.





the former is all that
he accomplishes.
But this does not answer to the requirements of
philosophy, according to Mr. Spencer s own showing.
Explanations are wanted, not generalisations. We seek a
law of construction, so that from the homogeneous or
undifferentiated we can understand by deduction all the
subsequent differentiations, and see that what has hap
pened must have happened. We presume to lay down,
then, as Mr. Spencer s understanding of the task of philo
sophy, this synthetic problem, viz., to frame an intelligible
formula, which, by its application to the homogeneous,
shall enable us ideally to construct and account for all
the changes of the universe.( 7 )
PART II.
AN INQUIRY AS TO THE INTELLIGIBILITY AND THE
SUFFICIENCY OF MR. SPENCER S FORMULA.
THE quotation as to the law sought given on page 3 implies
that all knowledge is the knowledge of matter or material
substances and the knowledge of their motions. Com
pletely unified knowledge is the expression in a formula
of the general or universal characteristics of all changes
of the motions, combinations, and relations of material
substances, and the formula which expresses these changes
in the most general way is the integration of matter
and the contemporaneous dissipation or transference of
motion.
The formula propounded by Mr. Spencer is as fol
lows (p. 396):
&quot;Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant
dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an
indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent hetero
geneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a
parallel transformation.&quot;
This formula seems to be of a descriptive rather than
of a constructive character. It seems to summarise rather
than to explain. It does not, in its bare enunciation,
account for these integrations and dissipations. It does
not account for itself. Whether it attempts to do this
or not we will hereafter inquire.8 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
Here let us pause to consider the meaning of words
included in the formula.
Definitions of Matter and Motion.
&quot;Matter,&quot; 48.
&quot; We may therefore deliver ourselves
over without hesitation to those terms of thought which
experience has organised in us. We need not, in our
physical, chemical, or other researches, refrain from deal
ing with matter as made up of extended and resistant
atoms ; for this conception, necessarily resulting from our
experiences of matter, is not less legitimate than the con
ception of aggregate masses as extended and resistant.
The atomic hypothesis, as well as the kindred hypothesis
of an all-pervading ether consisting of molecules, is
simply a necessary development of those universal forms
which the actions of the Unknowable have wrought in
us. The conclusions logically worked out by the aid of
these hypotheses are sure to be in harmony with all
others which these same forms involve, and will have a
relative truth that is equally complete.&quot; Matter, then, is
made up of extended and resistant atoms.
The differentiations of atoms, or, by preference, ultimate
units for atoms of the seventy or eighty so-called elemen
tary substances are now regarded as composite, and, on Mr.
Spencer s hypothesis, are bound to be so regarded can,
then, only be in differentiations of extension, viz., shape or
size. Now, differentiations of shape and size are distin
guishable and measurable ; and although the shapes and
sizes of ultimate units, if differentiated, are beyond our
observation, it is necessary to consider them as possessed
of shapes and sizes, which, if we had the capacity, would
be representable geometrically and arithmetically. ThereINTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 9
could be no other differentiation in them. Their only
other property, viz., resistance, means merely that two of
them could not occupy the same space at the same time.
&quot;Motion.&quot; I do not find the term &quot;motion&quot; ex
plained apart from a perceptive organism. I only find a
description of the conception of motion, involving (sect. 49)
&quot; a something that moves
; a series of positions occupied
in succession ; and a group of co-existent positions united
in thought with the successive ones. These are the con
stituents of the idea.&quot; But as it is necessary to eliminate
the perceptive organism in accordance with the require
ments of the formula which is to explain all changes
anterior to or subsequent to the existence of a perceptive
organism, we are obliged to modify the explanation of
the term. Motion, then, must be a description applicable
to the previous description of matter that is to say, to
extended and resistant atoms. So applied, we have for
the word &quot;something&quot; in the above quotation &quot;extended
and resistant atoms&quot; &quot;that move.&quot;
Then, again,
&quot; a series of positions occupied in succes
sion&quot; must mean positions of each atom in relation to
itself, i.e., rotation ; or else in relation to other atoms, i.e.,
a series of positions of atoms in relation to each other.
These movements, whether of rotation or of mutual
relation, are expressible in relation to an unit of movement,
and therefore in rates of motion. They can, therefore, be
described arithmetically.
We therefore find that the ultimate units which have
extension and resistance have also motion, and that the
whole of their differentiations are to be described in terms
of extension (shape or size), and in terms of motion
(rates or modes, i.e., rotary and relative).
And we also find that the only method of describingio SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
these differentiations is in terms of mensuration, i.e., in
terms of geometry and arithmetic.
The formula, then, only recognises two factors that
is to say, matter and motion
; or, since motion cannot
exist by itself, it is more correct to say matter in motion.
Elsewhere we find that matter is indestructible and
motion continuous. That is to say, that no atom ever
ceases to exist, though it may enter into ever-changing
combinations with other atoms, or may move at different
rates of motion. And, further, that no atom moves more
slowly without other atoms moving more quickly. No
motion is ever lost
; it is only transferred.
Whether any ultimate units can ever wholly lose their
motion is a question. But it is clear that we cannot have
motion without matter.
Note. This suggests a hypothesis concerning ether, for there
are three alternatives respecting these ultimate uniform units.
First, that they entered into permanent combinations, as known
to us in the so-called elements ; secondly, that some remained
free and uncombined, retaining their motion, or some degree of
it; thirdly, that some lost their motion altogether, although
capable of receiving it again. Now, if we conceive of ultimate
units having extension and resistance and relative gravity but
no special motion, we have a case similar to, say, a row of marbles
close together, having no motion, but capable of transmitting
motion from any centre of activity. Such a supposition would
be agreeable to the theory of the undulatory transmission of
light and heat. And since all solid, liquid, and gaseous bodies
are to be regarded as permeable bodies, existing in the ocean
of ether in much the same way as sponges exist in the sea, they
would be subject to disintegration from the violent interior
mechanical action of the contained ether. And the theory of
heat would be a theory of increased etherial excursion rather
than of increased molecular or atomic excursion, or of all three ;
and the theory of light would be one of undulations of ether.
Moreover, the theory of the indissolubility of the elementsITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 11
vrould be the non-permeability of atoms by the ether, in conse
quence of the smallness of the interstices, due to the composition
of the atom from ultimate units of the same size as the unit of
ether. So also the greater the degree of complexity, the greater
the facility for dissolution under heat.
There would also follow a supposition as to the individuality
of a body of ether in an aggregate due to the molecular construc
tion of that body, and the contiguity and continuity of the units
of the contained ether.
And there might be other suppositions respecting magnetism
and electricity, &c., according to the views held of the existence
of free uncombined ultimate units of extension and resistance
with polarities, or having lost all motion.
Inquiry into the Application of the Formula of Evolution
and Dissolution, commencing with Dissolution.
By the light of the preceding statement of the scope of
philosophy and of the formula by which all the changes
of the universe are explained, let us set about the appli
cation of it as an interpretation of these changes. And
we will commence with Dissolution, for this reason,
viz., that we may be able to reduce the contents of the
universe to its constituents, and thereby enable the mind
to form a clear conception of matter and motion, the two
factors of the formula, and accustom it to free those terms
from any other considerations than size, shape, mode or
rate of motion. In this way we shall be able to rid the
theory from any associations of consciousness or intelli
gent ordering of processes, and get clear down to the
material and mechanical basis of things.
We shall see, in fact, the earth disappear and all life
;
then we shall see the whole solar system reduced to
vapour. Finally, the whole sidereal system shall dissolve
into nebulae, and when dissolution shall be completed by
ultimate dissolution of even the nebulse, we shall have to12 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
ask what that state will be, and thereby try to realise in
our own minds what that primal condition must have
been from which Evolution was bound to start, if it is to
be a complete statement of all changes. By thus realis
ing the ultimate dissolution, we shall arrive at a starting-
point for Evolution, and then by the application of the
formula we shall endeavour to understand i. The for
mation of the so-called elements, their relative quantities
and permanence. 2. Their distribution. 3. The motions
of heat, light, &c. 4. The origin of consciousness and life,
and the development of organisms and mind.
The process of dissolution is thus described :
a
i Si. For the earth, as a whole, when it has gone through
the entire series of its ascending transformations, must remain,
like all smaller aggregates, exposed to the contingencies of its
environment
; and in the course of these ceaseless changes in
progress throughout a universe of which all parts are in motion,
must, at some period beyond the utmost stretch of imagina
tion, be subject to forces sufficient to cause its complete disin
tegration.
. . . There is a force at work which, it is held,
must at last bring the earth into the sun. This force is the
resistance of the etherial medium. From etherial resistance is
inferred a retardation of all moving bodies in the solar system.
... If, then, retardation is going on, there must come a
time, no matter how remote, when the slowly diminishing orbit
of the earth will end in the sun
; and though the quantity of
molar motion to be then transferred into molecular motion will
not be so great as that which the calculation of Helmholtz
supposes, it will be great enough to reduce the substance of the
earth to a gaseous state.&quot;
Such will be the case w
rith every member of the solar
system, until we arrive at the period when &quot;the total
mass must become completely integrated, and its excess of
contained motion radiated into
space.&quot;
Not only this, but since the stars, distributed irregu
larly throughout the heavens, move in conformity withITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 13
the law of gravitation, they will undergo rearrangement.
&quot; If we now ask the nature of this rearrangement, we find
ourselves obliged to infer a progressive concentration.&quot;
The question arises,
&quot; What must be the limit of such
concentrations ?&quot;
&quot; An increasingly frequent integra
tion of masses.&quot; &quot;And if so relatively small a mo
mentum as that acquired by the earth in falling to
the sun would be equivalent to a molecular motion suffi
cient to reduce the earth to gases of extreme rarity,
what must be the molecular motion generated by the
mutually arrested momenta of two stars that have
moved to their common centre of gravity through spaces
immeasurably greater ? There seems no alternative but
to conclude that it would be great enough to reduce the
matter of the stars to an almost inconceivable tenuity
a tenuity like that which we ascribe to nebular matter.&quot;
Then
&quot; the diffused matter produced by such conflicts must
form a resisting medium, occupying that central region of
the cluster through which its members from time to time
pass in describing their orbits a resisting medium which
they cannot move through without having their velocities
diminished. Every additional collision, by augmenting
this resisting medium, and making the losses of velocity
greater, must aid in preventing the establishment of that
equilibrium which would else arise, and so conspire to
produce more frequent collisions. And the nebulous
matter thus formed, presently enveloping the whole
cluster, must, by continuing to shorten the gyrations of
the moving masses, entail an increasingly active integra
tion and reactive disintegration of them, until they are
all dissipated. &quot;Whether, &c. . . . In any case, the con
clusion to be drawn is, that the integration must continue
until the conditions which bring about disintegration are14 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
reached, and that there must then ensue a diffusion that
undoes the preceding concentration.&quot;
&quot;
This, indeed, is the conclusion which presents itself as a
deduction from the persistence of force. If stars concentrat
ing to a common centre of gravity eventually reach it, then
the quantities of motion they have acquired must suffice to
carry them away again to those remote regions whence they
started. And since, by the conditions of the case, they can
not return to these remote regions in the shape of concrete
masses, they must return in the shape of diffused masses.
Action and reaction being equal and opposite, the momentum
producing dispersion must be as great as the momentum ac
quired by aggregation ; and being spread over the same quan
tity of matter, must cause an equivalent distribution through
space, whatever be the form of the matter.
&quot; When that integregation everywhere in progress throughout
our solar system has reached its climax, there will remain to
be effected the immeasurably greater integration of our solai
system with other such systems. There must then reappear in
molecular motion what is lost in the motion of masses; and
the inevitable transformation of this motion of masses into
molecular motion cannot take place without reducing the masses
to a nebulous form.
&quot;
183. Thus we are led to the conclusion that the entire
process of things, as displayed in the aggregate of the visible
universe, is analogous to the entire process of things as displayed
in the smallest aggregates.
&quot; Motion as well as matter being fixed in quantity, it would
seem that the change in the distribution of matter which motion
effects, coming to a limit in whichever direction it is carried,
the indestructible motion thereupon necessitates a reverse distri
bution. Apparently the universally co-existent forces of attrac
tion and repulsion, which, as we have seen, necessitate rhythm
in all the minor changes throughout the universe, also necessitate
rhythm in the totality of its changes, produce now an im
measurable period during which the attractive forces predomi
nating cause universal concentration, and then an immeasurable
period during which the repulsive forces predominating cause uni
versal diffusion alternate eras of evolution and dissolution.&quot;ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 15
It may be asked, Is there any occasion for carrying
the theory to such an extent ? Is there any necessity
for supposing the process of dissolution to be complete ?
for supposing other than partial processes of evolution
and dissolution ? I submit that all these suppositions
exceed the limit of legitimate philosophical speculation,
and are therefore futile. The author makes them, as he
is logically compelled to do, in accordance with the enor
mous claims, as stated by him, of philosophy; and we
must therefore follow him to the full extent of his specu
lations. But let us not do so blindly ; let us take care
not to lose ourselves in these obscurities, but to aim at
definite thought.
And it answers a good practical purpose in our
studies. For since it conducts us by gradual steps from
the complicated cosmos of the present to simpler and yet
more simple conditions, we can the better educate the
mind to the final realisation of that state of affairs out of
which evolution arises, and the better realise for our
selves the application of the formula to those initial
changes and that primordial history for which it claims
to account.
As long as there is any differentiation, dissolution is
not complete. Every differentiation implies an anterior
history which has to be accounted for. Dissolution is
incomplete until homogeneity is attained. We must do
away with all differentiations of ultimate units until
they are alike in size and shape, and we must obliterate
all differentiations of their motions until the same de
scription can be applied to all of them.
In studying the process of dissolution, therefore, we
find it to be the dissolution of combinations of molecules,
the further dissolution of molecules into atoms, and if1 6 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
there be any further dissolution of atoms into ultimate
units, then dissolution is not complete until this also has
been effected. And the question then arises, Does any
differentiation still remain differentiation of shape or
size differentiation in rates or modes of motion ?
And we also find that in this dissolution of the com
binations of matter the process is accompanied by a trans
ference of motion by which the motions of atoms or
ultimate units becomes more and more equalised.
So that the end of dissolution seems to be the dis
integration of all combinations into ultimate units of
matter moving at equal rates. We have heterogeneity
becoming less and less heterogeneous ; will it ever reach
the homogeneous ?
It seems to me that the task prescribed by Mr.
Spencer for Philosophy requires of it that it should
account for all differentiations, since all differentiation
implies change, and all change a history. Homogeneity
must be the starting-point of Philosophy.
If not, then it must start from an arbitrary point,
which every one may determine according to his own
fancy. Each one may please himself at what degree of
differentiation he commences with the application of his
philosophical formula. Some may choose differentiated
atoms already formed
; some may choose living protein
ready made to their hands.
A philosophy stands convicted of inadequacy if it does
not account for every differentiation. The question as
to the origin of differentiation is not to be confounded
with the question as to the origin of existences or ulti
mate undifferentiated units, but if differentiated matter is
postulated, then any degree of differentiation is equally
justifiable.ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 17
Philosophy is thus brought face to face with the Homo
geneous, into which, by tracing out the ultimate process of
dissolution, we are logically led.
Can we picture to ourselves the Homogeneous ?
It is useful to try.
Study of the Homogeneous.
We have, then, to suppose, in the first place, ultimate
units having resistance and extension. They must be the
same shape say spherical and the same size.
In the next place they are in motion. The motion
may be rotary, or relative, or both. If rotary, then the
motion must be in the same direction, and the axes
must be parallel, and they may have some universal
relation to a common centre
; or the motion may be
wholly (or in addition to the rotary motion) in relation
to each other. This motion would be one of movement
towards and movement from other units.
Here we reach a very difficult part of our subject.
&quot;We may altogether abandon the rotary movement, or we
may simply hold it in suspense to fall back upon in aid
of the explanation of subsequent differentiations and com
binations.
But before going any further it is necessary to bear in
mind that the differentiation between matter and ether
has to be obliterated. In homogeneity there is not a
mass of units and ether. The atoms of matter and the
units of ether have become identified, and when we speak
of the Homogeneous we are not speaking of a mass and
of the medium in which it moves, but of a mass in which
the matter and the ether have become unified.
What we have to represent to ourselves, then, is a
mass a spherical mass of undifferentiated units, each1 8 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
unit moving towards what ? The neighbouring unit or
all the other units ? and then moving away from the
neighbouring or all the other units ?
With the why and how of the movement we have
nothing to do any more than with the how and the why
of the units themselves.
If we say that philosophy starts with the homo
geneous,
it is not required to account for the existence
of that matter and that motion which constitute it,
but only to describe the properties of the two factors, so
that by the application of the formula the results may be
worked out. The origin of the matter and the motion
is unknowable. But a complete philosophy is bound to
start from the homogeneous. It may be that a philo
sophy is sufficient without being complete i.e., we may
go back to a differentiated state, and account for all
changes subsequent to that from the factors therein. But
then it is not a complete philosophy, and since Mr.
Spencer claims that Evolution is a complete philosophy,
we are bound to go back to the homogeneous ; and this
is really a logical necessity, for if one man chooses an
arbitrary starting-point, however remote, so may another
one select a point of much greater differentiation and be
equally justified.
The following is Mr. Spencer s account of the motions
of the ultimate units :
Page 223.
&quot; However verbally intelligible may be the pro
position that pressure and tension everywhere co-exist, yet we
cannot truly represent to ourselves one ultimate unit of matter
as drawing another while resisting it. Nevertheless this last
belief is one which we are compelled to entertain. Matter
cannot be conceived except as manifesting forces of attraction
and repulsion. ... We are obliged to think of all objects as
made up of parts that attract and repel each other, since this isITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 19
the form of our experience of all objects. By a higher abstrac
tion results the conception of attractive and repulsive forces
pervading space. We cannot dissociate force from occupied
extension, or occupied extension from force, because we have
never an immediate consciousness of either in the absence of
the other. Nevertheless, we have abundant proof that force
is exercised through what appears to our senses a vacuity;
mentally to represent this exercise, we are hence obliged to fill
the apparent vacuity with a species of matter an etherial
medium. The constitution which we assign to this etherial
medium, however, like the constitution we assign to solid
substance, is necessarily an abstract of the impressions received
from tangible bodies. The opposition to pressure which a
tangible body offers to us is not shown in one direction only,
but in all directions
; and so likewise is its tenacity. Suppose
countless lines radiating from its centre on every side, and it
resists along each of these lines and coheres along each of these
lines. Hence the constitution of those ultimate units through
the instrumentality of which phenomena are interpreted. Be
they atoms of ponderable matter or molecules of ether, the pro
perties we conceive them to possess are nothing else than these
perceptible properties idealised. Centres of force, attracting and
repelling each other in all directions, are simply insensible por
tions of matter having the endowments common to sensible
portions of matter endowments of which we cannot by any
mental effort divest them.
&quot;Note. In brief, they are the invariable elements of the con
ception of matter, abstracted from its variable elements, size,
form, quality,
&c.&quot;
Eesuming, then, our consideration of the homoge
neous, we have a sphere of ultimate units having like
motions of rotation or of mutual attraction and repul
sion. What is the corollary of this statement, bear
ing in mind the two propositions that motion is con
tinuous, and that all action is equal and opposite ? That
all action is equal and opposite would seem to pre
clude the notion of any motion whatever, but as motion
is continuous, we can only fall back upon this as a20 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
solution of the difficulty, viz., that each unit moves
towards its neighbour and then moves back to its
original place. In a sphere of these units there would
be an universal movement to the centre and an uni
versal movement away from the centre, but from all action
being equal and opposite the units would be bound to
return to their original positions.
So far no differentiation is produced.
We have now to consider the question of gravitation in
respect to such a mass. It will be seen that so far we
have merely considered the subject free from gravitation.
On that supposition there is only a movement of an unit
to and from its neighbours. Now, as the outside units
have neighbours only on one side, the movement towards
them is not impeded by any movement in another direc
tion, and this may possibly leave the next layer free to
close in upon the next interior layer of units, and thus
an universal concentric motion take place, to be followed
by an universal retrocession. Now, it may be argued that
the falling to the centre of such a vast mass of particles
creates a pressure upon the centre parts, which causes
some change of motion and some combinations of the
ultimate units. But admitting this, then, since action
and reaction are equal and opposite, everything is re
versed and restored in the backward motion.
How Affected ly G-ravitation.
To get out of this difficulty it seems necessary to
add gravitation or the law by which the attraction of
matter exceeds repulsion. This, it seems to me, is a
necessity of the case, and is the first failure of our
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But if we now add gravitation, according to Newton s
law, to the mass before us, how is our problem affected ?
Then, instead of an unit attracting its neighbour and
repulsing it. we have each unit attracting every other unit
inversely, according to the square of the distance. The
why or how is relegated to the same nescience as the why
and how of the ultimate units and their motions.
Here, then, we have set up a definite movement to a
centre. Action and reaction are not equal and opposite,
and concentration proceeds.
It cannot be supposed that there is no limit to the
process of condensation that would immediately com
mence. But it would be carried to an extreme point.
All the ultimate units would be pressed into closer con
tact and the interspaces obliterated. The pressure into
closer contact would no doubt cause changes of rates and
modes of motion, forming under the immense pressure
structural units (atoms), having special shapes, sizes, and
motions of their own, and perhaps, as we shall hereafter
show, they would be indissoluble that is to say, of a
permanent, indestructible character
; and the motion sup
posed lost in the formation of these atoms might be
added to the motion of other units.
The result of such a process would be the formation of
a sphere of concentric layers from the centre to the cir
cumference of atoms of varying degrees of density and of
different construction. But beyond this stage of hetero
geneity we are unable to advance without the aid of ex
ternal interference. The result that would be arrived at
would be an equilibrium, a sphere or structural whole in
which the matter and motion would have reached such a
state of harmonious relationship, each in its place and
moving in unison, that no further change would ensue.22 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
Each unit and atom would be in harmony with its en
vironment, like a wheel in a watch, with a perpetual
equal motion which was not lost.
In any case, an equilibrium.
That Mr. Spencer looks forward to arriving at such a
state of equilibrium, even from the present heterogeneous
condition of the universe, is evident from chap, xxii.,
&quot; On
Equilibration.&quot; He says, p. 484
:
&quot; In all cases, then, there is a progress towards equilibration.
That universal co-existence of antagonist forces which, as we
before saw, necessitates the universality of rhythm, and which,
as we before saw, necessitates the decomposition of every force
into divergent forces, at the same time necessitates the ultimate
establishment of a balance.&quot;
Page 483.
&quot; And now towards what do all these changes
tend
1
? . . . Does it work towards some ultimate state admitting
no further modification of like kind? . . . Evolution has an
impassable limit?&quot;
Page 513.
&quot; If evolution of every kind is an increase in com
plexity of structure and function that is incidental to the uni
versal process of equilibration, and if equilibration must end in
complete rest, what is the fate towards which all things tend 1
. . . Omnipresent Death ?&quot;
And again, p. 5 1 4
:
&quot;That such a state must be the outcome of the processes
everywhere going on seems beyond doubt. Whether any ulterior
process may reverse these changes and initiate a new life, is a
question to be considered hereafter. For the present it must
suffice that the proximate end of all the transformations we have
traced is a state of quiescence.&quot;
The theory is, that if in a condition of homogeneity,
matter in motion cannot remain in this state of homo
geneity, but must move to its centre, and thereby pro
duce heterogeneity as just described, and that this move
ment must end in a state of equilibrium, or balance of
motions, of which the formula would be a = a.ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 23
In the progress of our studies, then, we have arrived
at a concentric equilibrium of matter in motion, beyond
which we can make no progress, for when we arrive at
the perfect equilibrium a= a, we cannot suppose any
further change than by supposing one a to be more
powerful than another a, which destroys the equation and
denies the equilibrium. We are thus obliged to come to
a stable equilibrium or else to a moving equilibrium of
alternations of concentration and retrocession, beyond
which equilibriums we can make no progress.
Unless, indeed, we import into our scheme the for
mation of some other similar sphere, and put the two
into collision in order to produce that general mixing up
that seething cauldron of chaos out of which the
higher stages of heterogeneity are to be produced. If so,
we thereby deny the ultimate homogeneity from which
we were supposed to start.
In speculations like these the mind is lost; but a
philosophy which is to account for all changes from the
very first is bound to consider them. If it fails, it
should limit its claims to more modest proportions, and
we would consider its merits on the more limited field.
Consideration of Mr. Spencers Argument on the
Instability of the Homogeneous.
But Mr. Spencer justifies his position by abstract
argument. This argument is entitled &quot;Instability of
the Homogeneous.&quot; We endeavoured to describe the
homogeneous, and admitted that if gravitation to a
centre must ensue that we would arrive at a condition of
heterogeneity, but that it would be also a state of
equilibrium. Now Mr. Spencer introduces a distinction
between stable and unstable equilibrium. Stable equili-24 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
brium is one of a lasting character
; unstable equilibrium
is one which a very minute exterior motion will destroy.
Of course it will be seen at once that the difference
between a stable and an unstable equilibrium, according
to Mr. Spencer, is only one of degree. The disturbing
motion must in the one case be great, in the other small.
Now if we can get an unstable equilibrium so delicate
and an exterior motion so minute that we can imagine it
no motion at all, or not to put too fine a point upon it
the very next thing to no motion at all, we realise to
ourselves as near as possible the mainspring of Evolution
the leading idea of the philosophy which here and
there, throughout the long course of ages, only needs
one or two little similar touches to develop out into all
we see. The legerdemain is accomplished so deftly as to
elude the detection of the keenest observer, and we may
even deceive ourselves.
This is the argument (p. 402)
:
&quot;The condition of homogeneity,&quot; says Mr. Spencer,
&quot;is a
condition of unstable equilibrium.
. . . The phrase unstable equi
librium is one used in mechanics to express a balance of forces
of such kind that the interference of any further force, however
minute, will destroy the arrangement previously subsisting; and
bring about a totally different arrangement.
. . . The proposition
is, then, that the state of homogeneity
. . . cannot be maintained&quot;
Illustrations are given in the instances of a pair of
scales not remaining in equilibrium, particles scattered
on the surface of water, and finally,
&quot; Were it possible to bring a mass of water into a perfect state
of homogeneity into a state of perfect quiescence and exactly
equal density throughout, yet the radiation of heat from neigh
bouring bodies, by affecting differently its different parts, would
inevitably produce inequalities of density and consequent currents,
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Page 404. &quot;The instability thus variously illustrated is
obviously consequent on the fact that the several parts of any
homogeneous aggregation are necessarily exposed to different
forces forces that differ either in kind or amount and being
exposed to different forces, they are of necessity differently
modified. The relations of outside and inside, and of compara
tive nearness to neighbouring sources of influence, imply the
reception of influences that are unlike in quantity or quality or
both
; and it follows that unlike changes will be produced in
the parts thus dissimilarly acted upon.&quot;
The argument as to the instability of the homogeneous
is condemned in the very statement of it. It is said to
be a condition of unstable equilibrium, viz., a balance of
forces such that the least external influence will disturb,
but will otherwise remain undisturbed. But since we
are talking of the homogeneous or balance of forces in
itself, and without any external influence, it follows that
the homogeneous or perfectly balanced is in itself stable.
It is only when we have the homogeneous or the equi
librium plus external influence that we get instability.
Further, on the supposition of a state of homogeneity
or perfect equilibrium, it follows from the persistence of
relations amongst forces that they remain in such con
dition. From the persistence of force this must be the
case, otherwise we have force (the disturbing force) arising
out of nothing, and we cannot conceive that it does not
arise except out of some existing or precedent force,
which is the application of Mr. Spencer s &quot;Test of
Truth.&quot;
Mr. Spencer says (p. 405)
:
&quot; No demurrer to the conclusion drawn can be based on the
ground that perfect homogeneity nowhere exists
; since whether
that stage with which we commence be or be not one of perfect
homogeneity, the process must equally be towards a relative
heterogeneity.&quot;26 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
The demurrer can be raised that perfect homogeneity
nowhere exists, and it does not follow from this state
ment, or any of the previous ones, that, given a state of
perfect homogeneity, the process must be towards a state
of relative heterogeneity, for in all the cases instanced
certain conditions are requisite to produce it. The con
ditions are external influences. The initial description of
an unstable equilibrium presupposes an external influ
ence, however small, to disturb it, and all the illustra
tions show that the condition of homogeneousness does
not become heterogeneous of itself, but only as affected by
external influences, and in a definite manner and degree,
according to the specific nature of those influences. So
that the proposition maintained is not the instability of
the homogeneous, but the instability of the homogeneous
under external influences ; and since the homogeneous
nowhere exists, it is rather the instability of the less
heterogeneous under external influences.
Perfect homogeneity without external influences to
disturb it, or a perfect symmetry of external relations,
Mr. Spencer admits himself is not unstable.
Page 407.
&quot;We need not here, however, commit ourselves to
such far-reaching speculations. For the purposes of the general
argument it is needful only to show that any finite mass of
diffused matter, even though vast enough to form our whole
sidereal system, could not be in stable equilibrium; that in
default of absolute sphericity, absolute uniformity of composition,
and absolute symmetry of relation to all forces external to it, its
concentration must go on with an ever-increasing irregularity,
and that thus the present aspect of the heavens is not, so far as
we can judge, incongruous with the hypothesis of a general evolu
tion consequent on the instability of the homogeneous.&quot;
The fallaciousness of this reasoning is obvious. The
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in which case it is admitted that heterogeneity would not
ensue. The only cases where heterogeneity ensues upon
the homogeneous is where external influences produce it,
as explained before. Yet the conclusion of the quotation
speaks of an evolution consequent upon the instability of
the homogeneous, as if it was an active principle apart
from external influences.
The purport of this argument is obvious. The author,
in the establishment of a philosophy which has to ex
plain everything that can have a potential history, is bound
to start with a state of things completely undifferen-
tiated, for every differentiation implies a history. The
undifferentiated is a state of homogeneity. But if the
homogeneous is unstable, we get a start towards hetero
geneity, and out of that we can make progress. A country
friend of mine describes Evolution as &quot;a lump with a
start in it.&quot; This is the start.
We have now to take up a postponed consideration,
and assume, to start with, the least departure from a state
of homogeneity, namely, a difference in the shape of the
mass.
Page 406.
&quot; If the matter of which stars and all other celestial
bodies consist be assumed to have originally existed in a diffused
form throughout a space far more vast even than that which our
sidereal system now occupies, the instability of the homogeneous
would negative its continuance in that state. ... In matter of
such extreme tenuity and feeble cohesion there would be motion
towards local centres of gravity, as well as towards the general
centre of gravity.
. . . Heterogeneities thus set up would tend
ever to become more pronounced. Established mechanical
principles would justify him in the conclusion that the motions
of these irregular masses of slightly aggregated nebular matter
towards their common centre of gravity must be severally ren
dered curvilinear by the resistance of the medium from which they
were precipitated ; and that in consequence of the irregularities28 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
of distribution already set up, such conflicting curvilinear motions
must, by composition of forces, end in a rotation of the incipient
sidereal system.&quot;
It will be at once noted in this statement of Mr.
Spencer s that he assumes a nebula moving in a medium.
It follows that the state of homogeneity about which Mr.
Spencer is arguing is not a state of homogeneity at all,
since there is already a differentiation between the nebula
and the medium, which differentiation is not accounted
for, and his whole argument is vitiated.
It is also to be noted that he does not state whether
this nebula is composed of ultimate similar units, and if
so, how they get differentiated.
But from the course of the argument, it would appear
that this differentiation had already taken place. The ne
bulae that Mr. Spencer speaks of seem to be composed of the
seventy or eighty so-called elements in a vaporous con
dition
; or at any rate, of units already so differentiated as
to fall naturally into these forms. But if Evolution fails
to account for this differentiation, either of the so-called
elements or of the differentiated units of which they are
composed, then both differentiations implying a previous
history, Evolution is convicted of inadequacy, accord
ing to Mr. Spencer s own test of the adequacy of a philo
sophy.
It may, however, be replied that Evolution does not
claim to supply all knowledge, but only formularises all
that is known, and claims a probability of the applica
bility of the formula to what is not yet known. If so, let
it be so stated. Then we shall know that Evolution does
not claim to be a complete theory of the universe, and if
we find it correct to a certain extent, we accept it as so
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It is very evident that Mr. Spencer s theory of Evolu
tion only starts from the supposition of an -unlimited
scattered group of nebulae, these nebulae consisting of
the seventy or eighty so-called elements in a gaseous con
dition, and moving through a medium the whole ante
rior history of which is wholly unaccounted for, and that
it so far fails, on the face of it, as a complete philosophy.
The Formula applied to Primary Evolution.
Now how far does Evolution, so far as we have gone,
answer to the test of a philosophy stated by Mr. Spen
cer ? Does it explain and account for the passage of
the imperceptible into the perceptible, and the percep
tible into the imperceptible ? I do not say that in
the increase of knowledge at some future time it will
not do so; it would be presumptuous to limit future
attainments of thought. But I mean to say that at
the present time it has not done so, and the attempt
to do so, as will be seen, is not only so speculative as to
be futile, but also lands us in difficulties that seem in
capable of solution, even under the license of speculation.
Therefore we conclude the inadequacy of the theory of
Evolution to account for the history of matter in motion
anterior to the state of differentiated nebulae, moving
through ether, and constituted of differentiated matter
(presumably the seventy or eighty so-called elements) in
a gaseous condition.
Evolution, therefore, fails to account for the first stage
of progress fails to show how an ultimate unit can part
with motion
; that it fails to account for the law of gravi
tation to a centre
; that, even if it accounts for the for
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permanency on the variation of their cause, viz., pres
sure ; and that it does not account for the existence
and distribution of the nebulae formed of mixed ele
ments.
And, as a matter of fact, although Mr. Spencer does
sometimes speculate upon the original condition of things
and the primordial evolutionary process, he practically
starts with the nebula, in itself a highly complex body,
composed of differentiated matter, that is to say, the
seventy or eighty so-called elements in a gaseous con
dition. But in so far as this complex state of the
heavens and this differentiated state of matter is not
accounted for except in a very speculative manner
indeed, we must say that Evolution falls short of being a
perfect philosophy.
Inquiry concerning the Origin of Organism on the Basis of
the Formula of Evolution.
We now come to another stage, in which it seems to me
that Evolution is not merely inadequate from possible
lack of the materials of knowledge, which inadequacy
might at some future time be made good, but in which
we seom to meet with facts utterly irreconcilable with
the theory of combinations of matter in motion as
accounting for all phenomena. I refer to the commence
ment of life, to the constitution of protoplasm, to the
formation of living organism.
We cannot have much difficulty in understanding the
process of crystallisation as combinations of matter in
motion. If the combinations of ultimate units result in
definite grouping, with definite shape, as well as rate and
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medium, which is never in a state of perfect rest, the
imperceptible motions would bring the molecules or
atoms into contact, and their harmonies of movement
would induce aggregations into masses, the form of these
masses being derived from the shape of the group of
ultimate units forming the atom or molecule out of
which the mass is built up.
But when we study the phenomena of life and its
processes, even in the very simplest organism, we feel
that we come upon a totally different field of activity.
We cannot understand how any combination or recom
binations of matter in motion can produce consciousness.
If consciousness can be explained geometrically and
arithmetically that is to say, as due to certain com
binations of shapes and certain rates and directions of
motions then we could accept the formula of Evolution
as an explanation. But we cannot do so, and, as I indi
cated before, this failure seems to me not an inadequacy
that can be supplied, but to be for all time utterly
beyond the reach of such an explanation. The case is
not parallel with crystallisation. In that case we can
understand that such an explanation is possible, but
in the case of life and organisms it seems impossible.
There appears to be no relation between the terms of a
proposition that should unite consciousness and matter in
motion, so that by the production of the one in certain
shapes and rates of motion the other would be produced.
I do not think I need enlarge upon this topic
: all I
need point out is that the failure of the formula of
Evolution to account for consciousness does not affect in
dependent theories of development, does not affect theories
of interaction of organism and environment, does not
affect theories of moral, intellectual, and social develop-32 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
ment, does not affect the law of the uniformity of
sequence, as holding good throughout them.
I cannot think that the facts of life and organism
are explainable by the formula of Evolution. This
may or may not be a separate investigation from that
concerning consciousness. By some it is held to be so,
but to me the organic combination of two molecules into
such a connection that the definitions of life are appli
cable to them, involves in each of them some fact of
feeling. And, therefore, some fact of feeling would seem
to precede life and organisation. But if feeling be the
result of the combination of two or more molecules, and
the organisation precedes feeling, even then we find that
in all the stages beyond this initial step feeling is the
principal factor inducing further changes, and is the active
factor principally taken into account, and the essential
element of all definitions of life. So that we may say
Without feeling no complex organism no life not even
a simple organism. Is feeling the result of mechanical
structure, or does it precede and form an essential factor
in organic structure ?
It would appear to me that the phenomena of life,
including nourishment, growth, decay, reproduction, adap
tation, heredity, consciousness, memory, emotion, reflec
tion, and will, however much they may conform to the
general modes or characteristics of material evolution
(which is not denied), cannot be accounted for as to
origin in any combinations of matter in motion, and can
not be expressed in terms of geometry and arithmetic, as
all combinations of matter in motion are capable of being
expressed ; and since the formula of Evolution recognises
only combinations and recombinations of matter in motion,
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organism as just enumerated, and is therefore inadequate
as a philosophy which professes to account for the whole
history of things.
Mr. Spencer on the Origination of Organism and
Consciousness.
But we will proceed to a consideration of Mr. Spen
cer s own statement of the theory of the origin of living
organisms. The best statement we find on the subject is
in his letter to the editor of the
&quot; North American Keview,&quot;
at the end of
&quot;
Biology/ vol. i., when, after criticism point
ing out various defects of statement, he undertakes to
explain the hypothesis in such a manner that it cannot
be misunderstood. In justice to its importance, I print a
considerable portion of this letter in extenso. In order to
escape any charge of an inadequate representation of Mr.
Spencer s views, I print more than is necessary for my
purpose ; to print it all would unnecessarily encumber
the argument. Size is a great deterrent to effective
criticism, and the size of Mr. Spencer s arguments, as a
rule, are greatly obstructive of their comprehensibility
and criticism, though it makes them imposing to an
impressible mind.
&quot; From what I do not believe, let me now pass to what I do
believe. Granting that the formation of organic matter, and
the evolution of life in its lowest forms, may go on under
existing cosmical conditions ; but believing it more likely that
the formation of such matter and such forms took place at a
time when the heat of the earth s surface was falling through
those ranges of temperature at which the higher organic com
pounds are unstable ; I conceive that the moulding of such
organic matter into the simplest types must have commenced
with portions of protoplasm more minute, more indefinite, and34 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
more inconstant in their characters, than the lowest Ehizopods
less distinguishable from a mere fragment of albumen than
even the Protogenes of Professor HaeckeL The evolution of
specific shapes must, like all other organic evolution, have
resulted from the actions and reactions between such incipient
types and their environments, and the continued survival of
those which happened to have specialities best fitted to the
specialities of their environments. To reach by this process
the comparatively well-specialised forms of ordinary Infusoria,
must, I conceive, have taken an enormous period of time.
&quot; To prevent, as far as may be, future misapprehension, let me
elaborate this conception so as to meet the particular objections
raised. The reviewer takes for granted that a first organism
must be assumed by me, as it is by himself. But the concep
tion of a first organism, in anything like the current sense of
the words, is wholly at variance with conception of Evolution,
and scarcely less at variance with the facts revealed by the
microscope. The lowest living things are not, properly speak
ing, organisms at all : for they have no distinctions of parts no
traces of organisation. It is almost a misuse of language to call
them forms of life : not only are their outlines, when dis
tinguishable, too unspecific for description, but they change from
moment to moment, and are never twice alike, either in two
individuals or in the same individual Even the word type
is applicable in but a loose way ; for there is little constancy in
their generic characters : according as the surrounding conditions
determine, they undergo transformations, now of one kind and
now of another. And the vagueness, the inconstancy, the want
of appreciable structure, displayed by the simplest of living
things as we now see them, are characters (or absences of
characters) which, on the hypothesis of Evolution, must have
been still more decided when, as at first, no forms, no
&amp;lt;
types,
no specific shapes, had been moulded. That
* absolute com
mencement of organic life on the globe, which the reviewer
says I cannot evade the admission of, I distinctly deny. The
affirmation of universal evolution is in itself the negation of an
4 absolute commencement of anything. Construed in terms of
Evolution, every kind of being is conceived as a product of
modifications wrought by insensible gradations on a pre-exist
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commencement of organic life as of all subsequent develop
ments of organic life. It is no more needful to suppose an
* absolute commencement of organic life or a first organism,
than it is needful to suppose an absolute commencement of
social life and a first social organism. The assumption of such
a necessity in this last case, made by early speculators with their
theories of
l social contracts and the like, is disproved by the
facts ; and the facts, so far as they are ascertained, disprove the
assumption of such a necessity in the first case.&quot; Principles of
Biology, vol. i. p. 481 et seq.
The problems to be studied are thus indicated, viz.,
&quot;the formation of organic
matter&quot; and &quot;the evolution of
life in its lowest forms.&quot;
We shall give our attention first to the formation of
organic matter, and for the time being pass our inter
mediate text until we arrive at this portion of it :
&quot; That organic matter was not produced all at once, but was
reached through steps, we are well warranted in believing by the
experiences of chemists. Organic matters are produced in the
laboratory by what we may literally call artificial evolution.
Chemists find themselves unable to form these complex com
binations directly from their elements, but they succeed in
forming them indirectly by successive modifications of simpler
combinations. In some binary compound, one element of which
is present in several equivalents, a change is made by substitut
ing for one of these equivalents an equivalent of some other
element, so producing a ternary compound. Then another of
the equivalents is replaced, and so on. For instance, beginning
with ammonia, NH 3 , a higher form is obtained by replacing
one of the atoms of hydrogen by an atom of methyl, so producing
methyl-amine, JST(CH 3H 2 ); and then, under the further action
of methyl, ending in a further substitution, there is reached the
still more compound substance dimethyl-amine, N(CH 3)(CH 3 )II.
And in this manner highly complex substances are eventually
built up. Another characteristic of their method is no less sig
nificant. Two complex compounds are employed to generate, by
their action upon one another, a compound of still greater com
plexity ; different heterogeneous molecules of one stage become36 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
parents of a molecule a stage higher in heterogeneity. Thus,
having built up acetic acid out of its elements, and having, by
the process of substitution described above, changed the acetic
acid into propionic acid, and propionic into butyric, of which the
( rYPTT WPTT ITT )
formula is &amp;lt;
QQ/JJO) I
&amp;gt;^s comP^ex compound, by ope
rating on another complex compound, such as the dimethl-amine




} N(CH 3)(CH 3 )H.&quot;
Now, let us examine this statement in detail. We are
to presume that it is an illustration of the process of the
formation of organic molecules from inorganic molecules.
In this case we start with ammonia, which is composed
of one atom of nitrogen and three of hydrogen. The atom
of nitrogen is composed of ultimate units of definite shapes
and sizes and motions, making up a complex indivisible
whole, having definite shape, size, and motions. These
are such that on coming into contact with atoms of
hydrogen, also complex atoms, and having definite shapes,
sizes, and motions, those shapes, sizes, and motions of the
nitrogen atom and the three hydrogen atoms are so har
monious that like, say, cog-wheels in a watch, they catch
and form a more complex molecule, having also a definite
shape, size, and set of motions. If we could see them, we
could delineate them on paper, and describe and count
their motions. Then we proceed to replace one of the
atoms of hydrogen by an atom of methyl, and produce
a much more complicated system of shapes, sizes, and
motions, which also could be geometrically and mathe
matically described. By the further action of acetic acid
a still more compound molecule is obtained, and in this
manner highly complex substances are built up.
Again, two complex substances are employed
&quot;
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rate&quot; and different heterogeneous molecules of one stage
&quot; become parents of.&quot; These phrases are used to describe
the production of a more complex compound from two
complex compounds, which is simply an extension of the
process already described, and, to whatever extent carried,
simply means a molecule compounded of a great number
of atoms having great varieties of shape and size and great
varieties of motion, but all of such forms and such modes
and rates that they are capable of an arrangement into a
system like the divers shapes and movements of the mem
bers of a solar system, and all of which, could we see them,
could be described geometrically and arithmetically.
&quot;Now this is called by Mr. Spencer an
&quot;
organic mole
cule;&quot; the action of one complex molecule upon another
is called
&quot; to generate,&quot; and the result
&quot;parentage.&quot; It
is only a question of the meaning of words. I did not
know before that organic and complex were identical in
meaning. I did not know that the mechanical change by
which one large wheel put into gear with a lot of small
ones with the resultant distribution of motion was an act
of generation, nor that the addition of 2 plus 2 was a
parentage of 4.
One would like to ask, before going any further, what is
the distinction between a complex molecule and an organic
molecule ? Mr. Spencer begins by calling certain mole
cules complex, and ends by calling the still more complex
molecules organic. Is there anything in the latter that
is not in the former ? Is there more in the latter than a
system of shapes, sizes, and relations of motion ? I pre
sume not, for how can there be ? What is it, and how
came it there ? 2 x 2 = 4, and 4 x 1 6 = 64 ; but the
latter, though more complex, is of the same construction
as the former. So Z\ and Q make Q and &amp;lt;|Tf&amp;gt;,38 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
yet the latter, though more complex than the former, is
constituted of the same factors.
I am told that the meaning of the distinction between
inorganic and organic molecules is that the latter are
animal or vegetable products. If so, there could be no
such products before animals and vegetables existed ; and
life must have come out of complex molecules and not
organic ones, in this sense.
I am also told that the distinction is one merely of
convenience, and is altogether an arbitrary one. In this





cally accurate, and as having no misleading connotations.
We now quote from Mr. Spencer a kind of litany of
Evolution.
&quot;
See, then, the remarkable parallelism. The progress to
wards higher types of organic molecules is effected by modifica
tions upon modifications ; as throughout Evolution in general.
Each of these modifications is a change of the molecule into
equilibrium with its environment an adaptation, as it were, to
new surrounding conditions to which, it is subjected; as through
out Evolution in general. Larger, or more integrated, aggregates
(for compound molecules are such) are successively generated
;
as throughout Evolution in general. More complex or hetero
geneous aggregates are so made to arise, one out of another ; as
throughout Evolution in general A geometrically-increasing
multitude of these larger and more complex aggregates so pro
duced at the same time results; as throughout Evolution in
general. And it is by the action of the successively higher
forms on one another, joined with the action of environing con
ditions, that the highest forms are reached ; as throughout
Evolution in general.&quot;
Bearing in mind that we have arrived only at complex
molecules, we find in the above quotation the introduc
tion of terms drawn from the changes of life and
organism.
&quot;
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The words used do not grow naturally out of the
mechanical factors we have been considering, but, like a
dissolving view in a magic-lantern, we trace the first
appearances of an utterly disconnected picture.
First we have
&quot; the progress towards higher types of
organic molecules.&quot; This must mean the progress to-
O




being both ambiguous and superfluous, and is drawn from
biological science. Next,
&quot;
is effected by modifications
upon modifications.&quot; Now we have found that the kind
of modification which a molecule undergoes, if such it
can be called, is the addition to, subtraction from, or
substitution of, atoms of such shapes, sizes, and rates and
modes of motion as fit them to form part of the mechani
cal system of the molecule, or to be withdrawn from it
without destroying the combination of the rest, in much
the same way that we see conjurors add article upon
article to a moving equilibrium at the end of a stick, if we
could suppose the motion to be in the articles themselves
instead of imparted to them by the arm of the performer.
It does not seem quite correct to call this recombination
and reconstruction, or the reverse process a modification
of the molecule, as it is the substitution of an indefinite
and ambiguous word for one of a definite meaning.
&quot;Each of these modifications (i.e., recombinations or
reconstructions) is a change of the molecule into equili
brium with its environment.&quot; Let us examine what
this means. If we suppose chemical combinations to be
mechanical, they will be due to harmonies of shape, size,
and movement. So if we suppose an atom of suitable
size and shape for combination with another atom, as, for
instance, A, itself composite, and another, Q], they
will combine thus,
&amp;lt;ODt&amp;gt;&amp;gt; and if tlie rates of attrac
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tive and repulsive motion are the same, the combination
is stable, as, for instance, if the rate of movement is 2
and 2 to the unit of time, or one 2 and the other 4,
or one 3 and the other 4, and in proportion to the
greater number of synchronometric beats (or rotations) so
the stability of the complex molecule. Now, if a quantity
of complex molecules be put into a liquid medium con
taining other complex molecules, either the molecules
will agree or disagree in their shapes, sizes, or rates of
motions. If they agree, then they form compounds, i.e.,
more complex molecules in certain definite proportions.
If they do not agree, then they tear each other to pieces
and form new combinations with atoms of suitable shapes
and sizes and synchronometric motions. This is all that
can be meant by the change of a molecule into equi
librium with its environment.
It does not invalidate my criticism that my illustrations
are not drawn from actual facts. I am arguing from Mr.
Spencer s premises, which, starting from matter in motion,
only admit of changes and recombinations of matter in
motion, by which I am necessarily obliged to translate all
his terms of generation, parentage, adaptation, environ
ment, &c., into a mechanical representation.
&quot; An adaptation, as it were, to new surrounding condi
tions to which it is subjected.&quot;
The phrase
&quot;as it were&quot; is not admissible into philo
sophical writing, indicating merely a possible likeness or
an indefinite one a term of uncertainty and ambiguity.
A likeness or illustration in philosophy should be care
fully considered and sparingly used, to the elucidation and
not to the confusion of a subject ; as, for instance, in the
illustration of the construction of a complex molecule from
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were&quot; refers to the word adaptation, and I do not think
it is correct. It is difficult to make out the meaning of
it in terms of matter in motion. In walking, I adapt my
pace to that of my companion. I adapt the size of my
cork to the size of the neck of my bottle. But I do not
see that when heterogeneous complex molecules come into
contact in a liquid medium that they adapt themselves
otherwise than by recombinations or reconstructions, as
above described viz., in accordance with harmonies of
size, shape, and modes and rates of motion. If they alter
themselves otherwise, it is equivalent to saying that they
alter their shapes or modes and rates of motion in order
to acquire such as will enable them to enter into com
bination with molecules in their environment ; that a
molecule OOO will change itself to cy to oblige go, and
thus form eg, and change its relative motion of 5 in
unit of time to 4 in order to harmonise better with 8 in
unit of time.
Adaptation of molecules would seem to imply that gold
in a jar of oxygen would change itself into hydrogen, in





is not used in the science of chemis
try, so far as I have been able to ascertain.
&quot;
Larger or more integrated aggregates (for compound




here only means formed or constructed.
&quot;More complex or heterogeneous aggregates are so





is made synonymous with
heterogeneous. A complex aggregate is a correct descrip
tion of a complex molecule, which is a system of shapes,
sizes, and motions in definite relations ; but an aggregate
made up of similar complex molecules would not be42 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
called heterogeneous. There is also an ambiguity in the
phrase,
&quot; made to arise one out of another.&quot; They do not
seem words that can be adapted to express the relations
and sequences of matter in motion. If I have two com
plex molecules, and if, by placing them in contact, a re
combination ensues, and I have one, two, three, or four
molecules instead, I know that I have the same number
of definite specific atoms with which I started
; and if I
say that I made them
&quot; arise one out of another,&quot; all I
mean is that they are combined in a different manner.
&quot; A geometrically-increasing multitude of these larger
and more complex aggregates so produced at the same
time results. And it is by the action of successively higher
forms on one another, joined with the action of environing
conditions, that the highest forms are reached.&quot;
&quot;Highest forms&quot; means more complex molecules, and
their action on one another means that their coming into
contact results in the formation of still more complex
molecules not always, but when the shapes, sizes, and
motions are harmonious.
&quot; Joined with the action of
environing conditions,&quot; must mean, not the environment
of suitable molecules, for that has just been discussed,
but the conditions of etherial motions, such as heat, light,
&c., and of a medium of suitable condition, such as water.
But both etherial motions and the medium are all ad
mitted to be nothing more than matter in motion.
&quot; When we thus see the identity of method at the two ex
tremes when we see that the general laws of Evolution, as they
are exemplified in known organisms, have been unconsciously
conformed to by chemists in the artificial evolution of organic
matter
; we can scarcely doubt that these laws were conformed
to in the natural evolution of organic matter, and afterwards in
the evolution of the simplest organic forms. In the early world,
as in the modern laboratory, inferior types of organic substances,ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 43
by their mutual actions under fit conditions, evolved the superior
types of organic substances, ending in organisable protoplasm.
And it can hardly be doubted that the shaping of organisable
protoplasm, which is a substance modifiable in multitudinous
ways with extreme facility, went on after the same manner. As
I learn from one of our first chemists, Prof. Frankland, protein
is capable of existing under probably at least a thousand isomeric
forms ; and, as we shall presently see, it is capable of forming,
with itself and other elements, substances yet more intricate in
composition, that are practically infinite in their varieties of kind.
Exposed to those innumerable modifications of conditions which
the earth s surface afforded, here in amount of light, there in
amount of heat, and elsewhere in the mineral quality of its
aqueous medium, this extremely changeable substance must have
undergone, now one, now another, of its countless metamor
phoses. And to the mutual influences of its metamorphic forms
under favouring conditions we may ascribe the production of
the still more composite, still more sensitive, still more variously
changeable portions of organic matter, which, in masses more
minute and simpler than existing Protozoa, displayed actions
verging little by little into those called vital actions which
protein itself exhibits in a certain degree, and which the lowest
known living things exhibit only in a greater degree. Thus,
setting out with inductions from the experiences of organic
chemists at the one extreme, and with inductions from the
observations of biologists at the other extreme, we are enabled
deductively to bridge the interval are enabled to conceive how
organic compounds were evolved, and how, by a continuance of
the process, the nascent life displayed in these became gradually
more pronounced. And this it is which has to be
^ explained,
and which the alleged cases of spontaneous generation would
not, were they substantiated, help us in the least to explain.&quot;
What is the purport of this argument? We have
so far seen that the process of the chemist in the produc
tion of complex molecules is the same as the natural
process, and it is difficult indeed to suppose that any one
would think otherwise, since the chemist only manipu
lates the matters and motions which he deals with. He44 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
does not and cannot alter them. He merely places them
in contact, and the mechanical sequences result. Mr.
Spencer, however, would draw some further conclusion.
Let us try to follow it out.
&quot; When we thus see the identity of method at the two ex
tremes, when we see that the general laws of Evolution, as they
are exemplified in known organisms, have been unconsciously
conformed to by chemists in the artificial evolution of organic
matter.&quot;
The first question that arises is respecting the impor
tation into the study of a new term,
&quot;
organism.&quot; Is this
identical with the term
&quot;
organic molecule,&quot; and therefore
Vrith the term &quot;complex molecule&quot;? We are induced
to think so from the employment of the word
&quot;thus,&quot;
which evidently connects the paragraph with the preced
ing one, and still more when we see that the process of
the evolution of an organism is likened to the
&quot;
artificial
evolution of organic matter
&quot;
by chemists.
&quot; We can scarcely doubt that these laws were conformed to
in the natural evolution of organic matter, and afterwards in the
evolution of the simplest organic forms.&quot;





matter, is identical with the
r.rtificial production by the chemist
; but what about the
evolution of the simple organic forms ? It is to be pre
sumed that
&quot;organic&quot; still means complex. The change of
the adjective having been satisfactorily effected, and, by re
petition, pretty well established in our minds, we are now,







can only remark, that so far we have made no progress,
whether in the world of nature or in the laboratory,
beyond complex molecules, which are mechanical arrange-ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 45




&quot; be defined as a combina
tion of organic molecules, and these organic molecules are
merely highly complex molecules
; and if, again, these
highly complex molecules are composed of less complex
molecules, then a highly complex molecule is by this
definition an organism itself. Tor what is the distinction
between a highly complex molecule and an organism
?
They are both aggregates of the less complex.
&quot;In the early world, as in the modern laboratory, inferior
types of organic substances, by their mutual actions under fit
conditions, evolved the superior types of organic substances,
ending in organisable protoplasm.&quot;
Here we remark the loose employment of several
words.
&quot;
Types,&quot; for instance, employed in relation to
complex molecules, can only relate to the degree of com
plexity which might, for our convenience, and for that
only, be so classified according to the number of atoms
or kinds of atoms composed in a molecule. The &quot;organic
substances,&quot; of course, only means complex molecules, and
the whole sentence is simply a repetition in vague and
more advanced language of what we have had before,
until we come to the phrase
&quot;
ending in organisable pro
toplasm.&quot; If this means that nothing was organisable
before the evolution of protoplasm, we are justified in our




hitherto; or if the appli
cation is the same now as heretofore, it simply means
protoplasm capable of being an item in a more complex
arrangement, which is the case with other complex
molecules.
&quot;
Organisable protoplasm.&quot; If w.e could only here
have a description of what was meant by this term,
and how it the organisable protoplasm was arrived46 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
at, we would feel safe in going further. Follow
ing up the train of thought carefully, we have got as
far as a complex molecule, vast varieties of them,
in fact, and we find them capable of forming crys
talloid and colloid masses, the particular form being due,
no doubt, to the form and composition of the mole
cules themselves, or the mould or medium in which they
happen to be placed. Yet we hesitate on this account to





seem to be capable of expression in terms of matter in
motion. Is the atom forming part of the mechanical
structure of a molecule organised or organisable ? It is
an essential part of a moving system, without which that
system could not be what it is. And in this view it is
to be considered more essentially a part of an organic
whole, and therefore more organic than the molecule
which forms part of a crystal or of a colloidal mass.
But the fact is, that the newly introduced word organisable





? We know what it is, or rather
what its properties are, viewed from this side of creation,
or present constitution of the cosmos
; we want to get at
it from the other side.
If we try to advance to it from the inorganic, we
simply end in a highly complex chemical formula, and
all chemical formulas are expressions of combinations oi
shapes, sizes, and modes and rates of motions. Has this
chemical protoplasm any other properties
? If so, whence
came they
?
Is protoplasm the chemical formula by which it is to
be expressed, or is it something more ? We know it is,
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It is a molecule having special shapes, sizes, and motions,
being the resultant of the shapes, sizes, and motions of
its constituent atoms. If it is organisable that is to
say, if it forms part of a larger group, without which that
group would not be a coherent group, as it itself would
not be with the loss of one of its constituent atoms it
is only the same as the molecule constituent of a crystal.
So far have we got with the meaning of the term organ
isable.
&quot; And it can hardly be doubted that the shaping of organisable
protoplasm, which is a substance modifiable in multitudinous
ways with extreme facility, went on after the same manner.&quot;
We have next to consider the shaping of organisable
protoplasm.
Are we to understand that the shaping of organisable
protoplasm is the shaping of the molecules or the shaping of
masses ofmolecules ? As regards the shaping of the mole
cules, we might, perhaps, admit the possibility of a highly
complex molecule of loose composition, which might
retain such relations of external motion as to retain its
molecular characteristics, yet be somewhat susceptible to
change of shape from external conditions. Yet it is a
very doubtful hypothesis.
As regards the shaping of masses of protoplasm, still
regarding it not as we know it, but only as a molecule
of factors of shapes, sizes, and motions, we presume the
mass could be shaped by external conditions in just the
same way that a mass of putty could be shaped. Let us
consider the matter in detail.
In the same manner as what ? If the shaping of
organisable protoplasm means the shaping of the mole
cules of protoplasm, we have to consider the theory of
the plasticity of molecules. Are atoms plastic ? What48 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
is the meaning of
&quot;plastic,&quot; applied to molecules and
atoms ? &quot;We only know the plasticity of masses. Plas
ticity is of two kinds that which is capable of alteration
of shape and retains the shape given, and that which
returns to its original shape ; the latter is more properly
termed elastic, although the latter has another meaning
in respect to compressibility and the return to the original
bulk. We can conceive of an atom composed of ultimate
units of a spherical, spheroidal, or other shape, without
angles, but of definite motions and sizes, like a miniature
solar system, which, in contact with other atoms, or
impact of other atoms, or moved by etherial currents
without disintegration of parts, should yet have the rela
tions of distance of these parts slightly changed without
change in the resultant size or specific motions of the
atom. There would, however, be a slight change of shape,
according to the nature of the action of the motions
affecting it. Again, it is conceivable that molecules
made up of atoms destitute of angles might in the same
way change shape and yet preserve those definite relations
of size and motions which constitute it a specific molecule.
And again, in any colloidal mass composed of these par
ticles there might be plasticity and elasticity. And it
seems reasonable to suppose that all these relations of
matter in motion, which are obvious to us in sensible
masses, should be attributed to the smallest aggregates of
atoms, or if not to these since they may be regarded as
indivisible and unchangeable complex units at any rate
to molecules which admit of etherial motions permeating
their constituents, rendering them subject to change and
divisibility. Yet it is not unreasonable to suppose either
that aggregates, such as molecules, and the more so
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to different modes of influence to the indivisible units,
such as atoms. So granted that molecules, and more
especially highly complex molecules, more loosely bound
together than others, may be susceptible to change of
shape slightly, and while retaining their specific con
stituents and motions, we may admit the plasticity of
some molecules. From similar methods we have the
plasticity of masses. The influence of heat, which means
the increased length of the beat of the molecule or of the
contained ether, implies the further separation of mole
cules, and favourably influences the conditions of plasticity
of masses, and in like manner may favourably influence
the plasticity of the molecule. Then if the molecule and
any aggregate of molecules be plastic, their shapes will
continually be changing within certain limits, due to the
range of the atomic motions, according to the motions of
surrounding molecules, or currents of molecular or etherial
motion, with which they may be in relation. It is per
haps, also, conceivable, since plasticity is affected by
heat or etherial vibrations, that on the cessation of this
heat the molecule should retain the shape it possessed
under the external influences, as before described, at the
moment of the cessation of the heat which rendered it
plastic, and this would enable us to admit the moulding
and shaping which Mr. Spencer speaks of; but these
acquired shapes would not be permanent, like the shape
of an atom or of a crystalloidal molecule, but, under the
conditions of increased heat, would resume their original
character of plasticity.
But the result, so far, has not carried us beyond com
plex molecules, and we are still far from understanding o
organisable molecules, otherwise than as capable of form
ing items of colloidal or crystalloid masses.
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We have next to consider the combination of these
plastic complex molecules with each other, with other
plastic complex molecules, and with non-plastic complex
molecules, whether colloidal or crystalloidal. But this is
best done in the criticism of the next succeeding section.
In the meantime, passing over several sentences, the
criticism of which would be merely a repetition of what
we have already said, we come to one which demands
attention from the introduction of new terms, which
might suggest the acquirement by matter in motion of
qualities that cannot be described in terms of matter in
motion, and therefore impairs the accuracy of our reason
ings. I refer to the passage,
&quot; The production of the still
more composite, still more sensitive, still more variously
changeable portions of organic (i.e., complex) matter, which
. . . displayed actions verging, little by little, into those
called vital actions which protein itself exhibits in a
certain degree, and which the lowest known living things
exhibit only in a greater degree.&quot;
I call attention here, in the first place, to highly complex
molecules being more sensitive. I presume
&quot;sensitive&quot; can
not mean consciousness, but molecules more easily decom
posable on account of the heterogeneity of their composi
tion, exposing them to the action of a greater number of
other molecules, simple or complex, with which they may
come into contact
; or the decompositions effected by the
general actions of etherial motions, or the diverse actions
thereof in respect to the different constituent atoms. In
the second portion of the quotation we find a reference to
vital actions, which also is a new term which I cannot
render into terms of matter in motion, and the considera
tion of which, together with the term
&quot;
living,&quot; will come
in with the criticism of the next section. We note here775&quot; INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 51
only, en passant, that the difference intended to be indi
cated is one of degree only that is to say, increased
complexity of measurable rates and sizes and shapes, and
consequent increased instability when subject to the in
fluence of even slightly inharmonious motions.
&quot; Thus setting out with the experience of organic
chemists at the one extreme, and the inductions from the
observations of biologists at the other extreme, we are
enabled deductively to bridge the interval are enabled to
see how organic compounds are evolved, and how, by a
continuance of the process, the nascent life displayed in
these became gradually more pronounced.&quot;
It is true that we did see how complex (called organic)
compounds are evolved, but we did not perceive that they
displayed any life even nascent life whatever that
means
; nor did we see that this life became more
&quot;
pro
nounced,&quot; whatever that is. We failed altogether to get
beyond a complex molecule. Even if we got as far as
chemical formulas representing protoplasm, they were but
mechanical formulas
; the protoplasm had no characteristics
beyond matter and motion, and had no biological value.
We now take up the second problem, viz., &quot;the evolu
tion of life in its lowest forms,&quot; which we may sufficiently
discuss by means of a consideration of the passages com
mencing with the section at the top of page 486.
&quot; Much evidence now conspires to show that molecules of the
substances we call elementary are in reality compound; and
that, by the combination of these with one another, and recom
binations of the products, there are formed systems of systems
of molecules, unimaginable in their complexity. Step by step
as the aggregate molecules so resulting grow larger and increase
in heterogeneity, they become more unstable, more readily trans
formable by small forces, more capable of assuming various
characters. Those composing organic matter transcend all others52 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
in size and intricacy of structure ; and in them these resulting
traits reach their extreme. As implied by its name, protein, the
essential substance of which organisms are built, is remarkable
alike for the variety of its metamorphoses and the facility with
which it undergoes them : it changes from one to another of its
thousand isomeric forms on the slightest change of conditions.
]N&quot;ow, there are facts warranting the belief that though these
multitudinous isomeric forms of protein will not unite directly
with one another, yet they admit of being linked together by
other elements with which they combine. And it is very signi
ficant that there are habitually present two other elements,
sulphur and phosphorus, which have quite special powers of
holding together many equivalents the one being pentatomic
and the other hexatomic. So that it is a legitimate supposition
(justified by analogies) that an atom of sulphur may be a bond
of union among half-a-dozen different isomeric forms of protein ;
and similarly with phosphorus. A moment s thought will show
that, setting out with the thousand isomeric forms of protein,
this makes possible a number of these combinations almost
passing the power of figures to express. Molecules so produced,
perhaps exceeding in size and complexity those of protein as
those of protein exceed those of inorganic matter, may, I con
ceive, be the special units belonging to special kinds of organisms.
By their constitution they must have a plasticity, or sensitive
ness to modifying forces, far beyond that of protein ; and bear
ing in mind not only that their varieties are practically infinite
in number, but that closely allied forms of them, chemically
indifferent to one another as they must be, may coexist in the
same aggregate, we shall see that they are fitted for entering
into unlimited varieties of organic structures.&quot;
&quot; Much evidence now conspires to show that molecules
of the substances that we call elementary are in reality
compound; and that, by the combinations of these with
one another, and the recombinations of the products,
there are formed systems of systems of molecules, unima
ginable in their complexity. Step by step as the aggre
gate molecules so resulting grow larger and increase in
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transformable by small forces, more capable of assuming
various characters.&quot;
This is all very comprehensible, but Mr. Spencer goes
on to say
:
&quot; Those composing organic matter transcend all
others in size and intricacy of structure; and in them
these resulting traits reach their extreme/ without specify
ing what organic matter is as distinguished from complex
matter, which he has all along treated as identical with
it, but here seems to mark off as a special kind of complex
molecules. However, some light is thrown upon this
subject by the next passage.
&quot; As implied by its name,
protein, the essential substance of which all organisms
are built, is remarkable alike for the variety of its meta
morphoses and the facility with which it undergoes them
;
it changes from one to another of its isomeric forms on
the slightest change of conditions.&quot;
From this it appears that the essential substance of
which all organisms are built is protein. The only organ-
isable matter then is protein, and when organisable matter
is spoken of it is protein that is meant.
It would seem further to follow, that the only organic
molecule is a molecule of protein, and that throughout this








I have been correct. The only correct use of the word
&quot;organic&quot; is in relation to the word
&quot;protein&quot; a view cor
roborated by a passage a few lines further on, where com
pound molecules of sulphur or phosphorus and protein
are contrasted with those of inorganic matter. So that
when Mr. Spencer heretofore spoke of the
&quot;
organic
chemists,&quot; he only meant chemists who produced complex
inorganic, i.e., non-protein molecules.
But what justifies the application of the term
&quot;
organic
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to compounds of protein, viewed not from our knowledge of
protein as derived from experience, but from our know
ledge of protein as a mechanical molecule or combination
thereof, the result of Evolution
; that is to say, a plastic
complex molecule or aggregation composed of atoms having
specific shapes, sizes, and motions, and the resultant in
itself being a compound of specific shapes, sizes, and
motions, though a shape, owing to its plasticity, capable of
change under pressure. There is nothing so far to mark
them off by a distinguishing title from all other complex
molecules.
Mr. Spencer, speaking of molecules composed of sulphur
or phosphorus and protein, says of them :
&quot;
By their con
stitution they must have a plasticity, or sensitiveness to
modifying forces, far beyond that of protein.&quot; Here we
simply repeat that &quot;sensitiveness&quot; does not mean conscious
ness or feeling of any sort, and that &quot;modifying&quot; only
means modification of shape and mechanical rearrange
ments of atoms and motions. &quot;And bearing in mind
not only that their varieties are practically infinite in
number, but that closely allied forms of them, chemically
indifferent to one another as they must be, may coexist in
the same aggregate, we shall see that they are fitted for
entering into unlimited varieties of organic structures.&quot;
We notice here specially
&quot;coexist in the same aggregate;&quot;
but it does not show how the aggregate was formed or
came into existence that is, in fact, the problem that
has to be solved. Is it merely a chance aggregate
? Sup
posing that complex organic molecules have been formed,
that is to say, sulphur and phosphorus and protein. We
wish to know what aggregate they exist in, and how they
form it ? Do they adhere like the molecules of water or
iron? Later on it is said that they are fitted to enterITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 55
into unlimited varieties of organic structure. Eut whence
the structure ? and how organic
? How do three or four
of them get their first skin and thus form a definite
whole ?
To realise to ourselves and unless we think clearly it is
no use thinking at all the formation of an organism, we
have to consider a case like this.
Given a mass of highly complex molecules, each mole
cule being an aggregate of atoms forming an equilibrium
like the solar system, to ascertain the mode of their be
coming an organic whole, as thus :
This mass will be brought into contact in a liquid
medium forming a highly complex aggregate, and will be
subject to the influences of light, heat, &c., and there may
result modifications of molecules and of their relations.
But there will be no wearing out or waste or using up of
the energy of the substance, nor repair of waste.
Mr. George Lewes, speaking of the modes of substances,
says, speaking of life :
&quot; Their peculiarity consists in this;
they undergo molecular changes of composition and decom
position which are simultaneous, and by this simultaneity
preserve their integrity of structure. They change their
state, and their elements yet preserve their unity, and even
when differentiating continue specific; unlike all other
bodies, are born, grow, develop, and decay through a pre
scribed series of gradual evolutions, each stage being the56 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
indispensable condition of its successor, no stage ever ap
pearing except in its serial order.&quot;
Now, to take the first stage. Is it asserted of a complex
molecule of sulphur or phosphorus and protein that this
molecule casts out some of its protein and assimilates other
from the environment ? If so, why so ? How did the cast-
off molecule of protein get out of relation with the other
part of the highly complex aggregate of which it formed
a part? Evidently only by means of some mechanical
agency in the environment, or of some etherial motion.
And how did some other molecule get into relation and
take its place? Would not the old molecule, being an
identical system of shapes, sizes, and motions, have done
just as well ?
We cannot entertain the notion of an atom constituent
of a complex molecule getting worn out in consequence of
its relations of movement as part of that complex system
of motions; for it was by virtue of its harmonies of
shape, size, and motions that it entered into the combina
tion, and what caused it preserves it. Such a change
would imply that it ceases to be what it is. It is not
merely cast out ; it has become something else that is to
say, some other element. If, however, the decomposition
has been effected by means of chemical recombination
with an exterior molecule, then the explanation is reason
able, although we still do not see why one molecule should
be so taken up by an exterior molecule when there are
others in the environment with which it could combine.
But the notion of interior decomposition is not admissible,
for the sizes, shapes, and motions that caused the combina
tion into the complex molecule tend to preserve that con
stitution until affected by exterior agencies.
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or phosphorus, are we not speaking of amorphous masses,
chance aggregates, without definite shape or structure, like
a mass of putty
? What is there in the shape or composi
tion of such a mass to imply the process of casting out and
replacement of its constituents upon purely mechanical or
chemical considerations ? All its changes would be due to
the impingement of external mechanical agencies.
And beyond this I do not see that we can go. I see not
the slightest attempt to get at structure, and if a certain
structure could be thought out by means of harmonies of
sizes, shapes, rates, and modes of motion of highly complex
molecules under suitable conditions of external mechanical
agencies, such as a scratch in a rock, a hole in the sand,
&c., this structure would exist only so long as the favour
ing conditions existed, and would then perish, and such
structures would come and go like the crystals of ice and
snow, like the clouds that float in the sky. The forms
would be evanescent as the shifting sands, or might last a
thousand years in a crack in the stone, like any chance
aggregate of clay.
But towards anything like consciousness, heredity, repro
duction, memory, or any facts comprising the transmission
of qualities other than motion from one molecule to another,
or towards anything like structure other than that of a
cloud, which exists only so long and quite as long as en
vironing conditions are favourable, we have no approach
whatever. The attempt to bridge over the process of Evo
lution from the inorganic to the organic has proved a
failure.
An attempt of this sort may be regarded as one of three
things
: firstly, as an endeavour to represent in words an
actual and observed process of nature
; or, secondly, it may
be an attempt to represent and realise in thought what58 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
might be an actual, but is an unobserved, process of nature
;
or, lastly, it may only be an evolution of words, represent
ing a supposed process of nature.
The Evolution contained in the explanation we have
been considering appears to be one of words only. It is a
kind of ladder of semi-synonyms. The stair by which we
mount from the inorganic to the highest forms of life is
made up of words that bracket together biological and
chemical (i.e., mechanical) processes. It is a scheme
founded on the frailties of language. Complex is over
lapped by organic, organic is overlapped by sensitive, sen
sitive is overlapped by vital, and so we get life
; class or
degree is overlapped by type, complex combination is
called generation, greater complexity, and greater sensitive
ness, and generation is the generation of higher types.
Then there is adaptation to environment and correspond
ing change of structure, and through generation again we
get heredity and the establishment of highly organised
living beings and organised experience.ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 59
The Evolution of Life.
THE STATE OF LIFE,
BYWHICH WEMOUNTVERBALLYFROM
The nascent life displayed
in these gradually becom
ing more pronounced.
THE INORGANIC TO THE HIGHEST Lowest known living things,
FORMS OF LIFE. and aggregates of them.
Verging little by little into those
called vital actions.
Still more composite, sensitive, and
changeable molecules.
Sensitive molecules.
Higher types of organic molecules.








Atoms or simple molecules.
I Matter in motion. Ultimate homogeneous units.
It is a process of knitting together of the terms used to
describe inorganic actions and the terms used to describe
the actions of living organisms. When this is done the60 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
explanation is supposed to be accomplished, but as a real
explanation it is a failure.
We have thus seen that not only are the phenomena of
consciousness, life, memory, generation, heredity, nourish
ment, and decay unexplainable a priori from the inter
action of the two factors matter and motion, but that Mr.
Spencer himself, in endeavouring to establish the theory
in this most ingenious and subtle reasoning, fails to bring
them within the processes of matter and motion, to what
ever degree of complexity these processes may be carried.
We may, therefore, safely come to the conclusion that no
merely mechanical theory, that no merely materialistic
theory for to that it is, in fact, equivalent is able to
account for life and its changes.
&quot; The existence of such physiological units, peculiar to each
species of organism, is not unaccounted for. They are evolved
simultaneously with the evolution of the organisms they com
pose they differentiate as fast as these organisms differentiate
;
and are made multitudinous in kind by the same actions which
make the organism they compose multitudinous in kind. This
conception is clearly representable in terms of the mechanical
hypothesis. Every physicist will endorse the proposition that
in each aggregate there tends to establish itself an equilibrium
between the forces exercised by all the units upon each and by
each upon all Even in masses of substance so rigid as iron
and glass, there goes on a molecular rearrangement, slow or
rapid according as circumstances facilitate, which ends only
when there is a complete balance between the actions of the
parts on the whole and the actions of the whole on the parts ;
the implication being that every change in the form or size of
the whole necessitates some redistribution of the parts. And
though, in cases like these^ there occurs only a polar rearrange
ment of the molecules, without changes in the molecules them
selves
; yet where, as often happens, there is a passage from the
colloid to the crystalloid state, a change of constitution occurs
in the molecules themselves. These truths are not limited toITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 61
inorganic matter
; they unquestionably hold of organic matter.
As certainly as molecules of alum have a form of equilibrium,
the octahedron, into which they fall when the temperature of
their solvent allows them to aggregate, so certainly must organic
molecules of each kind, no matter how complex, have a form of
equilibrium in which, when they aggregate, their complex forces
are balanced a form far less rigid and definite, for the reason
that they have far less definite polarities, are far more unstable,
and have their tendencies more easily modified by environing
conditions. Equally certain is it that the special molecules
having a special organic structure as their form of equilibrium,
must be reacted upon by the total forces of this organic struc
ture
; and that, if environing actions lead to any change in this
organic structure, these special molecules, or physiological units,
subject to a changed distribution of the total forces acting upon
them, will undergo modification modification which their ex
treme plasticity will render easy. By this action and reaction
I conceive the physiological units peculiar to each kind of
organism to have been moulded along with the organism itself.
&quot;
Setting out with the stage in which protein, in minute aggre
gates, took on those simplest differentiations which fitted it for
differently-conditioned parts of its medium, there must have un
ceasingly gone on perpetual readjustments of balance between
aggregates and their units actions and reactions of the two, in
which the units tended ever to. establish the typical form pro
duced by actions and reactions in all antecedent generations,
while the aggregate, if changed in form by change of surround
ing conditions, tended ever to impress on the units a correspond
ing change of polarity, causing them in the next generation to
reproduce the changed form their new form of equilibrium.&quot;
This paragraph is difficult to deal with. The first two
sentences take Tip the subject at a stage at which we
have not yet arrived. Then Mr. Spencer states :
&quot; This
conception is clearly representable in terms of the mechani
cal hypothesis.&quot; He then argues from the rearrangement
of molecules in correspondence to changes of mass which
we may safely assume to be correct a corresponding change
in the organic molecules of an organic aggregate. But it62 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
must be borne in mind that we have not yet got an organic
aggregate beyond the atom of sulphur or phosphorus and
protein. And if we assume a mass of these smaller aggre
gates, we may assume some change of its constituents to
take place, in accordance with pressure, cutting, heating,
freezing, passage of light, electricity, &c., in the same manner
as the molecules of a bar of gold might be modified by pres
sure, cutting a piece off the end of it, heating, and the like.
Perhaps the changes would be greater in the former case,
on account of the greater complexity of the molecules, but
as it would be an unorganised mass, the changes would
only be in degree and not in kind. Mr. Spencer, however,
denies this. He says they
&quot; have their tendencies more
easily modified by environing conditions.&quot; Here we have
the importation of a new term, &quot;tendencies.&quot; The only
tendency of an atomic motion is to go on, or to combine
its motion with another atom moving at a harmonious rate.
The only tendency (a term applicable only to the motions,
and not to the shapes and sizes of atoms and molecules)
of the motion of a molecule is to go on or to unite with
other molecules of agreeable motions. The modification of
a tendency of an atom or a molecule is to increase or
decrease their rates of motion. This can be done by heat
perhaps, and perhaps in some other ways, but it is rather
a doubtful sort of expression to say that the tendency of
their motion is changed. What is the meaning of the
word &quot;tendency&quot;? Does it apply to organised experi
ence, and therefore a biological term, or is it a mechanical
term? If so, it is only another expression for the con
tinuity of motion.
The rest of the argument proceeds to discuss the rela-
Hons of an organism to its molecules.
&quot; By this action
and reaction I conceive the physiological units peculiar toITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 63
each kind of organism to have been moulded along with
the organism
itself.&quot;
Before we have got an organism it is premature to dis
cuss this question. If we have an organism, or set of
organisms, already in existence the whole question, in
fact, begged we can then discuss the interaction of
organism and its physiological units, but not till then. At
the same time it seems extremely difficult to me, and I am
sure it will be to others, to imagine an organism without
sensibility and consciousness to imagine an organism
which goes on through all its changes of birth, growth, re
production, decay, in a manner which could be represented
by wheels revolving or pulsating molecules, &c. But if
sensibility and consciousness be added, how are they to be
expressed in terms of shape or size or rates of motion,
which are the only factors recognised in the formula ?
Mr. Spencer says more viz.,
&quot; in which the units tended
ever to establish the typical form produced by actions
and reactions in all antecedent generations.&quot; He looks at
the matter persistently from this side of creation, not the
other. Why did the units tend to establish anything?
Why to establish a type ? Do actions and reactions of
inorganic substances tend to the establishment of any type
of movement ? Does the pendulum acquire a tendency to
wag, or the striker to strike, or the spring to wind itself




Mr. Spencer s argument as applicable to concerns much
later than the commencement of the propagation of life by
generation. How did the first tendency arise ? Was it
other than a mechanical tendency or motion to go on or to
unite with harmonious motions? The only tendency of
matter in motion is inertia. The only tendency of
shapes and sizes is to retain the shapes and sizes. The64 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
only tendency of motion is to go on moving at the same
rate.






&quot; tended ever to impress on units a corresponding
degree of polarity
&quot;
? &quot;What is the polarity of an unit ?
What are the degrees of polarity? what are the changes
denoted by changes of polarity
? and how does one unit
impress another ? Or even granting an organism (which w
Te
have not yet arrived at), how does that organism impress
any unit ? How are all these things to be expressed in
terms of matter and motion ?
&quot;
Setting out,&quot; &c. Here protein aggregates take on
differentiations which fit them for different mediums, that
is to say, a pentatomic or hexatomic atom of sulphur or
phosphorus, being on a flat surface, in an angle, or in a
corner, or two together, &c., would only be able to group
the protein in special shapes, for different mediums would
contain different mineral substances, which might be aggre
gated with the protein molecules
; and if the mediums
changed, so would the aggregated molecule, in shape, in
size, in composition. Change in motion would be, in all
probability, change of molecular construction. But what
is there in this beyond the changes that would take place
in like manner in the inorganic ?
The rest of the argument it would not be fruitful to
follow, as it falls under the general criticism, and the first
step, found to be insurmountable, precludes the rest.
To some such criticism as the foregoing I presume Mr.
Spencer undertakes a reply towards the end of his letter,
p. 491:
&quot; I have repeatedly and emphatically asserted that our con
ceptions of matter and motion are but symbols of an unknow
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bolise it to be; and that, as manifested beyond consciousness
under the forms of matter and motion, it is the same as that
which, in consciousness, is manifested as feeling and thought.&quot;
Eeading it in this way, then, the integration of matter
and the dissipation of motion is what ? The integration
of one symbolic conception and the dissipation of another
symbolic conception.* Or is it the integration of that
which is symbolised and conceived of symbolically, and
the dissipation of something which is symbolised and con
ceived of symbolically ? And this something is unknown
and unknowable. Then manifestly the formula of Evolu
tion, which is the formula of a, philosophy which was to
account for the history of every existence from its emer
gence from the imperceptible to the perceptible, is Igno
rance. It would seem, in ordinary language, to mean that
the integration of matter meant the approach together and
combination of movement of ultimate units, atoms, mole
cules, masses, to be described geometrically and arithmeti
cally, and that the dissipation of motion was the trans
ference from one bit of matter to another of its rate of
motion, by which their measurable rates were mutually
increased and diminished, and on this supposition we have
discovered an intelligible but insufficient theory. But if
by matter we mean we don t know what, and by motion
we don t know what, but certainly not the matter and
motion that we have been discussing, then we have a
theory which may be sufficient, but is utterly unintelligible.
The formula which was to penetrate and show the organic
connection of all sequences is a formula with two blanks
in it. It is the integration of x and the dissipation of y.
* Are not integration and dissipation themselves symbolic conceptions
too ? If so, then to translate the formula of Evolution into exact
language would make it a most abstruse enigma.
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Our hopeful primal ignorance ends in the certainty of it
cloaked in a specious intelligibility.
An Endeavour to make the Eeader understand the Meaning
of a Formula describing all Phenomena in terms of
Matter in Motion.
In order to assist those who are unacquainted with
the subject, I have printed a diagram illustrative of the
theory of Evolution. The representation is in the form of
two cones connected at the apex. The upper one repre
sents the unknowable, the absolute, the first cause which
Mr. Spencer treats of in his first book ; the lower one re
presents the knowable. The only manifestation of abso
lute force, or first cause, or of the unknowable, is as the
antecedent or cause of matter in motion. Once constitute
matter in motion, then from the indestructibility of matter
and the continuity of motion, everything else follows, and
the first cause, absolute force, or whatever you like to call
it, is done with altogether. There is no connection be
tween the cone, so to speak, of the unknowable and the
cone of the knowable except at the apex, and the apex is
matter in motion and the formula of Evolution namely,
the redistributions of matter in motion. There are no
outside lines of connection or influence. The materials for
evolution once constituted, evolution proceeds and dis
solution succeeds in enormous but interminable cycles in
the future, and so far from our being in a first era of evo
lution, there may have already preceded us an eternity of
enormous rhythms of evolution and dissolution
; so that
between the apex of the upper cone and the apex of the
lower cone there may be placed as many of these courses
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may fancy, each of them taking millions or billions of
years to complete its rhythm. But and this is the most
important thing to understand within the lower cone, and
in all preceding and succeeding cones, there is nothing but
matter in motion, rates of motion, shapes, sizes, and com
binations and recombinations of these matter in motion
to start with, matter in motion all through O
I will now endeavour to correct an erroneous view of
Evolution which is sometimes entertained, or which leads
to its being viewed in a favourable light. It is that view
of it which understands it simply as a generalisation of
the modes of force. This view seems to recognise bodies
as having properties, and almost recognises different kinds
of forces. Thus the properties of bodies, such as specific
gravity, chemical affinities, thermic relations, &c., are sup
posed to be inherent, and forces are sometimes spoken of
as being entities with qualities of their own, such as mag
netism, electricity, &c. But such notions are utterly out
of place in connection with any theory of Evolution, for
these properties of bodies are only modes of motion, and
these forces are only modes of motion, all of them having
to be accounted for by Evolution. Some seem to accept
the nebulous condition as the starting-point, but such a
point is an arbitrary one, just as much as any later point
that others might wish to start from, and those who do so
are Developmentalists, and not Evolutionists. Thus Dr.
Drysdale, who takes such a decided stand as an Evolu
tionist, holds an imperfect theory, in that he believes in
the inherent properties of matter, and only allows force =
motion an influence in relation to these properties; not
allowing, apparently, that these properties are only rates
and directions of motion, and having a previous history
of their combinations. I derive this from his work63 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.




Throughout the world of variety of chemical compounds, in
no case is mere force, or that which is expended in the pro
duction of motion, the determining cause of any form, shape,
or specific affinity. I may conclude by illustrating, with the
diagram formerly given, the above views of the subordinate
nature of force in the development of the secondary properties
of matter, and its dependence upon the determining powers of
the inherent properties of matter in all cases :
The properties of matter Force, in all its forms,




The necessity for keeping in view this so-called
&quot; radical
distinction between property and force
&quot;
is corroborated by
quotations from Mr. James Croll and from Professor
Tyndall, the latter to the effect that &quot;energy is conditioned
by its atomic machinery.&quot; Whether Dr. Drysdale has
changed his views or not since 1 874 I do not know, but it
seems to me that many others besides himself think that
it suffices to start from a nebula composed as described
to constitute an all-comprehensive philosophy. But any
one starting from that, as any one starting from the
commencement of life or any other arbitrary point, is a
Developmentalist and not an Evolutionist.
I would strenuously impress upon every one wishing pro
perly to understand the formula of Evolution that there is
nothing in the universe but matter, i.e., extension in vari
ous rates of motion and combinations of motion. There
is no light, no colour, no hot or cold, no smell or flavour,
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know how far I may go in saying what there is not, with
out getting into an entanglement ; but of this we may be
quite certain, that there is nothing but matter in motion,
and all qualities and properties of matter are merely differ
entiations of shapes or sizes, and differentiations of rates
and directions of motion, and the complex combinations of
these. What we call them are the names of our modes of
consciousness of them.
Conclusion of the Argument.
My task so far has been to show that both from the
formula and definitions, as well as from the explanation of
evolution and dissolution furnished by Mr. Spencer, the
philosophy is simply and purely one of the combina
tion and recombination of ultimate units, having equal
mutual motions of attraction and repulsion. The first
compound is, say, into atoms, the next into molecules,
the next into liquid and solid states and molar motion, the
next into organic and various complications. But the
great point to bear in mind is, that there is nothing im
ported into the problem at any stage but what was there
at the first. All that we have at the first is matter in
motion, and that is all that we have at the last. Now,
passing over certain primary difficulties already sufficiently
discussed, viz., the law of gravitation, the distribution and
permanence of the elements, all of which might possibly
be explained, what we are &quot;bound to assert from the
postulate is, that the only differentiations of which matter
in motion is capable are size and shape, and different
rates, and, perhaps, directions of motion. Therefore, all
the combinations and recombinations of units are capable
of being expressed in terms of shape, size, and rates and70 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
directions of motion
; that is to say, in terms of geometry
and arithmetic.
Can this be done ? And the question I propose is not
one that might have been proposed with regard to the
science of astronomy after the laws of sidereal and plane
tary motion had been discovered. The answer to such a
question would have been: Yes, it is only a matter of time
arid labour ; we can see clearly that the task is possible.
My question is, Is it possible in this case? Can we
express protoplasm in terms of size and shape, and rates
and directions of motion? Can we express genesis and
adaptation and heredity in terms of matter in motion?
Can we describe organism in such a way
? Can we explain
emotion, thought, and consciousness in terms of matter in
motion ? On the Evolution theory we are bound to do so.
The charge against it is that it is merely a mechanical
theory ; and though I did not think so at first, I find on
examination that, notwithstanding the disclaimers of Book
I., and the use of the mysterious terms &quot;force&quot; and
&quot;
forces&quot; in Book II., it really is so
; and being so, the con
stitution of the universe, including life, organisms, con
sciousness, thought, emotion, ought to be capable of
mechanical expression ; it only requires time and study to
work it out.
But I maintain that this cannot be done, and until it
is done we cannot allow Evolution to take rank as an
exhaustive theory of the universe, whatever merits it may
otherwise possess.
To conclude, the summary of the criticism is this : that
since Evolution is not able to apply its laws to an explana
tion of the origin and continuance of the seventy or eighty
so-called elements, and since Evolution is not able to
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thought, and emotion in terms of matter in motion, in so
far it fails as an exhaustive theory of the universe.
I am aware that Mr. Spencer would repudiate this criti
cism as unfair, on the ground that the position I assign
him is too mechanical and materialistic a position which
he repudiates in the letter from which I have already so
largely quoted.
He says,
&quot; The common uses of the words mechanical
and mechanist are such as inevitably call up in all minds
the notions of visible masses of matter acting on one
another by measurable forces and producing sensible
motions.&quot; His remarks in continuance show the inade
quacy of such notions, for science now recognises motions
of matter which are not sensible nor measurable, and pro
ducing motions which are not sensible nor measurable.
But we must note that they are not insensible nor im
measurable on account of difference of nature, but on
account of our incompetency. However much removed
from our recognition and manipulation of them by reason
of their minuteness, matter is matter still, and motion is
motion ; and if within our reach, there is not the minutest
of either of them that could not be described in terms of
geometry and arithmetic. If this is not materialistic I
do not know what is. but this charge and its repudiation I
deal with elsewhere.I
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PART III.
AN INQUIRY AS TO THE INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFI
CIENCY OF MR. SPENCER S FORMULA, WITH THE
INCLUSION OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE.&quot;
IT will have been observed that in the preceding part
of this criticism I have employed the term &quot;matter in
motion,&quot; and have avoided the use of the word &quot;force,&quot;
although it appears so prominently in the pages of Mr.
Spencer s work. This has not been accidental, but by
design, indicating as it does one of my main criticisms of
Mr. Spencer.
I can logically take up one of two positions. The first
recognises matter, whose properties are merely those of
extension, which are capable of being described in terms of
geometry and arithmetic. I can also recognise as the sole
active properties of matter its modes and rates of motion
the motion, that is to say, of ultimate units, atoms,
molecules, or masses, also capable of measurement.
The second position recognises matter and its activity or
activities matter as endowed with force or forces.
Let us consider the second position first. If we merely
recognise the activity or activities of matter, we adopt a
term which is comprehensive enough, but is not in the
least explanatory or unificatory. For what does it mean ?
Does it mean that matter has any other kind of activity
than is exhibited in motion, or that there is any other kind
of motion or activity of matter than that which is capable74 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
of communication by impact or contact, or otherwise ac
cording to the laws of mechanics ? If by the activity of
matter is meant no more than this, then we have an ex
planation which, if correct, unifies all phenomena and
renders them all intelligible. But if we only mean the
recognition that all changes are the activity of matter, we
merely apply a word that covers or includes all those
changes in a general term, but affords no explanation or
constructive unification.
And if we speak of matter as endowed with forces, we
are in the same position. We recognise differentiated
forces, but fail of unification. And if we recognise, as Dr.
Drysdale recognises, matter endowed with properties which
are put in motion by force, we lose ourselves in mysticism.
And, in fact, in either of these two latter cases, we do
not know what we mean when we talk of forces, or of
matter having properties set in motion by force. But the
researches of the last quarter of a century have identified
all forces, and we have the doctrine of the correlation of
forces, and the corollary of the conservation of energy or
the persistence of force.
Mr. Spencer, accepting the modern doctrine of the con
servation of energy or the persistence of force, apparently
unifies forces into one force
; but what I want to know is,
does he mean more than this, viz., that matter which is
composed of space-occupying units, having shape and
measurement, has any other active property than that of
motion, capable also of being measured, and capable also
of being augmented or diminished by transference to or
from other matter, and of entering into relations according
to shape, size, and modes and rates of motion, with other
matter, thus forming atoms, molecules, and masses in cos-




this is what is meant, viz., the motion of
matter, I can understand it
; if more than this is meant,
I do not understand it. Can Mr. Spencer express it in a
mathematical formula or not ?
For information on this subject I referred to Magnus
&quot;
Elementary Mechanics,&quot; and I find that
s = tv
is the fundamental proposition of uniform motion.
Also that
*-*/
is the algebraical expression of uniform acceleration of
motion.
In dynamics I find that
P=Mp
as the fundamental equation of Dynamics,
r-x%! d t
But these all relate to aggregated bodies and presume
the law of gravitation. They refer simply to matter and
motion.
It may be said that Mr. Spencer assigns force as the
unknown and unknowable cause of matter and motion. If
so, it is equal to its results, and we can judge of it and
measure it by its results, and we need only deal with its
resultants.
Having disposed of forces i.e., differentiated permanent
forces as all resolvable into force we call it the unknown
and unknowable. Does this mean that it is in its origin
unknown and unknowable, or that it is now to us un
known and unknowable ? If the former, we agree at once.
The origin of matter and force is unknowable. If the
latter, then there are two or three matters to discuss.76 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
Force is known only by its manifestations. Its mani
festations are matter in motion. Has it any other mani
festations ? Is it an ever-present cause or a primal cause
only?
If a primal cause only, then, when it has once consti
tuted the mass of primordial units, and endowed them
with motion, and perhaps gravitation, it is done with, and
can be relegated to Book I. on the unknowable, and dis
missed from philosophy altogether, which is complete
without it.
But if an ever-present cause, then, if it is an augmenting
or diminishing cause, either of matter or of the motion of
matter, philosophy is impossible unless it is in uniform or
rhythmical rate of increase or diminution. But if, as an
ever-present cause, it increases or diminishes irregularly,
or endows matter or motion with properties that are not
measurable, then also philosophy is impossible. And if
there be a law of increase or diminution,, and this law is
unknown or unknowable, then again philosophy is impos
sible.
But these propositions, I understand, are not admitted
by Mr. Spencer, who contends for the uniformity of the
quantum of matter and of the quantum of motion, and I
do not think he admits of interference of cause in the
addition of any other properties to matter or motion.
But if force is an ever-present cause of matter and of
the motion of matter, and these are uniform in quantity,
and affect one another in their relations of co-existence
and sequence only, in accordance with their properties of
size, shape, mode, and rate of motion, then the statement
that force is the ever-present cause of them limits the
operations of force to their manifestations, and though we
may still say that we do not know force in itself (what-INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE&quot; 77
ever that means), we do know force, inasmuch as we do
know all its manifestations. If it has any others, they do
not concern the cosmos, and therefore in a philosophy
which is an exhaustive theory of the changes of the
cosmos it has no place. A cause is only equal to its
effects. If we know the effects, we know the cause. If
there is nothing in the effects of force but matter in
motion, we know force so far as it is necessary for the
purposes of philosophy to know it, and we also know that
it thereby becomes a useless term.
If in a philosophy which unifies our knowledge and ac
counts for all changes in the cosmoswe admit the term Force,
we can only admit it on a comprehensible definition, in
which case its definition takes its place. But if we admit
it, and state that it is unknowable, then as a term of an
explanation it is sheer nonsense to introduce it, for it would
render our explanation and our philosophy altogether vain.
All philosophies so far have been
Philosophy = Special Philosophy + the Unknowable.
And the algebraical representation of. the Evolution philo
sophy, if force is unknowable, is
Evolution =MH
n
, or else Evolution =MM n
x.
A philosophy which introduces x
t the unknowable, into its
terms, can scarcely claim to be a complete unification of
knowledge.
After this preliminary explanation of the grounds of my
criticism, it is my task to examine the main course of Mr.
Spencer s argument in its exposition in Book II. on the
Knowable.
This criticism may appear very curt and summary, and
therefore it may seem wanting in due respect to one of
our leading thinkers
; and my own feelings would dictate78 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
an exhaustive and detailed criticism. But it is obvious
that this would require a book almost as large as that
which I criticise. Therefore, if I am somewhat summary




I have no objection to this chapter, the summary of
which is
&quot;Knowledge of the lowest kind is ummified knowledge;
science is partially unified knowledge ; philosophy is completely
unified knowledge.&quot;
I would merely remark, that since knowledge is not yet
commensurate with the totality of the changes of the
cosmos, any philosophy must be of a tentative character
;
and if we would include in it all the past changes which
are implied in the present constitution of the cosmos, that
application of it must be of a somewhat speculative
character.
But if philosophy is only completely unified actual know
ledge, it does not mean that it is an unification of all past
changes of the cosmos, which, even if knowable, are, as a
matter of fact, unknown, and therefore do not form part of
the body of knowledge.
At the same time, we must not omit to bear in mind the
much more ambitious claim made for philosophy by Mr.
Spencer, p. 541
&quot;A philosophy stands self-convicted of inadequacy if it does
not formulate the whole series of changes passed through by every
existence in its passage from the imperceptible to the perceptible,
and again from the perceptible to the imperceptible. If it beginsINCLUSIVE OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE.&quot; 79
its explanations with existences that already have concrete forms,
or leaves off while they still retain concrete forms, then mani
festly they had preceding histories, or will have succeeding his
tories, or both, of which no account is given ; and as such pre
ceding and succeeding histories are subjects of possible knowledge,
a philosophy which says nothing about them falls short of the
required unification.&quot;
OF CHAPTER II.
The Data of Philosophy.
See p. 157. &quot;In brief, our postulates are: An unknow
able power ; the existence of knowable likenesses and differences
among the manifestations of that power ; and a resulting segrega
tion of the manifestations into those of subject and
object.&quot;
Only the two latter data are treated of in this chapter.
The first datum,
&quot; an unknowable power,&quot; is the theme of
Book -I. Our criticism before expressed is this : Since
philosophy is an unification of the knowable, and the know-
able comprises all the manifestations of the unknowable,
the datum of an unknowable power simply means the
recognition of the unknowability of the force or power
which originally set those manifestations going, or which
also keeps them going, but in such unchanging relations
that neither any supposition as to it being one or the
other, or any such supposition at all, adds anything to our
knowledge, nor explains anything, nor unifies anything.
OF CHAPTER III.
Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force.
I do not think it essential to the argument to criticise
considerable portions of this chapter, though I do not
wholly agree with them.8o SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
Space I do not regard as an entity, but as merely an
abstraction of relations of distance.
In like manner, Time is not an entity, but an abstraction
of relations of successions of changes.
Matter, p. 166. &quot;Hence the necessity we are under of
representing to ourselves the ultimate elements of matter as
being at once extended and resistent : this being the universal
form of our sensible experiences of matter, becomes the form
which our conception of it cannot transcend, however minute
the fragments which imaginary subdivisions produce.&quot;
Motion, p. 1 6 8. &quot;A something that moves; a series of
positions occupied in succession; and a group of co-existent
positions united in thought with the successive ones these are
the constituents of the idea,&quot;
Force. Force is said to be the ultimate of ultimates.
Mr. Lewes defines it as the activity of matter, without pro
mulgating a formula as to the nature of that activity being
an unification of all activities. Mr. Spencer posits force as
the primordial experience. It is difficult to make out
whether he is speaking of the history or genealogy of
knowledge, or of the constitution and history of the cosmos.
Our experience is the succession of states of consciousness,
whether faint or vivid. We have experiences of resist
ance (matter), and we have experiences of change (motion),
and w
re have experiences of the combinations of matter and
the combinations of motion. Need we go beyond this, and
say that these are manifestations of something else, and
call that something else force ? There is nothing gained by
doing so




&quot; Thus all other modes of consciousness are derivable from ex
periences of force ; but experiences of force are not derivable from
anything else. Indeed, it needs but to remember that conscious
ness consists of changes to see that the ultimate datum of con-INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE? 81
sciousness must be that of which change is the manifestation
-
and that thus the force by which we ourselves produce changes and which serves to symbolise the cause of changes in genera? is
the final disclosure of
analysis.&quot;
I do not feel any necessity, for my part, when I recognise
changes in my consciousness, to acknowledge the existence
of a something of which these changes are a manifestation.
I recognise the
indestructibility of matter and the con
tinuity of motion, and the uniformity of sequence amongst
changes, and am thus led to seek amongst anterior states
for the sequence I experience; but I see no necessity for
positing a something of which these states and sequences
are manifestations. It is useless and unwarranted.
But it is said, &quot;the force by which we ourselves produce




serves to symbolise the cause of changes in
general.&quot;
To take the latter clause first, what is predicated is the
&quot;cause of changes in
general.&quot; Are we to consider all
changes to be evolution, i.e., the integration of matter and
the dissipation of motion, or dissolution, i.e., the disintegra
tion, of matter and the resumption of motion ? If so, then
all changes are of matter in motion, and the cause looked
for is the cause of these changes. But admitting that we
look for the cause of any particular change in the state of
things immediately preceding that change, and of all
changes in the same way, we are thrown back into infinite
time and the study of the homogeneous before there was
any change if we wish to discover, the &quot;cause of changes
in
general.&quot;
As to the force by which we ourselves produce changes
serving to symbolise this cause of aU changes in general? it
can only mean either that the experiences of matter and
motion which constitute ourselves enables us to under-
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stand matter in motion elsewhere, and the nature of their
relations; which, considering that we do not yet under
stand ourselves or the nature of consciousness, I deny.
Or it means that the experiences of will and volition we
possess symbolise an original will and volition, which is
a theory well worthy of consideration; but, as a matter of
science, if its only manifestations were constituting matter
and setting it in motion, and is a constant and unvarying
factor in the universe, it may practically be left out.
Is force objective or subjective
? If taken to be the
former and since it is said to have existed anterior to
consciousness, it is reasonable to regard it as such then it
can only have been the unknown original or constant pre
sent cause of the totality of matter and motion, and is
only interpretable in the terms thereof.
If taken to be the latter, how is it to be described?
Evidently not in nervous tremors, for those are motions of
matter, and truly objective. Is it the consciousness of
these nervous tremors ? But mere consciousness is not
force. Force implies a power applied and a result. Con
sciousness does not imply activity.
If consciousness is a force, then the question arises, Is it
a force that is interchangeable with the physical forces ?
or is it a force that is not so interchangeable? Do different
nervous tremors resulting in correspondent reflex move
ments, and of which there is a consciousness, receive any
modification or influence from this consciousness ?
We do not even suggest any reply to these questions.
To consider now the first clause of our quotation.
&quot;Thus all other (i.e., than a single impression of force)
modes of consciousness are derivable from experiences of
force; but experiences of force are not derivable from any
thing
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of consciousness means a consciousness which differs from
some other consciousness. Mr. Spencer says these modes
of consciousness are derivable from experiences of force.
I suppose he means are experiences of force. But these
experiences of force are not derivable from anything else.
Certainly not if they are experiences of force. But he
said that consciousness consists of, or is the experience of,
changes. Where does Mr. Spencer get his force from?
We only recognise changes, and perhaps degrees of change.
Surely force is an idea added to the primordial experience
of consciousness, and is not the primordial experience.
We next come to the algebraical representation of the
subject. If matter and motion are represented by x and y,
and force is represented by z, we may ascertain the values
of x and y in terms of z, but the value of z can never be
found. This looks very exact and scientific, but I would
like the operation performed so as to be able to under
stand it. Does it mean that x+y=z? If so, then, if the
value of x and y are known, we know the value of z, or it
is known so far as it is a factor in the cosmos, and for all
practicable purposes, if z is the ultimate of ultimates, x + y
are equal to it, and may stand in its room as the ultimate
of ultimates.
Mr. Spencer goes on to speak of an undecomposable
mode of consciousness. Can any mode of consciousness
(the word &quot;mode&quot; seems to me superfluous) be decom
posed ? There is a consciousness of seeing articles in a
room. This may be regarded as a complex consciousness,
and may be decomposed into, so to speak, its separate
parts. But is each separate part decomposable ? I have
a consciousness of co-existence, and I have a consciousness
of succession. I have a consciousness of change. If I lift
an article I have a consciousness of tension of the muscles,84 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
and I have a consciousness of resistance of the floor on
which I stand. These are all simple items of experience,
and I call them by certain names. The only one I call by
the name of force is that of lifting, but muscular tension
is no more primordial than taste or the sensation of
breathing. Beyond this the idea of force is a growth of
varied and multiform experience, and, as used by Mr.
Spencer with respect to preconscious existences, is a gene





Mr. Spencer adds that all other modes of consciousness
may be decomposed into experiences of force. I presume
he means experiences of motion, i.e., experiences of nervous
shocks and vibrations, and cerebral molecular motion.
But speaking of this undecomposable mode of conscious
ness, which I presume to be consciousness of force,
&quot; can
not be itself the power manifested to us through pheno
mena has already been proved&quot; (sect. 18).
This means that the consciousness cannot be the powder
which is consciousnessed. Therefore there is a force
which produces the changes of matter and motion of
which we are conscious. This we have already considered.
But what is this consciousness ? It cannot be the force or
the power cognised. Mr. Spencer, in fact, does not say
that it is. But he does not say what it is, nor how in
cluded in the formula of Evolution.
Force he describes in very indefinite language, and we
reserve the consideration of it till the next portion of our
criticism. We must notice here a distinction that is drawn
between some
&quot; unknown force which is the correlative of
the known force.&quot; Leaving out the
&quot;
correlative,&quot; I merely
draw attention to the phrase &quot;known force.&quot; We are
studying the book on the Knowable, and I would like to
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sciousness of change, or the consciousness of muscular
tension, or the consciousness of results of matter in motion,
or, stepping outside consciousness, is it matter in motion
in relation with matter in motion ? Surely a known force
is capable of definition and description.
Let me now ask a few questions. Does the scope of
philosophy include times anterior to and subsequent to the
existence of organised and conscious beings ?
If so, did force exist before, and will it exist after, such
a period ? It is to be presumed that there was a time
when neither man nor any other sentient being existed.
Now it would simplify matters if we could know the
state of affairs under these conditions. Was there any
thing in the totality of the cosmos but a certain quantum
of matter and a certain quantum of motion ? If not, then
the changes in the cosmos might require a philosophy which
would unify the explanation of their changes and account
for their differentiations, but it would be a philosophy
which would be limited, in terms of its formula, to
matter and motion
; and if the word
&quot; force
&quot; were intro
duced, it would simply be as the unknown original cause,
or primarily constant quantity, which kept in existence
the quantum of matter and motion.
What was force anterior to consciousness ? What will
it be subsequent to consciousness ?
Force, indeed, seems to have come into existence with
consciousness. Is it another name for consciousness ? It
would really seem to be so the consciousness, more or
less forcible, of change.
Page 171. &quot;An unknown cause of the known effects,
likenesses, and differences among these known effects, and a
segregation of these effects into subject and object these
are the postulates without which we cannot think.&quot;86 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
It is here said that we cannot think without postu
lating an unknown cause of the known effects which we
call phenomena. I do not see that this is essential to
thinking. I can recognise phenomena and modes of
consciousness, and confine my thinking to their known
relations of co-existence and sequence without concerning
myself with the unknown cause, which I apprehend Mr.
Spencer to place right away in the beginning of things, or
else to be a constant unvarying quantity, commensurate
with, and behind, as it were, the known, in which latter
case it is simply to be ignored.
OF CHAPTER IY.
The Indestructibility of Matter.
I have to offer no adverse criticism to the theory of the
indestructibility of matter. The following questions sug
gest themselves, however. Does matter exist which has
lost all its individual motion ? Does matter exist which
has lost all gravitation ? Is the rotary motion of an ulti
mate unit a motion or a force ? Is the excursive motion
of an ultimate unit to be described as a motion or a force ?
Is the motion of each ultimate unit towards every other
unit a motion or a force ? And consequently, is the move
ment of every mass of units towards other masses at rates
inversely to the square of their distance to be described
as a motion or a force ? This is very important.
Is force arrested motion. Is our consciousness of force
the consciousness of arrested motion ? Is all conscious
ness the consciousness of arrested motion ? Is equilibrium
a balance, not of forces, but of motions ?
In the further progress of our criticism we are in con-INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE&quot; 87
siderable difficulty from an incapacity to attach, any defi
nite meaning to Mr. Spencer s use of the word
&quot;
force,&quot; and
to his employment of the term
&quot;
forces.&quot; Since we under
stand him to limit the manifestations of force to matter and
motion, we can only understand him to mean by
&quot; force
&quot;
matter in motion ; by
&quot;
forces,&quot; specially recognised modes
of matter in motion ; and by such terms as
&quot; combinations
of forces,&quot; &quot;special relations of different quantities,&quot; as
shapes and rates and modes of motion, either etherial,
atomical, molecular, molar. Thus interpreted, force is
merely a shorthand term of useful application.
Thus, when the piece of gold (p. 178) is found to weigh
less, we postulate
&quot; that the quantity of matter is finally
determinate by the quantity of gravitative force it mani




Page 179. &quot;Thus, then, by the indestructibility of matter
we really mean the indestructibility of the/orce with which
matter affects us.&quot; I presume matter exists independently
of its affecting us, and therefore its definition is indepen




The Continuity of Motion.
Page 184.&quot; Motion can never be lost, but can only be
transferred.&quot; This is the keynote of the chapter.
In accordance with the foregoing criticism, however, we
find much to which we demur. For instance (pp. 187,
!88)
:
&quot; It remains to be pointed out that the continuity of
motion, as well as the indestructibility of matter, is really
known to us in terms of force.&quot; The inquiry naturally88 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
arises,
&quot; What are the terms offorce ?
&quot; We know the word
force, but we do not know what it means, and thus we are
referred from the known to the unknown. The terms of
motion are the terms of arithmetic and geometry, but force
defies all terms.
A consideration of the next chapter, however, will decide
our estimation of this one.
OF CHAPTER VI.
The Persistence of Force.
Page 189. &quot;What is the force of which we predicate
persistence ?
&quot;
&quot; It is not the force we are immediately conscious of in
our own muscular efforts
; for this does not
persist.&quot;
We here come upon the consideration of a most difficult
matter, our decision upon which will decide the value of
Mr. Spencer s philosophy.
Viewed in accordance with the line of thought hitherto
pursued, the remark to be made would be this. We would
say that it is not the force we are immediately conscious
of, for that does not persist. Therefore, when the human
race ceases to exist, and the whole animal and vegetable
kingdoms come to an end, the force that would still
persist would be a force unrelated to consciousness or
feeling. And similarly anterior to vegetable and animal
life i.e., to consciousness or feeling we have to think
of the force that then persisted unrelated to conscious
ness. What are we to say of it ? Only this, that it was
a fixed quantity, and that it operated in one of two ways
(i.) That it was the original cause of matter in motion,
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quantity keeping them going. And also, that since its
results are constant in measurable quantities of matter
and measurable quantities of motion, these latter are
sufficient expression for the state of affairs, without any
reference to the unknown cause, force, which is a metem-
pirical phrase to be eliminated from philosophy. It would
also seem that since force is a constant quantity, and \ms
fully manifested in matter and motion anterior to feeling,
there was none left to manifest itself in feeling except by
the transformation of some other of its manifestations,
i.e., matter or motion into feeling. Are we to understand
that this is intended to be taught? Or are we to con
clude that consciousness and force are indissolubly con
nected, and that effort and muscular tension are also
involved, and that before consciousness there was no
force ?
&quot; I am conscious
&quot;
is primary. Then we notice differences
amongst our consciousnesses, and we are conscious of exert
ing personal effort and muscular tension. Here conscious
ness of force comes in, and we are conscious of resistance
to our force, and we think of exterior force. But do we
not thereby think of it in terms of consciousness, and
would it not be, no consciousness no force, whereas matter
in motion would still exist and persist ? The origin or
cause of matter in motion is unknowable, and to this
those who are inclined may give the name of force so
long as they do not confuse the measurable matter and
motion which are its known functions by any vagueness
derived from the unknowable.
True, the question may be asked, Are not the motions of
gravitation and of attraction and repulsion to be put down
to force ? You may, so long as you do not use the term
in a scientific explanation (for it does not explain any-90 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
tiling), but put it separate in the introduction, and confine
the treatment of the subject to that which is measurable,
and which will afford explanations.
But let us examine Mr. Spencer s argument more in
detail. After the example of raising an object from the
ground (p.
1 89), he says
:
&quot;We are compelled to admit that
force, as it exists out of our consciousness, is not force as
we know
it;&quot; but,
&quot; Hence the force of which we assert per
sistence is that absolute force of which we are indefinitely
conscious as the necessary correlate of the force we know.&quot;
The argument is this : We are conscious of the exertion
of force, therefore there is a correlative force against which
we exert ourselves. We call it an absolute force, I sup
pose, because it exists i.e., acts independently of our
consciousness of it. This force, in the instance given, is
gravitation, which denotes, I suppose, a mode of inter
relation of matter in motion stateable in terms of measure
ment. Other names are given to other modes of inter
relation of matter in motion which are also measurable.
But as to the cause. Of the how and the why of these
modes of interrelation of matter in motion we know nothing,
and so long as these modes are explainable according to
the harmonies of shapes and sizes, and of rates and modes
of motion, we may safely ignore, from a purely scientific
and philosophic point of view, all these questions.
The formula of Evolution is founded on this supposi
tion, and the doctrine of the correlation and transforma
tion of forces implies it.
But if such an explanation is insufficient, then we may
perhaps be obliged to recur to force, or even to a will cor
responding to that of which we are conscious, to eke out
the explanation of the universe. But in this case we do
not reach a definite, intelligible explanation of the universeINCLUSIVE OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE.&quot; 91
one by which we could ideally construct it out of the
homogeneous.
&quot;
Thus, by the persistence of force, we really mean the
persistence of some power (force?} which transcends our
knowledge or conception ;
. . . that which persists is the
unknown cause of these manifestations.&quot; The cause
unknown &quot;but the results all known, and therefore no con
fusion arises, and a formula of philosophy possible ; or else
the results not all known, and a philosophy and universal
formula of explanation impossible.
But the tenor of Mr. Spencer s argument is, that a
formula of philosophy is possible, and therefore that all
the results of the unknowable force are knowable. The
unknowable force is thus eliminated from philosophy ; and
throughout his exposition of evolution and dissolution,
when he uses the term
&quot;
force,&quot; it is to be understood as a
kind of shorthand term for
&quot; matter in motion,&quot; for they
are the only known functions of the absolute force, and
are all stateable in terms of mathematics and geometry.
With this understanding we accept the doctrine of the
persistence of force, limiting it, however, to its known
functions.
But if we include consciousness in force, and acknow
ledge it to be one of the interchangeable forces included in
the persistence of force, then we shall not be able to re
cognise an intelligible formula of Evolution.
OF CHAPTER VII.
The Persistence of .Relations amongst Forces.
The persistence of force means, then, the persistence of
the functions of force
; that is to say, matter in motion.92 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
There is a quantum of matter and a quantum of motion,
and however much the motion of some matter is accele
rated or retarded, it is only in corresponding retardation or
acceleration of the motion of other matter, and the sum of
matter is constant. This is the persistence of force.
What are forces ? It is to be presumed that, in accord
ance with harmonies of shape and motion, some matter
in motion enters into combination with other matter in
motion, forming differentiated aggregates. Is this the
meaning of a force or forces ? I cannot make anything
else out of it.
Is heat a force ? It is called by scientists, I believe,
&quot; a
mode of motion.&quot; I believe light, electricity, magnetism,
are all called modes of motion. I suppose gravitation also
is a mode of motion. The atomic theory would go to show
that chemical affinity is due to modes of motion.
In any case, it would scarcely be contended that they
are different forces, since it has already been established
that there is only one force. Forces, then, can only be a
colloquial term, and means differentiated matter in motion,
or differentiated modes of motion of matter.
The persistence of relations amongst forces, as thus ex
plained, will be readily admitted. Since the quantum of
matter and motion is constant, there is no interfering
cause, and the relations of the shapes, sizes, modes, and
rates of motion are as constant as 2 + 2 = 4, and that the
three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.
Of course, if there is any interference anything else
put into the universe then the explanations founded
upon the persistence of force or of its relations (unifor
mity of sequence) would not be valid.
The persistence of relations among forces negatives the
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those of size, shape, rate or mode of motion, or of the
aggregates of them, since matter and motion are the only
functions of force, and the only functions recognised in
the formula of Evolution
; and thus the persistence of
relations amongst forces is hostile to the evolution of any
new kind of relation, such as feeling or consciousness, and
all the phenomena of biology, psychology, and sociology
that are dependent upon the new factor.
OF CHAPTER VIII.
The Transformation and Equivalence of Forces.
The same question naturally arises in this as in the
last chapter What are forces ? I have defined them
as differentiated aggregates of matter in motion. With
this definition one may accept and understand the doc
trine of the interaction, transformation, and equivalence of
forces.
As a manifestation of something else as a form or mode
of force, the doctrine is incomprehensible, for force itself
being unknowable, the interactions of the unknowable
must be incomprehensible.
But the difficulty is in the language employed, not in
the processes of nature and in their comprehension. If
light is turned into electricity, we acknowledge the general
fact that matter in motion in one mode has altered its
mode of motion, and certain other matter in motion has
concomitantly altered its mode of motion, but that the
amount of motion remains the same. As, for instance, of
two factors a and 5, having motion 2m and 4771 respec
tively, then
a 2m + I ^m = a I 6m;94 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
but if from some causal relationship there be a transference
of motion, then
a $m + I 3m is still = a b 6m
and
a + I 6m = al 6m.
These are all measurable quantities of matter, a and b,
and measurable quantities of motion, and by their mea
surement they are known to be equivalent. And how is
force known to be equivalent except by measurement, and
how is force measurable otherwise than as matter and
motion ? The only transference is a transference of motion,
not of the indefinite something force, but of measurable
motion.
If we pass over this chapter somewhat briefly, it is
not for want of interest, but that it does not in principle
call for remark, interpreting some of the words employed
in accordance with the foregoing criticism. Into some
of the illustrations given I am not qualified to go, and
my main object does not seem to require that I should
do so.
That part of the chapter which treats of vital phenomena
is the most puzzling, for while we see the dependence of
an organism upon the motions or matter in motion of
its environment, and thus recognise the transformation of
matter in motion into other matter in motion, there still
appears to be something about the process very peculiar ;
for instance, that from the same raw material forming the
food of men and animals such different results should
follow, such different memories, habits, instincts, and in
all of them that fact of an entirely different order from
the constituents of the food, viz., consciousness.
In carrying on the argument to mentality and to
sociology, as Mr. Spencer does in this chapter, it wouldINCLUSIVE OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE.&quot; 95





to that which applies to the
matter in motion of inorganic bodies due to the considera
tions previously detailed.
Hitherto we have spoken of force as the unknown
cause of the known or knowable functions of matter in
motion which are stateable in terms of measurement i.e.,
in terms of mathematics and geometry. When we introduce
life and the facts of consciousness, of waste and repair,
generation, heredity, modifiability, &c., we have phenomena
which cannot be thus represented ; and if we speak of them








of inorganic nature. And
although we discern in the activities of organisms and of
societies the same characteristics of modes of activity as,
for instance, uniformity of sequence, movement in the line
of least resistance, &c. we accept the facts as items of
weighty import ; but this acceptance does not blind us to
the defect of connection which we have just pointed out.
The transformation and equivalence of force admitted is
not recognised to be the same as the transformation and
equivalence of force as between heat and gravitation ; and
even if it is admitted, it is so with a plus, which plus
would seem to be a plus of a different kind to shape, size,
mode or rate of motion, of a different nature to the




With regard to this Mr. Spencer states (p. 217)
:
&quot; How this metamorphosis takes place, how a force existing
as motion, heat, or light can become a mode of consciousness,
how it is possible for aerial vibrations to generate the sensation
we call sound, or for the forces liberated by chemical changes in
the brain to give rise to emotion, these are mysteries which it is95 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
impossible to fathom. But they are not profounder mysteries
than the transformations of the physical forces into each other.&quot;
Beally this is most puzzling. We are given a formula
which shall account for all changes, and we are now
brought to a change which cannot be accounted for a
mystery
! The very end and object of our studies brought
to nought, and even the transformations of the
&quot;
physical
forces&quot; viz., aggregates of matter in motion into each
other, which we thought had been theoretically explained
as the harmonies of shape and size, mode and rate of
motion, are pronounced mysteries equally profound
!
The philosophy which explains everything by a formula
says of these questions (p. 218)
:
&quot; They have simply the same insolubility as all other ultimate
questions. We can learn nothing more than that here is one of
the uniformities in the order of phenomena.&quot;
Philosophy, or an intelligible formula that from the
homogeneous shall enable us ideally to construct all the
changes of the universe, appears, then, to be impossible.
OF CHAPTER IX.
The Direction of Motion.
In this chapter Mr. Spencer seems to be starting de now.
Sections 74 and 75 take us to the beginning of things and
the ultimate constitution of the universe. For criticisms
upon them I refer to the second part of this examination.
The key to the chapter is the last paragraph of sect. 75.
&quot; As a step towards unification of knowledge, we have now to
trace these general laws throughout the various orders of change
which the cosmos exhibits. We have to note how every motion
takes place along the line of greatest traction, of least resistance,INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE&quot; 97
or of their resultant
; how the setting up of motion along a cer
tain line becomes a cause of its continuance along that line
how, nevertheless, change of relations to external forces always renders this line indirect
; and how the degree of its indirectness
increases with every addition to the number of influences at
work.&quot;
With the reservation that no account has been given of
the origin of the organic or of organism, of consciousness
or mind, there is no objection to the application of the
proposition to the motions of life and sociology, although
some very nice questions as to individual volitions might
arise ; as, for instance, when the choice lay in the direction
of the greatest resistance.
OF CHAPTER X.
The Ehytlim of Motion.
To me a novel doctrine, and beautifully explained. I,
however, understand &quot;force&quot; to be a shorthand expression
for aggregates of matter in motion.
OF CHAPTER XL
Recapitulation, Criticism, and Recommencement.
&quot; Sect 92. To resume, then, we have now to seek a law of
composition of phenomena, co-extensive with those laws of their
components set forth in the foregoing chapters. Having seen
that matter is indestructible, motion continuous, and force per
sistenthaving seen that forces are everywhere undergoing
transformation, and that motion, always following the line of
least resistance, is invariably rhythmic it remains to discover
the similarly invariable formula expressing the combined con
sequences of the actions thus separately formulated.&quot;
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Page 277.
&quot; The law we seek, therefore, must be the law of
the continuous redistribution of matter and motion. . . . The ques
tion to be answered is, What dynamic principle, true of the
metamorphosis as a whole and in its details, expresses these ever-
changing relations?&quot;
Here I notice a great obscurity, due to a change in the
terms. The law we seek, must be the law of the continuous
redistribution of matter and motion. Waiving any criti
cism of the word &quot;law,&quot; and accepting it as an expression
of uniformity of action, we read the sentence tnus:
&quot;The formula we seek must express the continuous re
distribution of matter and motion.&quot; We notice that we do
not aim at seeking the cause or origin of matter and motion,
nor the cause of gravitation, nor a constructive formula
starting with them, but only a formula or sentence that
will cover the description of the changes of the universe,
from a state of homogeneity or of less heterogeneity to
the state as we see it now.
But the object is restated and changed when it is said
that &quot;the question to be answered is, What dynamic
principle
. . . expresses these ever-changing relations?&quot;
What is a dynamic principle? and does it ever express
anything ? I must state that, after the closest considera
tion and best endeavours to understand what a
&quot;
dynamic
principle&quot; is, I am utterly unable to form the least notion.
I must, therefore, fall back upon that which I can under
stand by
&quot;the continuous redistribution of matter and
motion.&quot; Having thus realised the object, I hold it over
for a few chapters, when I will recur to it, to see how that
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OF CHAPTER XII.
Evolution and Dissolution.
The first paragraph is to the uninitiated a very great
puzzle indeed. I do not know whether to put it down to
intrinsic faultiness of statement or to my own incapacity
But I do not think that any ordinary reader of good in
telligence would be able to make anything out of it, and
one would suppose that a book should be written so as to
be understood by such an one.
Let us go into detail. Mr. Spencer says
:
&quot; An entire
history of anything must include its appearance out of the
imperceptible and its disappearance into the
imperceptible.&quot;
This implies a percipient, and renders the history of any
thing dependent upon the existence of a percipient. But
it is evident that the changes of matter in motion are not
dependent upon a percipient. Mr. Spencer is conscious of
this difficulty, and says
:
&quot; Unless on the assumption that
it acquired a sensible form at the moment of perception,
and lost its sensible form the moment after perception, it
must have had an antecedent existence under this sensible
form, and will have a subsequent existence under this
sensible form. These preceding and succeeding existences
under sensible forms are possible subjects of knowledge; and
knowledge has obviously not reached its limits until it has
united the past, present, and future histories into a whole.&quot;
The question then arises, What is a sensible form existent
apart from perception ? This is important as a necessary
demarcation of the limits of investigation. All sensible
forms that we know are formed of matter and motion
all their properties are sizes, shapes, and motions. Are we,
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motion is a sensible form, or only such of them as could
be sensible if there were the human perceptions to perceive
them, ignoring all others ? This latter would seem imper
fect, as different men and races have different ranges of
perception, and some individuals of the race have no per
ception of light, colour, or sound, and yet the sensible
forms of which they are ignorant exist to others, and are a
subject of possible knowledge. We, therefore, seem forced
to assign as the scope of all possible knowledge the range
of all past and future changes of matter and motion, quite
irrespective of the limitations of perceptibility and sensible
forms.
In the second sentence of the section Mr. Spencer speaks
of
&quot; a concrete form.&quot; What is a concrete form ? Is not
a concrete form the combination of position and motion of
two ultimate units having definite motions into an atom
differentiated from the ultimate units and from other
combinations thereof ? If not, then what are the limits
and what is the meaning of
&quot; concrete forms
&quot;
? But if so,
then
&quot; be it a single object or the whole universe, any
account which begins with it in a concrete form or leaves
off with it in a concrete form is incomplete, since there
remains an era of its knowable existence undescribed and
unexplained.&quot;
But we have again a reference to the unknowable and
to Being conditioned so as to act on our senses, and the
question is put, How came it thus conditioned ? and how
will it cease to be thus conditioned ?
Now, it will be acknowledged at once that the unknow
able has no meaning, arid we proceed to inquire as to the
meaning of Being so conditioned as to act on our senses.
We want to know what Being is ? what is meant by it
being conditioned ? and how it was done ? These, perhaps,INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM
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seem severe questions. In framing an answer to them in
my own mind, I understand being to be undifferentiated
matter in motion. I take conditioned to be the differenti
ation
; and as to how it was done, I suppose by gravitation,
or the motion of every unit towards every other unit or to
its neighbouring unit. Beyond that one cannot go.
But Mr. Spencer says
&quot; so conditioned as to act on our
senses.&quot; This seems to me to be putting the cart before
the horse. I presume the conditioning was done long
before the senses were formed. The question rather is,
How came the senses to be conditioned ? How came we
to be conscious of the perceptible and of sensible forms ?
Moreover, if the scope of philosophy is independent of
perceptibility, it is independent of the limitations of con
crete forms, and is bound to account for all changes from
the homogeneous.
We now approach the formula which shall consolidate
philosophy, and gain an idea as to what that formula
shall relate
; and on perusing sect. 94 the reader will see
that it relates to matter and motion only.
&quot; Sect. 94. Already in the foregoing paragraphs the outline of
such a formula is foreshadowed. Already in recognising the
fact that science, tracing back the genealogies of various objects,
finds their components were once in diffused states, and pursuing
their histories forwards, finds diffused states will be again
assumed by them, we have recognised the fact that the formula
must be one comprehending the two opposite processes of con
centration and diffusion; and already, in thus describing the
general nature of the formula, we have approached a specific
expression of it. The change from a diffused imperceptible state
to a concentrated perceptible state is an integration of matter and
concomitant dissipation of motion ; and the change from a con
centrated perceptible state to a diffused imperceptible state is an
absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration of matter.
These are truisms. Constituent parts cannot aggregate without102 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
losing some of their relative motion ; and they cannot separate
without more relative motion being given to them. We are not
concerned here with any motion which the components of a
mass have with respect to other masses ; we are concerned only
with the motion they have with respect to one another. Con
fining our attention to this internal motion, and to the matter
possessing it, the axiom which we have to recognise is that a
progressing consolidation involves a decrease of internal motion,
and that increase of internal motion involves a progressing
unconsolidation.
&quot; When taken together, the two opposite processes thus for
mulated constitute the history of every sensible existence under
its simplest form. Loss of motion and consequent integration,
eventually followed by gain of motion and
consequent^
disinte
grationsee here a statement comprehensive of the entire series
of changes passed through: comprehensive in an extremely
general way, as any statement which holds of sensible existences
at large must be, but still comprehensive in the sense that all
the changes gone through fall within it. This will probably be
thought too sweeping an assertion, but we shall quickly find it
justified.&quot;
Sect. 97 should be read carefully. It contains a defi





dissolution.&quot; Mr. Spencer specifies
what he does mean and what he does not mean in the use
of them. Thus, throwing aside all other meanings, the




integration of matter and the concomitant dissipation of
motion. It will be noted that the word
&quot; force
&quot; does not
occur in the definition.
But after all the care expended in the definition of evo
lution and dissolution, it is all vitiated by the concluding
paragraph.
&quot;While, then, we shall by dissolution everywhere mean
the process tacitly implied in its ordinary meaning the
absorption (transference ?) of motion and the disintegrationINCLUSIVE OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE.&quot; 103
of matter; we shall everywhere mean by evolution the
process which is always an integration of matter and dissi
pation of motion, but which, as we shall see, is in most
cases much more than this.&quot;
The confusion is caused by the last few words. What
evolution was defined to be is then not complete ; it is in
most cases much more than what it was said to be.
Surely a curious definition this. The antithesis of dissolu
tion, after all, is not perfect. Dissolution is dissipation of
matter and transference of motion, but evolution is some
thing more than the opposite process. And as a matter of
fact, it will be found that in the process of dissolution as
described by Mr. Spencer he keeps pretty well to his
limitations of the words
&quot; matter and motion,&quot; and in the
few cases in which he uses the word
&quot;
force,&quot; it might
easily be substituted by the words &quot;matter in motion;&quot;
whereas in his description of the processes of evolution
there is a constant recurrence to that occult word, which,
represented by the symbol x, stands for anything the
reader likes to fancy.
Dissolution then is
&quot; mm mm mm m mm
changing into &amp;lt; in
Evolution is
mm mm mm mm
) , . .




In this representation m stands for matter, the small m
for motion, and the numerals for quantities of motion. F
symbolises force, and it would be better if Mr. Spencer
had used it instead of the whole word throughout his ex
position, as it would more correctly represent the indefinite
character of its value.
In sect. 105, however, I find that Mr. Spencer recurs to104 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
this
&quot;
something more,&quot; and the something more that he
refers to is compound evolution, which is technically no
thing more than varied relations of matter in motion.
OF CHAPTER XIII.
Simple and Compound Evolution.
This is a very important chapter, and requires very care
ful study. I do not know that we can object to the de
scription of compound evolution by means of secondary
changes in the process of concentration and dissipation.
Sect. 103, however, should be well examined. It relates
to organic matter, i.e., protein, of which the distinctive
peculiarity
&quot; consists in the combination of matter into a
form embodying an enormous amount of motion at the
same time that it has a great degree of concentration.&quot;
This, in the first place, does not conform to the ex
pressed law of evolution, which is the concentration of
matter and the concomitant dissipation of motion, but as
it recognises merely changes of matter in motion, we are
willing to accept it without objection.
But what is the meaning of
&quot; motion locked up
&quot;
? Of
course it cannot mean motion not going on. That would
be a flat contradiction; just the same as speaking of a
thing whose existence is suspended. It would have gone
out of existence, but it is ready to come into existence
again. It means, I suppose, that there is a great amount
of molecular or atomic motion actually going on in the
interior of the mass, or even in the interior of the mole
cule, which does not affect the relation of the mass or the
molecule with its environment.
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disguised, cannot be absolutely lost in combinations, it is
to be inferred that the protein molecule concentrates a
comparatively large amount of motion in a small
space.&quot;
The characters of the elements are shapes, sizes, modes
and rates of motion. When they enter into combinations





? The motion in any case is
certainly not lost, but the inference is, therefore, not that
it is still there unchanged, but disguised so that it cannot
be perceived; but that it has been transferred or com
pounded, and is a factor with others in a resultant motion.
We have here the curious and new notion of a concentra
tion of motion. We have heard hitherto of a concentration
of matter : the concentration of motion
is new. It means, I suppose, that if
these dots represent molecules moving
in the limits of the space assigned, that
by some means these limits might be reduced as under ;
only the law of Evolution, that the con-
centration of matter is accompanied by the . . ..
dissipation or transference of motion, is not
complied with in this case, but that a more rapid motion
through the smaller spaces is set up instead, and thus
motion may be said to be concentrated. I do not know
whether this is justifiable or not, but since it introduces no
new factor, I am willing to admit that it may be so : at the
same time it seems to me that as the properties of an atom
or molecule, beyond its mere shape and size, consist only
in the speciality of its motions, that if these are changed it
ceases to be what it was. However, there may be intri
cacies of relationship of matter in motion which we are
as yet unable to explain.
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sorbing heat ? Does it mean that the molecules move
more quickly, or that the intersticial ether moves more
rapidly, or that there is an increase in the quantity of it ?
Of course, in any case, the absorption of heat must mean
the increase of motion of something. Mr. Spencer calls it
&quot;insensible motion in a free state the motion we call heat.&quot;
Does
&quot; motion in a free state
&quot; mean motion not of matter ?
If so, how can that be ? In any case, whether sensible or
not, it must be motion of something, and that something
in relation to environment, even if only to interrnolecular
environment.
Mr. Spencer, in this chapter, does not attempt to account
for the organic or for organism ; and as I have already
criticised the attempt that he does make elsewhere, it is
not necessary for me to dwell upon this matter. The
argument drawn from the comparative bulk of the con
stituents of the human body, if free and uncombined, when
compared with their bulk in combination, is obscure as
to the inferences to be drawn, and even if we admit the
inference drawn by Mr. Spencer, which is not unwarranted
very reasonable, in fact we may do so on the safe
ground of the relationships of matter in motion, though
their organisation remains unexplained. But there is a
plus, an unknown factor, which has entered into the pro
cess. So in the continuation of the argument into organic
development, after this plus or unknown factor has made
its appearance, the argument, allowing for this plus, still
holds good in the formation of those secondary changes
which are called compound evolution.
We would further suggest a question as to the origin of
compound evolution. For if we start with &quot;the homo
geneous,&quot; and find that by simple evolution a mere process
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tion and combination of ultimate units until a certain
equilibrium is effected, then we arrive at the end of simple
evolution.
But how does compound evolution arise ?
Mr. Spencer says, p. 287
:
&quot; Where the only forces at
work are those directly tending to produce aggregation
or diffusion, the whole history of an aggregate will com
prise no more than the approaches of its components
towards their common centre and their recessions from
their common centre.&quot; As I understand the formula of
Evolution, there are no other forces than those referred to,
and therefore, starting from
&quot; the homogeneous,&quot; this is the
whole history that can result from the formula of Evolu
tion. If we start from a mass of homogeneous units, and
the law of action and reaction as equal and opposite, I do
not see how any other history is possible.
But Mr. Spencer goes on to describe compound evolu
tion, and to describe the circumstances under which it will
arise. These circumstances are complex conditions already
implying a precedent compound evolution. But this pre
cedent compound evolution is wholly unaccounted for.
The statement, or argument if it be one simply begs
the question. How compound evolution can arise out of
simple evolution is not shown, and therefore, again, we
are at a loss to account for the origin of compound evo
lution.
In fact, it is very evident that a complex or differen
tiated state is requisite for a compound evolution. How
to account for this complex and differentiated state, from
which only compound evolution that is to say, the state
of things as we find them now is only to be produced, the
statement of Evolution by Mr. Spencer fails to show, and,
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whole history of things, from the imperceptible to the per
ceptible, proclaims its own inadequacy.
The fact of the matter is, Mr. Spencer starts, not from
the homogeneous, but from the hypothesis of an indefinite
tract of ether interspersed with nebulous clouds, composed
of what we know as the seventy or eighty elements in a
vaporous condition, but how produced and why retaining
their characteristics, he does not attempt to show; and
from this hypothesis he works out the processes of Evolu
tion, but it is clear that it is not a complete philosophy ; it
is not Evolutionism as defined, but Developmentalism,
taking as its starting-point a very remote stage, but, never
theless, just as arbitrary as that of any one else who starts
at a later stage.
OF CHAPTERS XIV., XV., XVI., AND XVII.
The Law of Evolution.
Here I think I may save time and trouble by a general
criticism. These chapters are very interesting and very
instructive, whether the particular formula I am criticising
is valid or not.
In each chapter a certain conclusion is arrived at, form
ing a cumulative exposition, each item of which, worked
out separately and in full detail, is summarised into one
important characterisation of the process of Evolution.
Page 396.
&quot; The formula finally stands thus : Evolution is
an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion,
during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent
homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity ; and during
which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transforma
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&quot; Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant
dissipation of motion.&quot;
To this, however, there is a most important exception in
the case of nitrogeneous compounds, where, as we found,
there took place a
&quot; concentration of motion.&quot;
Again, if consciousness is included in Evolution that is
to say, if the change from unconscious matter to conscious
matter has to be accounted for by Evolution then the con
centration of matter and dissipation of motion, or the alter
nation of the process, does not account for it.
&quot;During which the matter passes from an indefinite,
incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent hetero
geneity.&quot;
It will be evident, in looking through these chapters,
that Mr. Spencer does not start from a state of homo
geneity, and therefore his formula is wrong, unless he
is prepared to assert a state of perfect homogeneity at
the commencement of Evolution, and to argue therefrom.
This position elsewhere he would seem to adopt, and has
already, in the first part of this criticism, received our
consideration. But in the chapters now under review it
will be seen that the advance in all cases is from the less
heterogeneous, and not from the homogeneous.
&quot;
During which the retained motion undergoes a parallel
transformation.&quot;
In this passage there is some obscurity of expression, as
it seems difficult to apply some of the terms to motion.
Thus there is no indefinite motion nor incoherent motion ;
but there are motions of bodies more or less in definite and
permanent relation to each other, and we can understand
that the progress made is from the homogeneous, separate,
and individual motions to combined motions, and intri
cately related motions, and diversities of relations of combi
nations.no SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
In our examination of chapter
ii. we found that Mr.
Spencer set before himself the problem the solution of
which we have just been considering. Let us now consider
that problem, and see if it meets with an equal solution.
Mr. Spencer says (chapter xi., p. 274)
:
&quot; The decomposition of phenomena into their elements is but
a preparation for understanding phenomena in their state of
composition as actually manifested. To have ascertained the
laws of the factors is not at all to have ascertained the laws of
their co-operation. The question is not how any factor matter,
or motion, or force behaves by itself or under some imagined
simple conditions ; nor is it even how one factor behaves under
the complicated conditions of actual existence. The thing to be
expressed is the joint product of the factors under all its various
aspects. Only when we can formulate the total process have we
gained that knowledge of it which philosophy aspires
to.&quot;
The argument is elaborated in sect. 92, p. 276.
&quot; To
resume, then, we have now to seek a law of composition
of phenomena co-extensive with those laws of their com
ponents set forth in the foregoing chapters.&quot;
These components, I suppose, are matter (i.e., units of
extension and resistance), motion (i.e., equal mutual motions
of attraction and repulsion), force (i.e., the unknowable
cause of matter in motion).
&quot;
Having seen that matter is indestructible, motion con
tinuous, and force persistent having seen that forces&quot;
(note &quot;forces&quot; a differentiation of matter in motion
roughly called ly that name, and implying the attainment
of a certain stage in evolution)
&quot; are everywhere under
going transformation, and that motion, always following
the line of least resistance, is invariably rhythmic, it re
mains to discover the similarly invariable formula ex
pressing the combined consequences of the actions thus
separately formulated.&quot;INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE.&quot; in
Page 277.
&quot; The law we seek, therefore, must be the law
of the continuous redistribution of matter and motion.&quot;
(Note, omitting force and forces.}
: Absolute rest and
permanence do not exist. Every object, no less than the
aggregate of all objects, undergoes from instant to instant
some alteration of state. Gradually or quickly it is re
ceiving motion or losing motion
&quot;
(Note, moves more
quickly or moves more slowly, as other aggregates move more
slowly or more qiiickly)
&quot; while some or all of its parts are
simultaneously changing their relations to one another.
And the question to be answered is What dynamic prin
ciple, true of the metamorphosis as a whole and in its
details, expresses these ever-changing relations ?
&quot;
Here force is discarded, and the subsequent reply in the
formula of Evolution and dissolution omits it, although its
employment in the singular and the plural is still retained,
with a very confusing result, as if in the redistributions of
matter and motion some outside force or forces not included
in them were perpetually interfering with their processes.
And I must here endeavour to remove any misappre
hension arising from the meaning of the word
&quot;
evolution,&quot;
as seeming to imply more than the formula I have several
times quoted. It is taken to mean sometimes a process of
&quot;
unfolding,&quot; but there may be some who call themselves
Evolutionists, because they believe that all successions of
things are processes of growth or unfolding, as if from a
germ something like the development of a plant, or an
animal, or a society. All such notions and associations,
however true they may be, are not to be identified with
the doctrine of Evolution as expounded by Mr. Spencer,
and it is that alone that I am dealing with. There is no
more a process of unfolding in the formula of Evolution we
are dealing with than is expressed in the relations of the1 1 2 SPENCER &amp;gt;S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
size and rates of rotation of an engine-shaft, and the sizes
and rates of motion of all the wheels and cog-wheels of
the machinery. The notion of unfolding or development
is utterly foreign to the formula. It is physics, it is
mechanics from first to last, and the formula cannot be
amended without radically altering the character and
nature of it and its processes.
Page 327. &quot;Evolution, then,&quot; he says, &quot;under its primary
aspect, is a change from a less coherent form to a more
coherent form, consequent on the dissipation of motion
and integration of matter.&quot;
And again, page 285: &quot;Evolution, under its simplest
and most general aspect, is the integration of matter and
concomitant dissipation of motion, while dissolution is the
absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration of
matter.&quot;
I think an improved statement would be :
&quot; Evolution is
the integration of ultimate units into definite and specific
relations of an increasingly complex character, which pro
cess is accompanied by a loss of rates of motion, which
is transferred in a quantitative degree in acceleration of
the rates of motion of other units or combinations of
units, during which aggregates of matter
pass,&quot; &c.
But however this may be, the terms &quot;force&quot; and
&quot; forces
&quot;
are not included in the terms of the definition,
and therefore I think that in the subsequent working out
of the theory of Evolution they are quite out of place, and
the cause of much confusion in the mind of the reader.
The confusion is this : one is apt to think that there is
after all in Evolution an element of mystery, something
that cannot be gauged and measured, something that can
not be put down geometrically and the number of its
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cohesive and complete, the terms of the all-embracing for
mula are sufficient for its own exposition.
Either, then, Mr. Spencer has committed the grave lite
rary fault of confusing his readers by the use of terms not
included in his formula a literary fault capable of correc
tion or in the working out of his system he has found
his formula insufficient a still graver objection. For if
the formula is insufficient, the whole key to the secrets of
the universe is lost, and we find ourselves wandering in a
labyrinthine puzzle. Which is it ?
What is required ? A correction of the exposition or a
correction of the definition ? If it is necessary to predi
cate any special forces other than that constituting matter
and motion, and presiding over its concentration at the
outset of Evolution, let it be done.
I do not presume to say that Mr. Spencer is wrono- I
only presume to speak of the impression his book produces
upon an ordinary mind in its endeavour to understand
clearly what is meant. I have found great difficulty in
following the thread of the argument. The book is like
the process of Evolution itself; we never know where
we are
; we seem to slip from one thing into another so
easily, that in the transmutation and connection of words
we often have a difficulty in making out our position
at all.
In this instance we are duly and solemnly impressed
with the associations of the unknowable in connection
with the word
&quot;
force,&quot; which henceforward we surround
with an element of mystery, and when we afterwards meet
with it in the exposition of Evolution, in the formula of
which it is not included, we seem to have joined company
again with a mystical companion from whom we had in
thought parted with for ever, and whose image remained
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only in our minds as a reminiscence of the last shadowy
dream of kindly, old-fashioned superstitions.
It seems to me that the words &quot;force&quot; and &quot;forces&quot;
should have been strictly denned in their employment in
the description of Evolution, or that there should have
been an intermediate book between the Unknowable and
the Knowable, giving a formal and final account of the use
of the terms. If force is the cause of matter, and the
cause of the motion of matter, it is only equal to its
results ; and if we know its results, we know it as we only
can know it. If its results are matter in motion in various
combinations if we take account of all matter and all
motion, and all combinations thereof we know all we
can know; and even if force is the cause of them, it
becomes to us indifferent. It is no factor in our expo
sition.
It would take a long paper to apply this criticism in
detail right through the chapters on Evolution. I can
not do more than indicate it. It may be my fault,
but I must confess I cannot understand a good many




&quot; excess of force,&quot; &c.
; and the
predication of eras, when the attractive forces predominate,
and alternate eras, when the repulsive forces predominate,
I cannot quite realise in thought from wondering what has
become of the others in the meantime.
My objection is to the employment of the terms &quot;force&quot;
and &quot;forces&quot; in the book on the Knowable and in the
exposition of the theory of Evolution. To say the least of
it, systems of philosophy ought to be worked out in terms
of their own definitions. They ought to be worked out like
Euclid. If Euclid changed his definitions in the elaboration
of his theorems and problems, instead of constantly referringINCLUSIVE OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE&quot; 115
back to axioms and definitions, no satisfactory result would
be arrived at. And Mr. Spencer in his statement of the




The Interpretation of Evolution.
How are we to approach the criticism of this chapter ?
The subject-matter of it is a problem.
&quot; Sect. 147. The task before us, then, is that of exhibiting
the phenomena of Evolution in synthetic order. Setting out
from an established ultimate principle, it has to be shown that
the course of transformation among all kinds of existences cannot
but be that which we have seen it to be. ... In other words,
the phenomena of Evolution have to be deduced from the per
sistence of force. As before said : To this an ultimate analysis
brings us down; and on this a rational synthesis must build
up. This being the ultimate truth which transcends experience
by underlying it, so furnishing a common basis on which the
widest generalisations stand, these widest generalisations are to
be unified, by referring them to this common basis, ... we
have similarly to affiliate the universal traits of Evolution, by
showing that, given the persistence of force, the redistribution
of matter and motion necessarily proceeds in such a way as to
produce
them.&quot;
The formula of Evolution is :
&quot; Evolution is an integra
tion of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion,
during which the matter passes from an indefinite, inco
herent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity,
and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel
transformation.
&quot;
The problem as stated is,
&quot;
Setting out from an estab
lished ultimate principle,&quot; &c.,
&quot; in other words, the pheno
mena of Evolution have to be deduced from the persistence
of force.&quot;n6 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
The question is, I suppose What state of affairs at
the first will account for the state of affairs at the last ?
We have, then, to start with an indefinite, incoherent
homogeneity of matter and motion. Homogeneity we have
already considered, and we found it consist of a mass of
ultimate units of like size, shape, and motion. But we were
forced to predicate of it a certain shape, viz., spherical, in
order to attain our idea of homogeneity. An equal relation
of motion implies similarity of space relationship, and this
is most nearly approached in a sphere, since there is only
one central result of motion instead of many. This, how
ever, is definiteness, and it is coherency. We seem there
fore obliged to deny that the homogeneous is indefinite
and incoherent. This is a criticism, however, that ought
to have been brought forward in the last chapter.
Now to this state of homogeneity we have to apply the
principle of the persistence of force and see what comes of
it ? And as it is very difficult to imagine homogeneity,
and as it is difficult if not impossible to frame a concep
tion of force and therefore of the persistence of it, it is a
problem that eludes mental effort to apply the principle
of the persistence of force to homogeneity so as to pro
duce the known condition of things. If it is said that we
do not know force, we are asked to explain the known by
the unknown, and to include in knowledge to make it
more known that which is utterably unknowable to
deduce the known from the unknown to produce some
thing out of nothing to unify knowledge by verbal
mysticisms.
We have already considered this subject, and came to
the conclusion that if w
re know all the effects of force, we
know force. The known effects of force are matter and
motion, or, more properly, matter in motion. We also knowINCLUSIVE OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE.&quot; 117
that these are constant quantities, and to that fact we may,
if we like, give the name of the persistence of force
; and
if from this we can deduce all the traits of evolution, and
account for all changes in the cosmos, we unify philosophy.
1
But we must take care fully to realise to ourselves and
always to bear in mind that the persistence of force means
nothing more than the constancy of the quantum of matter
and of motion.
Very well, then, can we on the ground of the constant
quantity of matter in motion deduce from it, on its appli
cation to the homogeneous, all the known changes of the
cosmos ?
In the first part of our criticism we tried to do so, and
failed.
But how does Mr. Spencer set about to prove that the
persistence of force accounts for all changes? In this
way.
In chapter xix. he advances the theory of the instability
of the homogeneous. As just remarked, we have in the
first part of our criticism considered this, and found it a
failure.
However, let us consider Mr. Spencer s argument in sect.
155, in which he undertakes to show &quot;that this general
truth is demonstrable cb priori&quot;
&quot;We have to prove specifically that the instability of the
homogeneous is a corollary from the persistence of force.&quot;
Now how does one set about getting a corollary? I
thought a corollary was a natural and inevitable conclusion
of thought from the terms of a proposition, and if I try to
frame a proposition the terms of which shall describe the
homogeneous, I cannot see that it contains any cause of
1 But if we do not know all the effects of force in the cosmos, then
philosophy is impossible.1 1 8 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
change, nor can I see that the persistence of force (i.e., the
constancy of the quantity of matter and motion) should
be the cause of instability or change. On the contrary, the
corollary that I should draw from the constancy of the
quantity of the matter and motion would be the permanency
of the established relations. If, on the other hand, I ima
gined the inconstancy of the quantums as opposed to the
permanence and persistence of force, I could naturally draw
the corollary of instability and change. But the varia
bility of the quantity of matter and motion is denied. The
permanence, constancy, and persistence seem to me to pre
clude change.
What is a priori reasoning ? I should have thought the
above was, if there is any such process.
Mr. Spencer undertakes to demonstrate the instability
of the homogeneous a priori. But he sets to work induc
tively, and adduces a variety of instances where the homo
geneous is found to be unstable. Is this apriori reasoning ?
Is it a deduction from the persistence of force i.e., the con
stant quantity of matter and motion ?
However, to take the argument on its own merits, Mr.
Spencer supposes a mass of matter and another piece of
matter striking it. He takes a body upon which radiant
heat is falling. Then he takes a force and forces, what
ever these may be, and shows how changes are produced
by their interaction. He speaks of the results of two
sets of factors.
Now, I ask is this the homogeneous
? Does any number of
bodies homogeneous in themselves, and subject to a variety
of motions such as heat, constitute the homogeneous
? Does
any argument drawn from relations of the heterogeneous
throw any light upon the nature of the homogeneous
?
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homogeneous from the constancy of the quantity of matter
in motion?
Mr. Spencer continues (p. 428) by arguing that, &quot;even
apart from the action of any external force, the equili
brium of a homogeneous aggregate must be destroyed by
the unequal actions of its parts on each other.&quot;
Then follows a very good argument if for
&quot;parts&quot; is read
&quot;units,&quot; which I suggest, not to alter the argument, but to




might be taken to mean
&quot;quarters&quot; or &quot;tenths,&quot; or any aggregate of units.
&quot; That mutual influence which produces aggregation (not
to mention other mutual influences) must work different
effects on the different parts, since they are severally ex
posed to it in unlike amounts and directions. This will be
clearly seen on remembering that the portions of which
the whole is made up may be severally regarded as minor
wholes; that on each of these minor wholes the action
of the entire aggregate then becomes an external incident
force; that such external incident force must, as above
shown, work unlike changes in the parts of any such
minor whole ; and that if the minor wholes are severally
thus rendered heterogeneous, the entire aggregate is ren
dered heterogeneous.&quot; There is another little flaw here, I
perceive. The part is regarded as a minor whole, having
parts which are modified. It would be better to regard the
change produced as one of motion, viz., the motion of the
ultimate unit. This argument relates then to the homo
geneous made up of like units and equal motions. Now
all this was considered in the first part of our criticism, and
we are not making progress. We considered a spherical
mass of like units having motions of equal mutual attrac
tion and repulsion, and got a total movement in the mass
of alternate concentration and retrocession, nothing more.120 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
Motion implies instability in a certain sense, but the
rhythms of concentration and expansion, being regular,
are stable relations and produce no definite coherent com
binations.
The question is, Does the constancy of the quantity of
matter and motion imply change ? Mr. Spencer has not
shown that it does.
The next question is, Does the supposition of the homo
geneous, i.e., a spherical mass of like units having equal
mutual motions of attraction and repulsion, imply change
or differentiation ? I think not, but, if so, it ends even
tually in equilibration.
Mr. Spencer, on page 429, makes a representation of the
homogeneous, but as the idea of infinity is introduced, the
supposition is, as he says, inconceivable.
We have dwelt thus long on the interpretation of evolu
tion, or the synthesis of evolution, and its first step from
the homogeneous, as we consider it of vital importance in
the study of a philosophy which professes to account for
all changes. The first step is always the most difficult, as
well as the most important.
Our conclusion is, that, as a matter of thought and argu
ment, the instability of the homogeneous is not deducible
as a corollary from the persistence of force i.e., the con
stancy of the quantity of matter in motion. And since
all the further changes of Evolution are dependent upon
this, then no other change or characteristic of Evolution
is a logical corollary from the persistence of force.
OF CHAPTER XIX.
TJie Instability of the, Homogeneous.
This chapter has already received our attention, and
passing over the two next chapters, we examine chapterINCLUSIVE OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE.&quot; 121
xxii. next, because we argue that from the homogeneous




Given the homogeneous and granted concentration, this
concentration would proceed until an equilibrium of motion
was attained. An equilibrium of motion once attained is
represented algebraically thus
m mn=mmn
and no further disturbance of relation is possible.
This is a corollary from the constancy of the quantity
of matter in motion, and the consequent persistency of the
relations of matter in motion.
To suppose any other matter in motion which shall
disturb it is to suppose something coming into existence
out of nothing, and to deny the constant quantity of
matter in motion.
Therefore an equilibrium once set up remains for ever,
and no further change is possible.
An equilibrium is, however, stateable in two ways.
If we say that an equilibrium is rest that is to say,
no motion we would seem to say that all motion ceases,
which is a denial of the proposition that motion is con
tinuous, and an assertion that motion goes out of existence.
One motion cannot cancel another. The only equilibrium
of motion can be alternation.
We are, therefore, forced to suppose that the equilibrium
established must be an equivalent alternate motion.
This agrees with the axiom that all action is equal and
opposite. The equilibrium established would, therefore,
be an alternate and equal concentration and retrocession.122 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
This is an equilibrium, and since no extra matter and
motion can come into existence to disturb it, it will go on
for ever.
And supposing a state of very complex heterogeneity,
even then, according to Mr. Spencer, we are ever progress
ing towards a state of equilibrium, which, once attained,
there does not seem any possibility of further disturbance.
This is a long and interesting chapter, and I do not see
any necessity for a detailed criticism. The above seems
to me a correct summary of the position, and the correct
corollary to be drawn from it. I think the reader will
find it fully corroborated by a perusal of sect. 176 in this
chapter. I have taken this chapter out of its order in the
work in order to present the first difficulty in the syn
thesis of Evolution which we are engaged upon, for if we
shortly arrive at an equilibrium or perfect balance of
matter in motion in their interrelations, we come to a full
stop.
OF CHAPTER XX.
The Multiplication of Effects.
I object very much to the first paragraph of this chapter.
It is an instance of loose writing throughout.
&quot; To the cause of increasing complexity set forth in the
last chapter we have ... to add another. . . . Even in
the absence of the cause already assigned, it would neces
sitate a change from the homogeneous to the heteroge
neous.&quot;
1
We read the following paragraph very carefully to see
how the homogeneous can be rendered heterogeneous, and
find that the homogeneous referred to is not the homo-
1 Mr. Spencer speaks of a conflict between force and matter. This
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geneous at all, but heterogeneity that is to say, differen
tiated concrete bodies in relation with external forces, so
this argument falls to the ground.
Our general criticism of the chapter follows naturally
from the great objection made on page in, viz., that,
after giving a definition of Evolution, which contains the
two factors matter and motion, although Mr. Spencer had
proposed to include three, viz., matter, motion, and force
;
yet when he comes to the synthesis of Evolution he picks
up the omitted factor, and works out the synthesis as if
it had been included in the definition.
Thus, if we refer to our diagram, it is as if he had
narrowed everything down to the formula placed at the
apex, and had afterwards opened out a supplementary
channel between the upper cone and the lower one. In
addition to this, if consciousness be not accountable as
matter in motion, a second channel might have to be
opened lower down in the lower cone.
The reader must carefully bear in mind that, according
to the definition of Evolution, there are only two factors to
be taken into account in the synthesis of Evolution, viz.,
matter and motion. Therefore when, in this chapter on
the multiplication of effects, he comes upon the terms
&quot;force&quot; or &quot;forces,&quot; with or without a variety of adjec
tives, such as &quot;a single force,&quot; &quot;forces that widely di
verge,&quot;
&quot; forces differing in their kinds,&quot; he is bound to
translate their processes and relations into terms of mat
ter in motion, expressible in shapes, sizes, modes, and
rates, by geometry and arithmetic.
And we must also bear in mind that the multiplication
of effects, however produced, and however complex they
may be, by the terms of thfe definition of Evolution can
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motion : that is to say, no new kind of force or quality can
find its way amongst them. For, given shape and size, and
given mode and numbers of rates of motion, it is possible
to calculate the universe. The whole cosmos is merely an
arithmetical and geometrical problem. There is no new
factor introduced. Or if there is, the formula of Evolution
OF CHAPTER XXI.
Segregation.
My criticism on this chapter follows on the same lines
as the last. The general proposition is this, and is quite
acceptable if the word
&quot; motion
&quot; be substituted for the
word &quot;force.&quot;
&quot; That in the actions and reactions of force and matter
an unlikeness in either of the factors necessitates an un-
likeness of the effects, and that in the absence of unlike
ness in either of the factors, the effects must be alike.&quot;
OF CHAPTER XXIII.
Dissolution.
This chapter was very fully considered at the commence
ment of the criticism.
OF CHAPTER XXIV.
Summary and Conclusion.
In the last paragraph of page 541, Mr. Spencer makes a
clear and uncompromising statement of the claims of philo
sophy, which we have referred to in the course of this
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In the two succeeding paragraphs, page 542, he gives an
equally definite statement of the factors by which aU phe
nomena are to be explained.
&quot; By these considerations we were brought within view of the
formula. Tor if it had to comprehend the entire progress from
the imperceptible to the perceptible, and from the perceptible to
the imperceptible ; and if it was also to express the continuous
redistribution of matter and motion, then, obviously, it could be
no other than one denning the opposite processes of concentra
tion and diffusion in terms of matter and motion. And if so,
it must be a statement of the truth that the concentration of
matter implies the dissipation of motion, and that, conversely,
the absorption of motion implies the diffusion of matter.
&quot;
Such, in fact, we found to be the law of the entire cycle of
changes passed through by every existence
; loss of motion and
consequent integration, eventually followed by gain of motion
and consequent disintegration. And we saw that, besides applying
to the whole history of each existence, it applies to each detail of
the history. Both processes are going on at every instant
; but
always there is a differential result in favour of the first or the
second. And every change, even though it be only a transposi
tion of parts, inevitably advances the one process or the other.&quot;
We cannot help thinking that Mr. Spencer confuses a
description of the general processes of changes with the
explanation of them. An explanation would be such as
this : Given a quantum of ultimate units in motion, certain
facts of mutual relation of size and shape, mode and rate of
motion, then there will result from the harmonies or dis
cordances of them certain definite changes, i.e., combina
tions and recombinations into aggregates having complex
relations, which, although practically incalculable, are
nevertheless comprehensible, and we would be able to
understand how the state of affairs at the first necessitated
all subsequent changes. A description, however, does not
afford such an insight or furnish us with an organon for126 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
construction, but admitting any number of original factors,
simply finds that all changes of them are either into
definite combinations or dissolution of combinations. So
that we can frame a formula which shall be a descrip
tion of processes, but yet not form an explanation of
them.
It is just possible that the unification of knowledge that
Mr. Spencer claims is not to be sought for in the formula




&quot;But the fact which it here chiefly concerns us to
remember is, that each of these laws of the redistribution of matter
and motion was found to be a derivative law the law deducible
from the fundamental law. The persistence of force being
granted, there follow as inevitable inferences the instability of
the homogeneous, and the multiplication of effects ; while
1
segregation and equilibration also become corollaries. And
thus discovering that the processes of change formulated under
these titles are so many different aspects of one transformation
determined by an ultimate necessity, we arrive at a complete
unification of them a synthesis in which Evolution in general
and in detail becomes known as an implication of the law that
transcends proof. Moreover, in becoming thus unified with one
another, the complex truths of Evolution become simultaneously
unified with those simpler truths shown to have a like affiliation,
the equivalents of transformed forces, the movement of every
mass and molecule along its line of least resistance, and the limi
tation of its motion by rhythm ; which further unification brings
us to a conception of the entire plexus of changes presented by
each concrete phenomenon, and by the aggregate of concrete
phenomena, as a manifestation of one fundamental fact a fact
shown alike in the total change and in all the separate changes
composing it.
5
But then we do not understand the persistence of force,
and therefore &quot;the unification&quot; does not &quot;bring to us a
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each complete phenomenon ... as a manifestation of one
fundamental fact.&quot;
The only definite idea capable of enabling us to form
such a conception is by interpreting persistence of force
into constancy of quantity of matter in motion, and this
we have found fails in some respects of the required uni
fication.
In sect. 194, Mr. Spencer says, page 556: &quot;Before pro
ceeding to interpret the detailed phenomena of life, and
mind, and society in terms of matter, motion, and force, the
reader must be reminded in what sense the interpretations
are to be accepted.&quot; It appears from this that the pheno
mena of life, mind, and society are not to be interpreted by
the stated formula of Evolution, which mentions only matter
and motion. They are to be interpreted also in terms of
force, whatever the terms of force may be, and which are
not given anywhere in the work. We are therefore in
vited to enter upon an inquiry, and to use a word and
terms of a something, the first of which is undefined and
asserted to be undefinable, and the second of which (the
terms) are not given.
The only terms which we can by implication give to
force are matter and motion
; yet, since they are two of the
three factors given, the third of which is force, they would
thereby seem to be excluded as terms of force.
If matter and motion were the terms of force, then the
theory would be materialistic
; but Mr. Spencer goes on to
repudiate this sense of his interpretations of the pheno
mena of life, mind, and society. Therefore the terms of
force must include more than the terms of matter and
motion, which are the two factors in the stated formula of





is not given, nor the terms of it, it will naturally seem to128 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
follow that all the subsequent interpretations of pheno
mena in the volumes on Biology, Psychology, and Sociology
are vitiated by this initial defect.
The final paragraph of the chapter will be considered in
the third part of this criticism.
Summary of Criticism.
My object throughout this criticism has been to show
that there has been a vital discrepancy between Mr.
Spencer s formula of Evolution and the exposition of the
steps that lead up to it, on the one hand, and the synthesis
deducible from it, on the other.
The formula of Evolution is framed upon the mutual
relations of two factors, viz., matter and motion, or matter
in motion. The preceding argument and the succeeding
synthesis both include force.
It follows from this either that the formula should be
amended so as to include force, or that the exposition
and synthesis should be amended so as to exclude it.
We have endeavoured to amend the synthesis so as to
make it conformable to the formula, and having done so,
we find two or three insuperable difficulties, viz. :
Firstly, A probable one in the initial change from the
homogeneous.
Secondly, In the change from the first equilibrium and
;he distribution and permanence of the so-called elements.
Thirdly, In the change from the unconscious to the con
scious, with its consequent phenomena of organism and
life.
Fourthly, The contradictory phenomena of the concen
tration of motion in nitrogenous compounds.
From which we conclude that no explanation of the
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motion is able to account for all the changes in the cosmos.
Let us, however, see if we can amend the formula of
Evolution so as to introduce the term
&quot;
force.&quot;
&quot; Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant
dissipation of motion (which are themselves manifestations
of a persistent force), during which,&quot; &c. But it is evident
here that the parenthetical interpolation is merely ex
planatory of the antecedents of Evolution, and not of its
sequences, as given in the following part of the formula,
and our first attempt fails.
Or we might say
:
&quot; Force constitutes matter, and those motions of attrac
tion and repulsion which it manifests, and Evolution, is,&quot;
&c. But this again only relates to the antecedents of
Evolution, not to its sequences.
If we wish to get it into the sequences we would have
to say, &quot;Evolution is an integration of matter and con
comitant dissipation of motion, and in which force
&quot;
does
something what shall we say ? interferes occasionally to
disturb equilibrium, or to endow protein or protoplasm
with consciousness ?
&quot; and during which,&quot; &c. But this
is an indefinite formula, and falls short of the requisite
unification of knowledge, for knowledge means definite
comprehension and not vague fancies
; besides, it does not
say what that persistent force is doing when it is not so
occupied.
It may be that this is the most complete formula that
we can reach; but if so, it would intelligibly assert, on
the face of it, an unknown power and deny the possibility
of a perfect philosophy.
Therefore, if we seek to amend the formula of Evolution
so as to include force, we insert in it a term to which we
can attach no definite meaning, and the formula and its130 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
application (since it contains an unknown quantity) does
not afford complete explanations, but confesses an element
of mystery.
But since Mr. Spencer expressly claims that Evolution
accomplishes all that it is required of a philosophy to do,
viz., to unify and account in an intelligible formula for the
history of all changes in the cosmos from the beginning to
the end, we are obliged to declare that both the formula
and the exposition are insufficient, and that the Evolution
philosophy is in both respects a failure.
But acknowledging that Mr. Spencer himself admits an
unknowable element, it is to be demanded of him whether
this unknowable is to be placed at the beginning of things
as the constitutor of matter in motion, or is to be regarded
as a constant quantity merely keeping them going; in
either of which cases, as we have seen, since we have all
its effective functions, it may be omitted from the formula
and the exposition ; or, if it is now, or ever has been, an
interfering power of unknown functions, in which case a
formula of philosophy is impossible.
Or is this force to be regarded as having known func
tions, but which are not expressible in terms of matter and
motion, but, nevertheless, regular in their modes of opera
tion a discernible element, having other functions than
matter in motion, and expressible, say, as consciousness,
from which factor, perhaps, by known laws of sequence,
the phenomena of organism, life, mind, and society might
follow.
This is a supposition that, in the present state of human
knowledge, we are unable to realise to ourselves, i.e., form
a clear conception of, and therefore for the present can
not be accepted as the formula of philosophy which is to
account for all changes of the universe.INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM &quot;FORCE? i 3I
&quot;Whether such a thought forms the germ of a future
philosophy or not, whether it is really the correct expres
sion of Mr. Spencer s philosophy or not, we cannot deter
mine. But in the meantime we are obliged to declare that,
in spite of Mr. Spencer s attempt, such an unification has
not yet been successfully made.( 132 )
PART IV.
AN ATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA AGREEABLE TO
MR SPENCER S EXPOSITION OF EVOLUTION, AND
AN INQUIRY AS TO ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUF
FICIENCY AS THE FORMULA OF PHILOSOPHY.
HAVING started by stating the problem of philosophy to be
the framing of an intelligible formula, which from a state
of homogeneity should account for all the changes of the
universe, we found that the formula propounded by Mr.
Spencer, although intelligible, was insufficient. &quot;We next
attempted an amended formula which should comprise
the term
&quot;
force,&quot; a term so constantly brought forward by
Mr. Spencer in his treatment of the subject, and w
re found
that no intelligible formula could be stated which included
it. We now purpose an attempt to frame a formula which
shall be agreeable to Mr. Spencer s exposition of the
changes of the universe, and which shall have constructive
efficiency in that exposition, so that by its formulation the
problem of philosophy shall be solved.
The only way that I can see for avoiding the material
and mechanical limitations of the formula is not by the
introduction of the term
&quot;
force,&quot; which we have seen to












Let us try the first proposal, when the formula wouldATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 133
read thus (the italics indicate the omissions and the
capitals the substitutions)
:
&quot; Evolution is (the) integration (of matter and the con
comitant dissipation of motion), during which (the matter)
EVERY EXISTENCE passes from an indefinite, incoherent
homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and
during which (the retained motion) THE ACTIVITIES undergo
a parallel transformation.&quot;
It may be objected to this amendment that it is not an
alteration of meaning. But here activity is meant to in
clude consciousness, life, reproduction, heredity, &c., which
are not included in the term &quot;motion.&quot; This formula
would leave the origin of matter and motion and con
sciousness unexplained it would simply formulate the
results of their integration.
And I put it forward as the only formula I can frame




integration,&quot; I apprehend it means
concentration, or perhaps more correctly combination, or
entering into permanent relations or definite combination.
Let us see how the amended formula corresponds with
the exposition of Evolution.
Sidereal Evolution, sect. 108, corresponds with the ori
ginal formula and with the amended one.
Geologic Evolution, sect. 109, also corresponds with both.
Organic Evolution is omitted by Mr. Spencer in his
&quot; First Principles,&quot; and has had to be considered separately
by ourselves. Our conclusion was that the original formula
was insufficient to account for it, since there is something
more in it than matter (extension) and motion (rates or
modes), but the amended formula is applicable to it, since
the term activities includes more than motion.I 34 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
Further Organic Evolution, sect. 1 1 o, sets out with
the statement that every organism is an integration,
&quot;because all its constituents were once scattered. These
constituents being absorbed into the organism, and per
haps adding to its growth, is a process of integration.
This is undoubtedly an integration of matter, although
it is not a dissipation of motion. (See sect. 103.) The
cause of the integration and of the particular modes
of it is not given, which is a very important omission.
But as an organism is something more than an integra
tion of matter, according to harmonies of shape, size,
mode or rate of motion, it does not come within the
original formula, although it may be included in the
amended formula.
The formations of separate organs in the embryo are
called
&quot;
secondary integrations,&quot; but how these particular
modes of secondary integrations are brought about is not
stated. Surely they are more than integrations; they
are structural integrations, and what is the cause of the
structure ? Anything more than harmonies of size, shape,
modes or rates of motion ? If so, then the first formula





comprise all the organs
of the bodies of animals and of the bodies of plants.
We have next
&quot;
integrations by which organisms are
made dependent upon one another. We may set down
two kinds of them those which occur within the same
species, and those which occur among different species.&quot;
A case of the first kind is that of gregarious animals.
There is a certain degree of combination ; they hunt in
packs, and form bodies united by co-operation. I sup
pose this might be called integration, and, since animals
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but it would not be due directly nor indirectly to inte
grations arising from the harmonies of size, shape, mode,
or rate of motion
; nor can I make out in the constitution
of a herd of buffaloes or a hive of bees, if they are cases
of integration of matter, where there is any corresponding
loss of motion. It seems a case of an utterly different
kind to those referred to in the original formula of Evo
lution.
Page 31 5. &quot;How organisms in general are mutually
dependent, and in that sense integrated,&quot; surely adds a
new meaning to the word. The interdependence of plants
and animals, and of different species of plants and plants,
and of animals and other animals, surely cannot be called
a process or state of integration of matter, however other
wise we might apply the word. And in any case, where
is the corresponding dissipation of motion ? What motion
has been lost, and to what has it been transferred ?
Super-Organic Evolution, in sect. 1 1 1, a case is given
in the formation of tribes out of wandering families, the
amalgamation by conquest or otherwise of these tribes
into larger ones, and of these again into nations. The
higher combinations being relatively stable and well
organised.
This is integration, but is it the integration of matter
and concomitant dissipation of motion spoken of in the
formula? Is there any dissipation of motion? and is
the integration not of a different kind to that referred to
in the formula, i.e., due to other causes than gravita
tion the complex results of combinations due to har
monies of size, shape, mode and rate of motion ?
But there is another instance. There is the inte
gration into groups. These are of two orders the re
gulative and the operative: the former comprising the136 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
governmental, administrative, military, ecclesiastical, legal,
&c.
; the latter comprising the industrial groups, the manu
facturing, the artisan, the agricultural, &c.
It seems a great stretch of the use of the term to call
this
&quot;
integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of
motion.&quot; It may truly be regarded as integration of men,
or integration of industries and occupations, and may,
therefore, come within the amended formula, but not
within the original.
But we are to go further, and are asked to consider
the cases of language, science, and the arts, industrial
and aesthetic.
Sect. 112. Language is described as an evolution, and,
since evolution is integration, we have to ask, Is it an
integration of matter ? But we cannot say that language
is matter, and must, therefore, say it is an integration of
motion. But is there such a process as the integration of
motion ? It is not hinted anywhere that there is. We
are told that the
&quot; retained motion undergoes a parallel
transformation,&quot; i.e., from
&quot; an indefinite incoherent homo
geneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity.&quot; But this
is not integration of matter with a concomitant dissipa
tion of motion.
But Mr. Spencer does not say whether he speaks of
matter or of motion. He speaks of words :
&quot;
Originally
the words used for the less familiar things are formed by
compounding the words used for the more familiar things.
Thus long words are formed, but since for convenience
they get contracted in use into short ones,&quot; &c. This is
integration. But integration of what ? and how does it
get within the formula ?
The same process takes place in the tenses and cases,
and with respect to the general construction of languageATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 137
Sect. 113.
&quot; The history of science presents facts of the
same meaning at every step. Indeed, the integration of
groups of like entities and like relations may be said to
constitute the most conspicuous part of scientific progress.
A glance at the classificatory sciences shows us that the
confused incoherent aggregations which the vulgar make
of natural objects are gradually rendered complete and
compact, and bound up into groups within
groups.&quot; At
the same time there is an integration of all the sciences by
means of wider generalisations, ending in the Evolution
philosophy itself.
We have to repeat the question, Is this so-called inte
gration of science
&quot; an integration of matter and concomi
tant dissipation of motion
&quot;
? &quot;We are now speaking of
men s thoughts, not of matter, and we suppose not of
motion. We consider that these processes are not in
cluded in the original formula, although they may be
included in the amended one.
Sect. 114.
&quot; Nor do the industrial and aesthetic arts
fail to supply us with equally conclusive evidence.&quot; The
progress from isolated rude tools to highly complex
machinery is said to be a process of integration. Is it of
matter, and is there a concomitant dissipation of motion ?
And in painting there is a progress from miscellaneous
depicting to a proper co-ordination of parts.
So also there is progress from the incoherent and the
fragmentary to the co-ordinated and coherent in the his
tory of music and literature.
As to these we ask the same question.
Mr. Spencer,, in summing up, sect. 115, says
: &quot;Evolu
tion, then, under its primary aspect, is a change from a
less coherent form (of what ?) to a more coherent form
(of what ?), consequent on the dissipation of motion and1 38 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
integration of matter.&quot; In answer to the queries, are we
to say matter and motion, or the former only ? That is
to say, the integration of matter and concomitant dissipa
tion of motion results in a change from the less coherent
to the more coherent form of matter, and to differentia
tion of motion of matter.
Mr. Spencer says this is the universal process through
which all sensible existences pass, including the solar
system, the earth, organisms, societies, language, science,
art.
What is the concomitant process with integration of
society, thought, language, science, industry, and art?
Evolution is stated to be a double process, viz., an inte
gration and a dissipation. We can understand that with
the integration of matter there is a concomitant dissipa
tion of motion. With the integration of the above what
dissipation is there? It is an integration of matter;
is it a dissipation of matter, or is it a dissipation of
motion, or an integration of motion ? We cannot even
frame a hypothesis. We can understand the economy of
motion in shortening a long word into a monosyllabic
one, but that is not a dissipation or transference of
motion from one body to another; or have we an in
tegration which has no concomitant process ?
Our criticism amounts to this, that the cases men
tioned, though perhaps integrative processes, are not all of
them integrative processes of matter, and therefore do not
come within the formula of Evolution, though they might
be comprised within the amended formula.
But this amended formula being vaguer and not speci
fying the nature of the activities referred to, is itself on
that account insufficient as a formula which shall unify
philosophy. It has no power of synthesis which, from aATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 139
given state of the cosmos, shall enable us to explain and
ideally construct the cosmos as we know it.
We are therefore forced to introduce a third factor,
and this third factor is supposed to be feeling or con
sciousness ?
The question then arises, Was this third factor in the
homogeneous at the beginning, or was it added at a cer
tain stage and made dependent upon certain conditions ?
The problem of philosophy, as already stated, requires
&quot;from a state of homogeneity,&quot; &c. We would there
fore be obliged to predicate consciousness as a property
of the ultimate units. We have already seen that it
cannot be a development or product of the two factors
already acknowledged, viz., matter (extension only) and
motion. We must also acknowledge that consciousness
is neither matter nor motion, else it could be described
geometrically and mathematically, although the conscious
ness is the consciousness of them. We are therefore
forced into the predication of consciousness as a property
of the ultimate units.
On this supposition are we able to suppose a transfer
ence of consciousness in the same way as there is a trans
ference of motion. If so, then some matter would be
come less conscious, while other became more conscious.
There would be a sum total or fixed quantum of con
sciousness in the same way as there is a fixed quantum
of matter and a fixed quantum of motion.
Carrying the inquiry further, we would have to ask
how the changes of consciousness could be affected by
integration of matter. It would still have to be recog
nised that gravitation to a centre (however explained)
would be the original disturbing movement from the
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of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion. The
question arises, What would become of the conscious
ness ? Would it accompany the motion ? The degree
of consciousness is, so far as we know it, in propor
tion to the activity of motion rather than to the inte
gration of matter. Yet this involves us in difficulties,
for we cannot say that heat, light, &c., are conscious.
Organism is the requisite for self-consciousness. For
self-consciousness we require both complex integration
of matter and great amount of motion.
Although we can understand the shapes and sizes of
matter, and although we can understand the transference
of motion, and can form for ourselves a tolerably correct
notion of the formation of complex and still more com
plex molecules, we cannot imagine the method or manner
of the transference and concentration of consciousness
;
we can only suppose it to go with increased complexity,
which is increased multiplicity of ultimate units in a
molecule and increased activity of them
; so that the for
mula would have to include in it the phrase,
&quot; and during
which also the consciousness undergoes a parallel trans
formation.&quot;
There is, however, an alternative supposition, viz., that
the third factor is an added factor. This alters the
ground of philosophy altogether. On this supposition the
cosmos is not a constant quantity, but every now and
again receives an accession of something entirely new.
In this case we have to provide a formula for each stage,
or else a formula for the new factor conformable to the
operative conditions of the others which is not quite so
revolutionary.
On this latter supposition, we know not how many addi
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This excludes the notion of growth or development
from the homogeneous, although it may not exclude the
notion of growth from the homogeneous with various
additions. In this case the formula would have to cor
respond.
However accounted for, we have to make a fresh start
from highly complex molecules which are also conscious.
The inquiry thereupon ensues, What results from the
consciousness of a molecule ? Is it in any respect an
active factor in subsequent changes ? It has not been
regarded as an active factor in all anterior changes. It has
hypothetically accompanied the integration of matter and
concomitant dissipation of motion, and has itself become
more intense when the integration of matter has gone on
with an increase of motion in the same molecule, but it
has not been a modifying factor. We may, if we like,
suppose that the harmonies of shape, size, and mode and
rate of motion, which cause combination, also cause
pleasure, and that disassociation causes pain, but since
those combinations and disassociations are entirely de
pendent upon the relations of the shapes, sizes, and
motions, the consciousness of them has not been an
active factor. Consequently, no degree or complexity of
such combinations or disassociations, however much they
may intensify the pleasure or the pain, will allow of these
pleasures and pains having an influence upon the result.
We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that if con
sciousness was an original factor in the homogeneous, it
must always have been an active and not a passive fac
tor, for the active cannot come out of the passive. The
difficulty, then, is to state what was the activity of the
consciousness of matter. How it could affect the ;potion
of matter it is impossible to imagine. If, in the recorn-142 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
positions of matter and motion, it came in as an outside,
untransformable force, it could only influence these re-
compositions by altering shape or size, or by increasing or
retarding motion, but these are, by the supposition, fixed
quantities, and we are now supposing a case of creation or
extinction of matter or of motion which is not allowable.
And even if we suppose that consciousness and motion
are transformable, it would seem to imply that conscious
ness is motion and motion consciousness. But conscious
ness cannot be described geometrically or mathematically,
and therefore is untransformable into motion.
We are again obliged to beg the whole question of
consciousness anterior to highly complex molecules, and
postulating consciousness of them, we have to inquire the
value of it as a factor in subsequent recompositions. We
have also to leave undecided its mode of action, so that
the question of motion of matter shall remain constant-
and unchanged.
We can only postulate as the function and active pro
perty of consciousness, as the unit of our factor, a pleasure
at harmonious combination of shape, and size, and motion,
and a pain at disharmony. We also have to postulate a
continuity of consciousness along with continuity of com
plexity.
The secondary problem, then, would be from these pos
tulates respecting consciousness to work out the develop
ment of organisms, their adaptations and changes, their
compositions, morphology, differentiations, biology. Also
memory, transmission of impressions, molecular wear and
tear, and reconstitution, generation, heredity, &c.
But it will have been noticed that we are in this
assuming a most important position, and most unjustifi
ably, viz., that consciousness can influence, modify, andATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 143
affect motion without being motion or adding to the
quantum of motion.
Now, some such view as this, it seems to me, must be
taken of the development of life from organic molecules,
which we have already seen are insufficient, if considered
merely as complex molecules formed only from harmonies
of shape, size, and motion. And, in fact, it really appears
to be Mr. Spencer s position, if we read carefully his
chapter on the
&quot; Substance of Mind
&quot;
in vol. i. of his
&quot;
Principles of Psychology.&quot;
In it he distinctly states that there is more in organ
isms made up of molecules formed by harmonies of shape,
size, and motion, than matter and motion. If this is so,
then his formula of Evolution, which only recognises
these two factors, must be insufficient to account for this
plus, and the amended formula which transcends these
limitations must be adopted.
PART II. CHAPTER I. The Substance of Mind.
Page 151.
&quot; It is possible, then may we not even say pro
bable that something of the same order as that which we call a
nervous shock is the ultimate unit of consciousness, and that all
the unlikenesses among our feelings result from unlike modes of
integration of this ultimate unit.&quot;
Page 153. &quot;A conceivable solution is afforded by this
hypothesis of two problems, which, in its absence, seem entirely
insoluble. How is it possible for feelings so different in quality
as those of heat, of taste, of colour, of tone, &c., to arise in ner
vous centres closely allied to one another in composition and
structure ? And how, in the course of Evolution, can there have
been gradually differentiated these widely unlike orders, and
genera, and species of feelings 1 Possible answers are at once
supplied if we assume that diverse feelings are produced by
diverse modes, and degrees, and complexities of integration of
the alleged ultimate unit of consciousness. If each wave of144 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
molecular motion brought by a nerve fibre to a nerve centre lias
for its correlative a shock or pulse of feeling, then we can com
prehend how distinguishable differences of feeling may arise
from differences in the rates of recurrence of waves, and we can
frame a general idea of the way in which, by the arrival through
other fibres of waves recurring at other rates, compound waves
of molecular motion may be formed, and give rise to units of
compound feelings, which process of compounding of waves and
production of correspondingly compounded feelings, we may
imagine to be carried on without limit, and to produce any
amount of heterogeneity of feelings.&quot;
It will be seen here that consciousness is not regarded
as a mode of motion. The unit of feeling is a feeling of
motion of matter, but is not the motion itself, nor a motion
at all. It is, therefore, not contained within the terms
of the formula of Evolution, and is not to be accounted
for by it. And since it is not motion, we cannot see
that it can modify or affect motion in any way. The
only way in which motion can be affected is by motion,
and since consciousness is not motion, it cannot affect or
modify it (volition). Consciousness is simply a conscious
ness of motion and its reactions. We do not see even
how it can be a registration of them (memory). If
consciousness were motion, then all motion is transform
able into it and vice versa, and it could be described
mathematically and geometrically. But if it caused
motion without being motion, then the quantum oi
motion is not constant.
It is sufficient, however, to note that consciousness is
not included in the formula of Evolution, and that the
integration of units of feeling is not an integration of
matter nor a mode of motion. It would have to come
under the amended formula.
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parallel between the compositions of matter and the com
positions of mind.
In the first place, he dwells upon the results of
physical analysis as pointing to the conclusion that all
matter, as we know it, is built up of ultimate similar
units, and continues :
&quot;
If, then, we see that by unlike arrangements of like units
all the forms of matter, apparently so diverse in nature, may
be produced ; if, even without assuming that the so-called ele
ments are compound, we remember how from a few of these
there may arise, by transformation and by combination, numerous
seemingly simple substances strongly contrasted with their consti
tuents and with one another, we shall the better conceive the pos
sibility that the multitudinous forms of mind known as different
feelings may be composed of simpler units of feeling, and even of
units fundamentally of one kind. We shall perceive that such
homogeneous units of feeling may, by integration in diverse ways,
give origin to different though relatively simple feelings, by com
bination of which with one another more complex and more
unlike feelings may arise ; and so on continuously.&quot;
We confess ourselves somewhat at a loss here to
understand the word
&quot;
integration,&quot; as applied to units of
feeling. We can understand two ultimate units of matter
(extension only) in motion, from their harmonies of shape,
size, and motion, entering into combination when brought
by gravitation into contact, but we cannot understand
one ultimate unit of feeling being combined with another.
If it means constant association, in the manner of the
association of ideas, it only means that there is the con
stant impression produced by the constant cause the
uniformity of feeling produced by uniformity of com
plexity of motions so long as they continue ; but there is
not any cause of continuance of impression after the cause
has ceased, and therefore no cause of revivability of an
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absent impression from association with a present one
with which it is usually accompanied. Feeling or con
sciousness, from the nature of the supposition made,
is utterly passive the mere consciousness of passing
motions.
In sect. 62 we have a very excellent discussion of the
relations of matter and mind, in which it is shown that
the latter cannot be represented in terms of matter and
motion. If by object is meant matter and motion, and
if by subject is meant feeling or consciousness, as we
suppose Mr. Spencer means, then (p. I 5 7),
&quot; So far from
helping us to think of them as of one kind, analysis
serves but to render more manifest the impossibility of
finding for them a common concept a thought under
which they can be united. Let it be granted that all
existence distinguished as objective may be resolved into
the existence of units of one kind. Let it be granted
that every species of objective activity may be under
stood as due to rhythmical motions of such ultimate units
;
and that among the objective activities so understood are
the waves of molecular motion propagated through nerves
and nerve centres. And let it further be granted that all
existence distinguished as subjective is resolvable into
units of consciousness similar in nature to those we know
as nervous shocks
; each of which is a correlative of a
rhythmical motion of a material unit, or group of such
units. Can we, then, think of the subjective and objec
tive activities as the same ? Can the oscillation of a
molecule be represented in consciousness side by side
with a nervous shock and the two be recognised as one ?
No effort enables us to assimilate them. That a unit of
feeling has nothing in common with a unit of motion
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into juxtaposition, and the immediate verdict of con
sciousness thus given might be analytically justified were
this a fit place for the needful analysis. For it might be
shown that the conception of an oscillating molecule is
built out of many units of feeling, and that to identify
it with a nervous shock would be to identify a whole
congeries of units with a single
unit.&quot;
It would even seem from this that the unit of feeling
and the unit of motion, to say nothing of the unit of
matter, are not all comprehended in the
&quot; Persistence of
Force,&quot; for the unit of feeling has nothing in common
with the unit of motion.
In the following chapter, on
&quot; The Composition of
Mind,&quot; Mr. Spencer shows the parallelism which exists
between the evolution of mind and the evolution of matter
that is to say, there goes on subjectively a change
&quot; from
an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent
heterogeneity.&quot; But it is a parallelism only, and cannot
be included in the terms of the formula of Evolution.
Mental action is not the integration of matter and con
comitant dissipation of motion, but the continuous differ
entiation and integration (?) of states of consciousness.
We now request the reader s attention to two points.
First, we would remind him of the problem of Philo
sophy with which we started, and of the formula of Evolu
tion which was adduced as the solution of it, and ask
him if that formula after the above extract can be held
to contain an explanation of mind, of consciousness, of
units of feeling ? If not, then the formula fails as a
solution of the problem of Philosophy.
On the other hand, if we amend the formula of Evolu
tion as now proposed, viz., by the exclusion of the words
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idea whatever is meant by the word integration or is im
plied in the use of it, and the three factors are matter,
motion, and feeling.
In this case the formula might be made to contain all
the factors constituting the substance and activities of
the universe, and might denote the general characteristic
of the process of differentiation and recomposition, but
it would have no constructive value ; it would not enable
us, that is to say, by its application to the homogeneous,
to account for and build up the universe as we know it.
We are, therefore, compelled to conclude that, even
upon the more extended field of three factors, however
admirable and valuable the work which Mr. Spencer has
undertaken for the elaboration of a synthetic philosophy,
the amended formula is not valid as a solution of the
problem of Philosophy. There may be a likeness of pro
cess and an inter-dependence, but we have not reached a
constructive organon.
We must, however, do Mr. Spencer the justice to
state, that although he holds these views as to the units
of feeling, he still adheres to his view of Evolution as
explained in
&quot; First Principles.&quot; It seems to us a contra
diction
; nevertheless, it is fair to him to state that he
does so.
For this read sect. 5 5 in the
&quot;
Principles of Biology,&quot;
in which it is claimed that Evolution is continuous.
&quot;... Evolution being a universal process, one and
continuous throughout all forms of existence, there can
be no break, no change from one group of phenomena to
another without a bridge of intermediate phenomena.&quot;
Geology is a continuation in detail of astronomy.
&quot;The separation between biology and geology once
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every day brings new reasons for believing that the one
group of phenomena has grown out of the other.
The chasm between the inorganic and the organic is
being filled
up.&quot;
Page 138. &quot;Biology is a specialised part of geo-
geny,
. . . and psychology is a specialised part of
biology.&quot;
From this it would appear that we have nothing more
in at the last, i.e., psychology, than we had at the begin
ning, viz., matter and motion. The only difference is
in the degree of complexity and differentiation and the
complexity of the relations of aggregates of matter and
motion. But Mr. Spencer, as we have seen, states that
feeling or consciousness is inexpressible in terms of matter
and motion, and hence the contradiction.
We are therefore forced to suppose that Mr. Spencer
holds some tacit theory of development a theory not
merely of Evolution proper as defined sect. 97, p. 285, of
&quot; First Principles.&quot;
&quot; As ordinarily understood, to evolve
is to unfold, to open and expand, to throw out, to emit
;
whereas, as we understand it, the act of evolving, though
it implies increase of a concrete aggregate, and in so far
an expansion of it, implies that its component matter has
passed from a more diffused to a more concentrated
state has contracted. . . . We are obliged ... to use
evolution as antithetical to dissolution.&quot;
It is true, as pointed out by us, p. 103 of this criti
cism, that Mr. Spencer says,
&quot; All we can do is carefully




winds up by saying that evolution is not merely anti
thetical to evolution, that it is, in fact, more than the
antithesis of dissolution.
&quot;
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mean the process tacitly implied by its ordinary mean
ing the absorption of motion and disintegration of
matter we shall everywhere mean by evolution the
process which is always an integration of matter and
dissipation of motion, but which, as we shall now see, is
in most cases much more than this.&quot;
At the time we thought that the
&quot; much more
&quot; was
conformable to the formula of Evolution, which only
recognises two factors, matter and motion, and meant
only the complexities of the relationships of the molecular
and molar aggregates of matter and motion. But it now
occurs to us that the &quot;much more
&quot; must be the evolution
of a new factor, which is not merely a relation of matter
and motion, but a something of a different nature. If
this is the theory, we ought to be informed, and the
formula should be made to correspond.
It is sometimes said of two combinable substances, that
if we know their properties we cannot know thereby the
properties of their combination. But I maintain that if
the properties of hydrogen are expressible in terms of
geometry and mathematics, and the properties of oxygen
are expressible in the same way, then the properties of
the compound, water, are also capable of being worked out
beforehand by any one who has the data. In the same
way, if any one seeks to hide the evolution of conscious
ness under this plea, we reply that any one who has the
data of the shapes, sizes, and motion of the atoms that
constitute organic molecules can work out and state in
terms of geometry and mathematics its property of con
sciousness in the same manner that the dynamic problem
of water can be worked out and expressed. No new
factor is introduced. If a new factor is introduced, then
the theory and formula of Evolution must be changed soATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 151
as to account for the introduction, or failing to account
for it, must admit it as an interfering factor, the origin
of which is unknown.
1
To conclude this part of our criticism, we find that the
task we undertook, viz., to construct a formula which
should express Mr. Spencer s exposition of Evolution,
results in either a formula which omits naming the
factors of the cosmos, and simply describes the general
nature of their changes, though it does not disclose the
law of their relations, or else it must include a third
factor, viz., feeling, in which case again it does not dis
close the law of its relations with the other factors.
Eut both these formulas are vague and of no construc
tive efficiency. They both leave the problem of philo
sophy unsolved, and, properly speaking, are neither suffi
cient nor intelligible.
1 Observe on p. 109 the loose manner of using the word &quot;factor.&quot;
&quot;The new factor which differentiates chemistry from molecular physics is
the heterogeneity of the molecules with whose redistribution it deals.&quot; If
heterogeneity is a new factor, what are the functions of the factor?( 152 )
PART V.
CRITICISM OF THE BOOK ON
&quot; THE UNKNOWABLE.&quot;
On the Relativity of all Knowledge.
THE doctrine of the Kelativity of Knowledge appears to
be this :
After the establishment, in the course of evolution, of
organisms with nerves and nervous centres, and the con
sciousness of nervous tremors which are made up of the
little shocks which are the units of feeling, there super
vened a knowledge or memory of them, and afterwards
an integration of the knowledge of these consciousnesses
by means of a process of distinguishment and grouping.
Then arose the fact of the representation of these differ
ences and likenesses by means of symbols, that is to say,
names.
Knowledge is therefore said to be relative, because it
is the knowledge of the manner in which the environ
ment is related to us. We are ourselves the product of
the environment, and our knowledge of our relations with
it is the sum of our knowledge.
But knowledge is also relative because all our know
ledge consists of the relations of things between them
selves, or rather between different items of knowledge.&quot; THE UNKNOWABLE.&quot; 153
Knowledge includes two factors that which knows or
is conscious, and that which is known or is conscious-
nessed. Without either of these there would be no
knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, is relative.
Naming is only legitimate when of actualities, or if
founded upon actualities. Actualities are only either
Matter )
, ,.
. . f or combinations thereof, Motion )
and
Modes of consciousness.
Now, since naming is a mark of differentiation, a name




&quot; denotes the apple and implies other things
that are not apples. Hence, all names are correlative.
They denote the individual or group, and imply all others









denotes a particular sensation or a
certain rate of motion, and correlates all other sensations
of the same sort, or all other rates of motion that are




correlates all other feelings of pressure, and
&quot; round
&quot;
correlates all other shapes.
All names, then, are relative, that is to say, all but one
class of names, viz., the class of names relating to the
totality of things. One thing comprised in a totality
implies the rest. The totality implies only its consti
tuents, and if relative, is relative only to the knower.
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These have no correlatives outside themselves, only to
the contained, or to that part of the contained which
cognises it.
The total implies the factors
; the whole implies the
parts ; the universe, the cosmos, implies its constituents
and nothing more. Existence is another name for the
cosmos. If it has smaller applications in the singu
lar number, and refers to particular combinations of
matter and motion at particular times, its correlatives are
other existences at the same or other times.
It may be said that existence implies non-existence,
and that this is the true correlative. We reply that we
are not dealing with words except as the representatives
of things and experiences. A denial of existence is a
denial of our consciousness, but we are only dealing with
our consciousness and its products, and if we deny our
consciousness, then all knowledge comes to an end and
no names are required. A denial of existence is not an
assertion of a positive non-existence, but simply an asser
tion of non-consciousness.
















existence is not a state or quality or relation of an
object, and cannot be stated in terms of matter or
motion or consciousness, which are the contents of all
knowledge.
So names of groups regarded in one respect imply the
individuals of their group, and in another respect all
those which are not of their group. But, properly speak
ing, correlation is a term of differentiation rather than of
likeness. When groups get so large that there is no
differentiation, then there are no correlative terms. When&quot; THE UNKNOWABLE? 155
names include everything there is no differentiation and
no terms of correlation. There is nothing to correlate
with, and there is no requisition for a correlative term.
Let us now consider the term
&quot; The Relative&quot;
Mr. Spencer applies it thus. We only have a knowledge
of &quot;The Eelative.&quot; And since all knowledge is relative, he
calls all known or knowable things, and all experiences
of consciousness,
&quot; The Eelative.&quot; Now, in what does this







? It equally with them denotes the sum total of
existence and all the included aggregations and modes of
activity. It accentuates perhaps as a part of that totality
of existence the inclusion in it of conscious beings, but it
does not differ from them in the sum of its contents. Its
correlative will, therefore, be (if it has any) all related
things.




is the non-relative. Now this is to be dealt
with on the same lines as the term
&quot;
Existence,&quot; as having
for its correlative the term
&quot;
Non-existence.&quot; We know
of nothing that is not relative ; we make use of the
name
&quot; The Eelative
&quot; not to mark off one class of experi
ence from another class of the same sort, in which case
any selected name implies the rest; but to express the
totality of things, in fact, the cosmos, and to indicate
specially either its knowability to us or its interdepend
ence throughout, and if this special limitation implies
marking off, it marks off only that which is not known or
cannot be known.
Of the existence of any non-relative we do not know.
It is beyond the pale of our knowledge.I $6 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
But Mr. Spencer goes further, and gives a name to the
non-relative, and calls it
&quot; The Absolute.&quot;
His argument in the matter we will consider presently.
We would first enter a protest against the illegitimate
naming of abstractions.
Generalisation is the naming of groups of aggregates or
of states of consciousness.
Names such as redness, liquidity, &c., are not abstrac
tions, properly so called, but generalisations, partly of
states of consciousness, partly of the external causes of
those states of consciousness.
Abstractions are such as vitality, space, time, &c.
Gravitation, heat, magnetism, &c., properly speaking,
are only modes of motion of something. And these
modes of motion are capable of geometrical and mathe
matical expression. Vitality differs from these, and is
only the naming of a process or group of processes. It
is nothing in itself. It is a useful term, and marks off
these perfectly distinguishable processes from processes
which are non-vital.
Space is an abstract of relations of distance, and of our
experience of these relations. But it is not a real. It
is a non-entity. It does not imply non-space, but the
totality of distance relations. It is a convenient term,
but it is only an abstraction.
So time is an abstract of the relations of sequence.
No sequences, no time. Time is a non-entity, but a very
convenient abstract term. It is the total of sequences,
and its correlative is not non-time but groups of se
quences.
There are no real antinomies. Every name means&quot;THE UNKNOWABLE! j 57
only itself, and by implication every other. No name
implies non-existence. One item of knowledge implies
itself and its differentiation from all other items of know
ledge.
Mr. Spencer, in his reply to Sir William Hamilton, ad
mits that the whole correlates not with another whole or
aggregate, but with its parts, which is an exactly similar
view, and I ask the reader to co-ordinate the relative in
the same way.
The relative, therefore, is equivalent to the kriowable,
and comprehends both the objective and the subjective.
It is a name of the cosmical class, and implies nothing
but what it contains. If any, its only implication is
the correlative.
With these preliminary considerations let us now exa
mine Mr. Spencer s chapter On the Relativity of all Know
ledge.
Statement of the Argument of the Chapter, with detailed
Criticism.
The argument of the chapter is this :
&quot;
If, respecting the origin and nature of things we make some
assumption, we find that through an inexorable logic it inevitably
commits us to alternative impossibilities of thought ; and this
holds true of every assumption that can be imagined.
&quot;
If, contrariwise, we make no assumption, but set out from
the sensible properties of surrounding objects, and, ascertaining
their special laws of dependence, go on to merge these in laws
more and more general, until we bring them, all under some
most general laws, we still find ourselves as far as ever from
knowing what it is which manifests these properties to us ; clearly
as we seem to know it, our apparent knowledge proves on exami
nation to be utterly irreconcilable with itself.&quot;
The assumption lying at the basis of this quotation is158 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
that, given the contents of knowledge, as consisting of
matter, motion, and perhaps consciousness, these, although
sufficient factors to account for and explain all that is
contained in our knowledge, are insufficient to explain,
firstly, their origin, and secondly, their own nature.
They are only appearances. There is a something of
which these are the manifestations. There is a reality
existing behind these appearances which we can never
know.
Leaving out of the question the origin of things, let us
inquire what is meant by this supposition of a reality
underlying appearances of which matter, motion, and con
sciousness are but the manifestations. The question that
naturally arises is, why we should form such a supposi
tion at all. If we know sufficient of matter, motion,
and consciousness to explain and account for all sequences,
knowledge is complete.
It is only when we come to inquire backwards for the
set of activities called causes immediately preceding cer
tain others, and so on as far back as imagination can
carry us first, perhaps, to the origination of consciousness,
and then still further back to the origin of the primal state
of homogeneousness in the constitution of the sphere of like
units, having equal mutual motions of attraction and
repulsion, that the mind fails to understand. Its realities
are its states of consciousness, and the causes of them in
the environment. It does not regard them as appear
ances at all, for they are the only realities. It sees no
necessity for the gratuitous assumption that they are not
real, but only manifestations of a reality. It is for those
who say so to prove it.
The question as to origin we will deal with hereafter.
But if we simply confine ourselves to the contents of&quot;THE UNKNOWABLE* 159
knowledge we recognise no unknowable reality. If it
is unknown and if it is unknowable it is not real. Since
all knowledge is relative, real is a relative term, and
means existence in relation to us and to other reals,
the whole forming part of the universe of sequences, and
therefore all reality is knowable. To speak of an un
knowable reality is therefore a contradiction of terms.
The unknowable, if anywhere, is at the beginning of
matter and motion and consciousness.
Mr. Spencer says that &quot;human intelligence is incap
able of absolute knowledge.&quot; He uses this word in two
senses
; in one sense as equivalent to perfect or perfectly,
in the other as relating to an unknowable reality called
the absolute. In either case the remark is true.
However, Mr. Spencer s first object agrees with our
views. He undertakes to show in this chapter that we
can have no knowledge except of those things which are
related to us and to each other.
He undertakes to show this by a consideration, firstly,
of the product of thought, and, secondly, by a consideration
of the process of thought.
An examination of the product of thought results in
this :
&quot; For if the successively deeper interpretations of nature which
constitute advancing knowledge are merely successive inclusions
of special truths in general truths, and of general truths in
truths still more general, it obviously follows that the most
general truth, not admitting of inclusion in any other does not
admit of interpretation. Manifestly, as the most general cogni
tion at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a more general one,
it cannot be understood. Of necessity, therefore, explanation
must eventually bring us down to the inexplicable.&quot;
All this is undoubtedly true.160 SPENCER .9 FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
The same result is arrived at from a consideration of
the process of thought.
This is worked out partly by means of an extract from
Sir William Hamilton, who maintains the relativity of
knowledge, and concludes that
&quot; the absolute is conceived
merely by the negation of conceivability.&quot;
It is a mere blank, in fact. It is unthinkable, for if
we think of it, it must be in relation, even if it be only as
an unknown reality manifesting itself to us in matter,
motion, and consciousness, and if it is in relation to the
relative it is itself relative.
Mr. Spencer follows up by a long quotation from Mr.
Mansel, in which the argument against the conceivability
of the absolute is admirably stated.
&quot; The absolute, on the other hand, is a term expressing
no object of thought, but only a denial of the relation by
which thought is constituted. To assume absolute exist
ence as an object of thought is thus to suppose a relation
existing when the related terms exist no longer.&quot;
In sect. 2 5 Mr. Spencer introduces a very clever argu
ment, showing that life and mind being the establishment
of correspondences with the external world, can only
allow of knowledge (which is part of life and mind) com
prising a knowledge of these correspondences and rela
tions. Therefore all knowledge must be relative.
&quot;
If,
then, life in all its manifestations, inclusive of intelli
gence in its highest forms, consists in the continuous
adjustment of internal relations to external relations, the
necessarily relative character of our knowledge becomes
obvious.&quot;
Sect. 26. But although Mr. Spencer quotes from Sir
William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel approvingly, and
enforces their arguments by a very cogent one of his own,&quot;THE UNKNOWABLE.&quot; 161
the effect of which, is to reduce the absolute to a nega
tion, he -nevertheless thinks it involves a grave error.
The logic he considers perfect if the premiss be correct.
But he considers that the premiss excludes an all-impor
tant fact.
&quot; To speak specifically
: Besides that definite consciousness
of which logic formulates the laws, there is also an indefinite
consciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides complete
thoughts, and besides the thoughts which, though incomplete,
admit of completion, there are thoughts which it is impossible
to complete, and yet which are still real, in the sense that they
are normal affections of the intellect.&quot;
Then follows some imperfect reasoning. In the first
place, there is a want of continuity in the argument, for
Mr. Spencer does not go on immediately to explain what
he means by







No doubt this is taken up afterwards, and in the mean
time we merely make a note of it.
Mr. Spencer next says
&quot;
Observe, in the first place, that every one of the arguments
by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, dis
tinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond the
relative. To say that we cannot know the absolute is by impli
cation to affirm that there is an absolute. In the very denial
of our power to learn what the absolute is there lies hidden the
assumption that it is, and the making of this assumption proves
that the absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing,
but as a something.&quot;
The case is this : one party states that all knowledge
L1 62 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.




is then invented, which is, in reality,
only equivalent to &quot;the cosmos,&quot; or &quot;the totality of
things.&quot; Then there is an erroneous impression derived
from the naming of things according to their differentia
tions, as implying the existence of things that differ from
them in respect of the absence of the special characteris
tic which is the signification of the given name
; that
such an implication extends to the totality of things, and
that, therefore, &quot;the relative&quot; implies the existence of
&quot; the non-relative.&quot; The next step is to convert this
negative term into a positive one, viz., &quot;the absolute.&quot;
The final step is when one party, denying the existence
of
&quot; the absolute,&quot; uses the words,
&quot; We cannot know the
absolute,&quot; is replied to by saying,
&quot; Then you admit the
absolute exists ?
&quot;
It is as if one said
&quot;
Nothing
exists.&quot; Here is a sub
stantive and a verb. A substantive i.e. Something
exists
; what is the name of that something ? Its name
is Nothing. Then something is nothing and nothing is
something, and whatever it is it exists.
The test is, what does it do ? How do we know of its
existence ? Let us have a description of it.






The use of the negative sign is apt to be misleading.
In the series o, I, 2, 3, &c., the figure nought stands for
nothing. Yet it is there, and it is made use of. In the
first place, as thus twenty and nought is twenty, i.e., 20.
It is also used as a remainder I I = o. It is con
venient to treat it as a something, We use it with the&quot;THE UNKNOWABLE.&quot; 163
verb
&quot;
is,&quot; and, therefore, according to Mr. Spencer in his




same way, this nought is nothing, is something.
&quot; The noumenon everywhere named as the antithesis of
the phenomenon is throughout necessarily thought of as
an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceive that
our knowledge is a knowledge of appearances only, with
out at the same time conceiving a reality of which they
are appearances ; for appearance without reality is un
thinkable.&quot;
In the first place, I do not know what phenomenon and
appearances are in the Evolution philosophy. We have in
it modes of consciousness, and we have matter and motion
and their combinations. I suppose appearances relate to
our modes of consciousness in correspondence with the
environment. I suppose phenomenon, if it differs from
the above, to apply to the relations of matter and motion
irrespective of consciousness. The word
&quot;
appearances,&quot;





correlates matter and motion,
or certain combinations thereof. In the former case the





are found to be not
yellow and heavy and hot, &c., but matter and motion
and our consciousness of them. Mr. Spencer has himself
succeeded more than any one in explaining
&quot;
things in
themselves,&quot; although he has not explained consciousness.
Mr. Spencer concludes
&quot; an argument, the very con
struction of which assigns to a certain term a certain
meaning, but which ends in showing that this term has
no such meaning, is simply an elaborate suicide.&quot; The
reply is, that we shall henceforth refuse to take a term
which is found both unnecessary and misleading. We164 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
shall be wary of inadvertently adopting it again, and shall




but confine ourselves to stating that all knowledge is of
consciousnesses and their causes in the environment, viz.,
certain combinations of matter and motion.
Mr. Spencer next proposes
&quot;to analyse our conception
of the antithesis between relative and absolute.&quot;
He says,
&quot;
It is admitted that . . . the relative is itself
conceivable as such only by opposition to the irrelative or
absolute.&quot;
Sir William Hamilton says that there are cases where
correlatives are merely negations, and these cases are not
realities
; therefore, the relative does not imply the posi
tive existence of the non-relative or the absolute.
Our view of the matter was given at the beginning of
the chapter, in which we said that wholes are only cor
related to their parts, and that the term
&quot; the relative
&quot;








is itself conceivable as such
only by opposition to the irrelative or absolute.
The difficulty is got over by recalling the process of
naming. Naming is the distinguishment by symbols of
differentiations of items of knowledge. Names denote
specific differences of known objects, or modes of con
sciousness, or their relations. Therefore names only cor
relate with names of the known, not with the unknown.
Knowledge is of matter, motion, and consciousness
only, and their relations. Names are only valid and have
a meaning in respect of these. All valid names are
limited to these. It is true we sometimes give names to
imaginaries, to false ideas, and to abstractions treated as
reals, such as force, vital principle, &c., but such mistakes&quot;THE UNKNOWABLE.&quot; 165
have to be rectified. Thus names being distinctive are
bound to correlate, but can correlate with nothing but
that from which the object or relation has to be distin
guished, and this is obliged to be known or else it
could not be distinguished, and the correlation cannot
extend beyond the limits of the knowable, i.e., matter,
motion, consciousness, or their relations. It cannot ex
tend to anything not known.
As knowledge extends the necessity for naming ex
tends.
If, then, we say of anything that it is finite or limited,
we recognise that it has boundaries known to us in con
tradistinction to those objects which have no known
boundaries. The correlative in this case is not infinite
or unlimited, but nescience of limits. The things are
known, but not their limits. From these we mark off
the things we know as having limits by calling them
limited or finite. Names always correlate with other
knowledge, never with the unknown. The correlative of
a relative name must be a relative, and both must be in
the sphere of the known in order to be able to be distin
guished and thereby named.
It is only from a knowledge of both that difference is
recognised, a name given and a correlation determined.
There can be no such process between the known and the
unknown, and, therefore, there can be no correlation be
tween the known and the unknown.
Since all knowledge is relative to ourselves, it is limited
to our powers of knowing. If an ant says of a forest it
is infinite, it is because it is beyond its power of cogni
tion. We know it to be limited, but say that the universe
of stellar systems is infinite. But we do not know. The
term is relative to ourselves. It means that we are1 66 SPEAKER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
ignorant of limits in distinction from those objects we
know as limited. Hence the correlative of finite is nesci
ence of limits. So of the order of sequences. We can
only personally cognise the sequences of less than one
hundred revolutions of the earth round the sun, and
history only records those of a few thousands of them.
Beyond these limits we do not know. We say of our
experience that it is limited. But the correlative of
Finite Time is not Infinite Time, but nescience of the
limits of sequences.
We cannot say of space and time that they are infi
nite or endless. We cannot grasp the meaning of these
words. They are unrepresentable in thought. We can
only say of them that we know no limits. Again, then,
the correlative of finite and limited is nescience of
limits.
Speaking of space and time, we must again say that
they are mere abstractions and not reals. Without
objects and sequences there could be neither space nor
time. They are only abstractions of relations and have
no correlatives.
What, then, is this Absolute ? When we say of it that
it is non-relative, what do we mean ? Non-relative to
us, or non-relative to the cosmos ? or that it is a word
that has no correlative ? But, as a word, its correlative is
the relative
; so it is said. Does it mean that it is not re
lated to our consciousness or knowledge ? Then w
re know
not that there is such an existence, and having no reason to
suppose it, we drop the suggestion of it out of our minds
at once. Or does it mean that it is not related to the
cosmos ? Then, again, it is utterly beyond our know
ledge, and there is no utility in the hypothesis.
But it is said to have manifestations. If so, it is re-&quot;THE UNKNOWABLE.&quot; 167
lated to its manifestations, and is therefore relative
; and
through its manifestations it is known to us, and there
fore it is relative to us
; and it is therefore not The
Absolute.
But absolute force is mentioned. This characterises
absolute, and makes it relative to the cosmos and to us,
and it is no longer the absolute. And again the passage
occurs,
&quot; The absolute force of which we are conscious.&quot;
Surely if we are conscious of it it is not absolute but
relative.
Let us now consider Mr. Spencer s argument on p.
90. He says
&quot; Our notion of the limited is composed, firstly, of a conscious
ness of some kind of being, and, secondly, of a consciousness of
the limits under which it is known. In the antithetical notion of
the unlimited the consciousness of limits is abolished, but not the
consciousness of some kind of being. It is quite true that in the
absence of conceived limits this consciousness ceases to be a con
cept properly so called
; but it is none the less true that it remains
as a mode of consciousness. If, in such cases, the negative con
tradictory were, as alleged,
*
nothing else than the negation of
the other, and therefore a mere nonentity, then it would clearly
follow that negative contradictories could be used interchange
ably ; the unlimited might be thought of as antithetical to the
divisible, and the indivisible as antithetical to the limited.
While the fact that they cannot be so used proves that in con
sciousness the unlimited and the indivisible are qualitatively
distinct, and therefore positive or real, since distinction cannot
exist between nothings. The error . . . consists in assuming that
consciousness contains nothing but limits and conditions, to the
entire neglect of that which is limited (unlimited ?) and con
ditioned (unconditioned ?). It is forgotten that there is some
thing which alike forms the raw material of definite thought,
and remains after the definiteness which thinking gave to it
has been destroyed&quot;
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consciousness and thought which, by having boundaries,
is recognised as limited, but which, not having boun
daries, must be called unlimited ? Is it an indefinite con
sciousness which is not capable of analysis ? It appears
to me that this raw material can only be regarded, first, as
the cosmos of matter and motion, and that it is indefinite
according to the inadequacy of the correspondence be
tween the inner activities and the environment, more
particularly in the case of the infant from imperfection
of growth to a normal standard; and, secondly, in the
adult from want of education in the Evolution philosophy.
But when this is learned there is no raw material, how
ever much there may be of unorganised knowledge.
Though we cannot grasp the boundaries of the cosmos,
nor make our experience coeval with the whole history
of its changes, we know that these cosmos and these
changes are of matter and of motion, which are definite
and comprehensible. And when we speak of the limited
and of the nescience of limitation, we speak of definite
objectivities, and not of an unknowable, and the conver
sion of such nescience into an absolute is a fault of
reasoning.
Mr. Spencer says, however
all this applies by change of terms to the last and
highest of these antinomies that between the relative and the
non-relative. We are conscious of the relative as existence
under conditions and limits
; it is impossible that these condi
tions and limits can he thought of apart from something to
which they give the form. The abstraction of these conditions
and limits is, by the hypothesis, the abstraction of them only ;
consequently there must be a residuary consciousness of some
thing which filled up their outlines ; and this indefinite some
thing constitutes our consciousness of the non-relative or abso
lute. Impossible though it is to give to this consciousness any&quot;THE UNKNOWABLE 169
qualitative or quantitative expression whatever, it is not the less
certain that it remains with us as a positive and indestructible
element of thought.&quot;
When we think of that which is limited and condi
tioned, we are obliged to think of matter and motion.
We can only think of matter and motion as of a mass of
ultimate units having shape, size, and modes and rates
of motion. When we would go further back than this,
and ask what it is that has motion, we say it is
matter. When we ask still again what is matter, we
say extension, i.e., that which has shape and size and re
sistance. Beyond this we cannot go. The answer that
Mr. Spencer would apparently give would be,
&quot; It is the
absolute.&quot; There must be a something that is possessed
of extension, resistance, shape, and motion. This some
thing must have a name. It is the absolute. If we accept
his answer, we remark that this absolute is conditioned
and limited specifically, and in its totality by the totality
and conditions of matter
; that it corresponds in every
way with the definitions of matter. It is an interchange
able term with matter, and therefore superfluous and mis
leading. The indefinite something is no more than our
obscure appreciation of matter, and is admitted to be
what Mr. Spencer claims :
&quot;A positive and indestructible
element of thought.&quot; But it is not the absolute
; and by
its very title it cannot possibly be an element of thought,
for every element of thought is related to an object of
thought.
Mr. Spencer proceeds to show that if we do not admit
the absolute we cannot think of the relative. He says
that contradictories cannot be known except as in rela
tion to each other. We ask, are correlated words con
tradictories ?
&quot; And thus the relative can itself be con-1 70 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
ceived only by opposition to the non-relative. It is also
admitted, or rather contended, that the consciousness of
a relation implies a consciousness of both the related
members.&quot;
We notice here that the adjective
&quot;
relative,&quot; as applied
to our knowledge of the objective, to distinguish it from
a hypothesis of knowledge which is not relative, or to
knowledge which is beyond our reach as, for instance,
the whole of the past is changed into a noun, &quot;the
relative,&quot; in which case it is equivalent to
&quot; the cosmos.&quot;
And so, as the relative cannot be thought of without
thinking of the related, then we are bound to think of
the related term in accordance with the laws of the rela
tions of the terms of wholes, viz., its component parts
that make up the cosmos or its equivalent, the relative.
Mr. Spencer says also that consciousness of a relation
implies a consciousness of both the related members, but
if the relative implies the absolute, then the latter, being
present in consciousness, is a something that can be con-
sciousnessed, is in relation to that which is conscious of






Mr. Spencer next proceeds to show that both Sir
William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel
&quot;
distinctively imply
that our consciousness of the absolute, indefinite though
it is, is positive and not negative.&quot; This assertion re
specting them appears to be justifiable, but it is certainly
inconsistent. However, as they have already clearly
proved along with Mr. Spencer that we can know nothing
beyond
&quot; the relative,&quot; not even that there is anything
beyond
&quot; the relative,&quot; we must count it for nothing, par
ticularly as the statement is not reasoned out as presented
by Mr. Spencer. At the same time, Mr. Spencer himself
maintains the existence of
&quot; the absolute,&quot; and we confine&quot; THE UNKNOWABLE? 1 7 1





? Is it not an actuality in rela




is positive is to say that it is relative. When
the absolute becomes positive it commits suicide.
But the belief in the
&quot;
positive character of our con
sciousness of the unconditioned
&quot;
is rendered more certain
by other considerations. We cannot conceive of space and
time as limited or unlimited, nevertheless
&quot; there is yet
in our minds the unshaped material of a conception.&quot;
So, also, we cannot form a circumscribed idea of cause,
&quot; and we are consequently obliged to think of the cause
which transcends the limits of our thought as positive
though indefinite.&quot;
&quot; The momentum of thought inevit
ably carries us beyond conditioned existence to uncon
ditioned existence
; and this ever persists in us as the
body of a thought to which we can give no
shape.&quot;
We reply that there is no entity called space ; all we
know is matter and motion : and there is no entity called
time
; all we know is sequence. The relations of the
former, size, shape, and distance, give rise in us to the
abstraction
&quot;
space,&quot; and the relations of the latter give




neither is there an
entity called cause, the sequences of events being deter
mined by the combinations of matter in motion in rela
tion to other matter in motion.
There is, it is true, a momentum of thought, but it
carries us back, not to unconditioned existence, which
means
&quot;nothing,&quot; but to a question as to final causes
what caused the matter and the motion ? The reply is,
we cannot know. But this is not the body of a thought ;
it is a mere blank.
Mr. Spencer next goes on to discuss real existence,172 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
concluding,
&quot;
Yet, as we cannot expel the entire contents
of consciousness, there ever remains behind an element
which passes into new shapes. The continual negation
of each particular form and limit simply results in the
more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits,
and so ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed
and unlimited.&quot; Here Mr. Spencer is speaking of the
state of our minds, not of the objective world, and to this
state of our minds he would make the objective world
correspond. We must say that we fail to accomplish
what Mr. Spencer asks us to do. We can imagine the
solar system dissolved, and the whole cosmos reduced to
its original ultimate units, but we cannot think of these
ultimate units as having no shape or size. It is just as
unthinkable to think them out of existence as to think
them into existence. And as to the quantity of them,
we cannot think of it otherwise than as limited, however
vast
; and if we are to call this
&quot; the absolute,&quot; it simply
means the primal cosmos.
Mr. Spencer may well ask (p. 94)
&quot; How can there possibly be constituted a consciousness of the
unformed and unlimited, when, by its very nature, conscious
ness is possible only under forms and limits *\
11 Such consciousness is not, and cannot be, constituted by any
single mental act, but is the product of many mental acts. In
each concept there is an element which persists. It is alike im
possible for this element to be absent from consciousness, and for
it to be present in consciousness alone; either alternative in
volves unconsciousness the one from the want of the substance,
the other from the want of the form. But the persistence of this
element under successive conditions necessitates a sense of it as
distinguished from the conditions, and independent of them.&quot;
Here we have a substance, viz., matter, and we have
it variously conditioned in shape, size, mode and rate of&quot;THE UNKNOWABLE? I73
motion, and the question reverts to the identification of
matter or ultimate units, or the homogeneous, with
&quot; the
absolute,&quot; as before discussed.
But Mr. Spencer would assist us by an illustration.
&quot;We are asked to take away from the notion of a piano
the conception of strings, hammers, dampers, pedals, and
visual appearance. By doing so we get an indefinite
notion of general existence.
&quot;
By fusing a series of
states of consciousness, in each of which, as it arises,
the limitations and conditions are abolished there is
produced a consciousness of something unconditioned.&quot;
We are asked, in fact, to follow out the process of dis
solution, and when we have arrived at ultimate units,
which is the notion of
&quot;
general existence,&quot; we are asked
to think these away, and the remainder will be in this
case
Something unconditioned=the absolute nothing.
&quot; This consciousness is not the abstract of any one group
of thoughts, ideas, or conceptions, but it is the abstract of
all thoughts, ideas, or conceptions. That which is com
mon to them all, and cannot be got rid of, is what we
predicate by the term existence. ... It remains as an
indefinite consciousness of something constant under all
modes. . . . The distinction we feel between special and
general existence is the distinction between that which
is changeable in us and thatwhich is unchangeable.&quot; But
we are not conscious of anything that is unchangeable,
and general existence is only the totality of things ; we
have no consciousness of something constant under all
modes
; and as to an
&quot; abstract of thoughts, ideas, and
conceptions,&quot; we cannot understand what is meant. It
is evidently a purely mental process relating to thoughts174 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
and modes of consciousness, and does not relate to the
constitution of the cosmos.
Page 96. &quot;The contrast between the absolute and
the relative in our minds is really the contrast between
that mental element which exists absolutely and those
which exist relatively.&quot;
What is a mental element ? What is meant by its
existing ? How does it exist relatively ? And what is
meant by its existing absolutely ?
With respect to the latter question, it is evident that,
if it exists as a mental element at all, it does not exist
out of relation, and, therefore, not absolutely.
It is very evident that the absolute that Mr. Spencer
argues for is identical with the primal state of matter in
motion, in relation, under limits and conditions to our
consciousness. We know that things do not exist as we
know them, viz., as red, hot, sweet, loud, &c., and that
even the relations of aggregates of matter and motion,
which cause the vibrations, &c., which affect us, and to
which we give these names, themselves are differentia
tions from a primal state of matter
; and it is either this
primal state, or the same as involved in the totality of
existence, that gives rise to the notion of general exist
ence, or the absolute, or that which persists under
changeable forms, and thus we can understand with Mr.
Spencer in the concluding sentence of the chapter &quot;how
impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an
actuality underlying appearances, and how from this
impossibility results our indestructible belief in that
actuality.&quot;
What that actuality is we have already seen. It is
not the absolute a fiction utterly unworthy of credence
but the ultimate units of matter and motion.&quot;THE UNKNOWABLE.&quot; 175
On Ultimate Scientific Ideas.
Science is systematised knowledge. Knowledge con
sists of a more or less perfect cognition of the knowable.
Ultimate ideas of the knowable are those of the most
general character, and are naturally the factors dealt
with in the formula which generalises the relations or
history of the knowable. We, therefore, naturally refer
to the book on
&quot; The Knowable
&quot;
for an estimate of ulti
mate scientific ideas. We are surprised to find them
treated of in the book on
&quot; The Unknowable,&quot;
The formula of Evolution, which sums up all know
ledge, is this,
&quot; Evolution is an integration of matter
and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which
the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homo
geneity to a definite, coherent, heterogeneity, and during
which, the retained motion undergoes a parallel trans
formation.&quot;
Now this formula, being placed in the book on the
knowable, is supposed to have an intelligible meaning
to be capable of being known and understood. Other
wise it could not be advanced as a formula which is cap
able of explaining the history of the universe. And each
of its terms is to be supposed to have a definite meaning,
otherwise what is the use of it ?
The ultimate scientific ideas, then, are matter and
motion.
Let us consider for a moment the nature of knowledge.
Life is defined as the continuous adjustment of inner
and outer relations. Mind as part of life is regarded as
the establishment of correspondences between inner and
outer relations. The absence of one end of a correspon
dence precludes knowledge. There must be the twofoldi;6 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
relation. These correspondences are called actualities or
realities, and are the only actualities and realities that we
know.
To the objective as well as to the subjective parts of
these correspondences we give names as well as to the
inter-relations of each within itself.
Consequently, the term matter has a definite meaning,
and the term motion has a definite meaning, and thereby
only can the formula of Evolution be intelligible and
valuable.
What are these meanings ? They are given in Book
ii. chap, iii., and have already been considered by us in
the course of our criticism.
But Mr. Spencer says in the chapter now under con
sideration that they, with the notions of space, time, and
consciousness, are incomprehensible.
But after all, it is only the subject-matter of the last
chapter over again. What we include in the terms we
know, and, therefore, we know what we mean by the
terms. But somebody thinks, we know not who, and we
know not why, that there ought to be something else in
the terms, and that something else we do not know and
cannot understand. But it must have a name, and it is
to be called noumenon, or the absolute, or essence, or some
name which, having no meaning, shall be fitted as near
as possible to represent that which has no existence.
This will be seen by a consideration of sect. 21, in
which Mr. Spencer says,
&quot; Ultimate scientific ideas, then,
are all representative of realities that cannot be compre










Force, space, and time pass all understanding ;
&quot;
he
&quot; can give no account either of sensations themselves&quot;THE UNKNOWABLE&quot; I??
or of that something which is conscious of sensations
;
&quot;




there is an impossibility of thought both in
the remote past and as to the extreme future. And
again,
&quot;
objective and subjective things he thus ascertains
to be alike inscrutable in their substance and
genesis.&quot;
From this it would appear that there is a matter,
motion, space, time, and consciousness which we do
understand, because they come &quot;within the range of
experience,&quot; and which are included in the formula of
Evolution and its subsequent exposition ; and there is
another set which we do not understand, because we are
prevented by our &quot;impotence in dealing with all that
transcends experience.&quot; Or it may be better stated that
the matter, motion, &c., that we do know are manifesta
tions of a presumed something that we do not know
; and
we are thrown back upon the discussion contained in the
last chapter.
However, we come to this as a conclusion : that ulti
mate scientific ideas are within the domain of the know-
able, and that when we make use of the words matter,
motion, &c., we mean something definite and expect to
be understood.
If we say that the ultimate ideas contained in the
knowable are not knowable, why are they retained in the
knowable ? But ultimate scientific ideas, to be ideas
and to be scientific, must be known, and it is a mistake
to class them with the unknowable.
If we say that they are only manifestations of some
thing else which we do not know, and which may have
other manifestations which we do not know, such a some
thing is beyond the pale of science and is not an ultimate
scientific idea.
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And if we say that we cannot account for the genesis
of things or of consciousness, this confession of ignorance
cannot be converted into an ultimate scientific idea.
Ultimate scientific ideas, then, are comprehensible, else
they would not be scientific, i.e., knowable. Mr. Spencer
says that they are
&quot;
all representative of realities that
cannot be comprehended.&quot;
It is true that beyond the ultimate we know nothing.
All beyond is hypothesis. We do not even know enough
to say that the matter and motion that we do know are
manifestations. All is a blank.





is a word of very wide and vague mean
ing, it is capable of definition and application in a great
variety of ways, according to the discretion of the writer.
To us it appears to involve two items. Firstly, an
idea, and, secondly, an emotion to which this idea is re
lated.
This emotion has been very variously directed with
more or less of logical guidance, and sometimes with none
at all. And it is an emotion associated with other emo
tions producing very complicated results.
It is not, however, our purpose to write an essay upon
the subject, but only to bring out our view of the intel
lectual element of the object contained in all the great
and predominant manifestations called religious.
And it appears to me that this main idea has been the
recognition of external non-human will.
The association of action with individual will, with
design and intention, is one of the earliest experiences of
infancy. So in the infancy of the human race all such
activities and variations of activities, especially of those&quot;THE UNKNOWABLE.&quot; 179
that are unexpected, except, perhaps, those uniformities
of nature which daily familiarities have caused to be
taken as a matter of course, have presumably been asso
ciated with, manifestations of external will.
There would be accessory causes of such beliefs, as so
carefully shown by Mr. Spencer and Mr. Tylor in their
expositions of the growth of a belief in the existence of
spirits of departed chiefs, &c.
In monotheism, as in polytheism, the hopes and fears,
the religious adoration and theological teachings, all
centre round the supposed relations of human wills with
the Divine Will, and in accordance with the belief in
the extent of the relation between the human wills and
the Divine Will have been the variations and perturba
tions of religion.
And even when the Divine Will has been placed
back in its relation to the human right away at the be
ginning of things or at the beginning of humanity, still
the religious sentiment found its legitimate object, more
particularly if a constant though purely spiritual com
munion was recognised.
And even pantheism finds a shadow to cling to in a
Being that, although working itself out, is doing so to a
well-ordered end.
But when pantheism takes the form of a blind de
velopment anywhere, anyhow, and towards no specific
end, and the human will forms no part of a relation to
another will, then the legitimate religious idea, as defined
and justified at the commencement of this section, has
escaped from the mind. There may be vague hopes and
aspirations left which will make the intellect frame for its
satisfaction some vague object, but the essential point of
a religion is gone.i8o SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
But if this is denied, and it is said that we have no
right so to limit the use of the term religion, we would
point out that although there may be a justification of
the varied use of an indefinite word, there is in this case
a marked departure in the employment of the term.
There is a distinct change of the intellectual position
in this respect, that there is no longer any relation of
will to exterior will. And even although there may be
a desire for a conformity to human will and for harmony
with the grand course of things, there is no personality
in the relationship. The object of the sentiment is not
a personality an individual. There is a marked change
of intellectual attitude.
And this idea of a relation to an external will will be
found, I think, to be the main idea which, on the part of
religion, has been in conflict with that progress of science,
or the systematisation of knowledge and of events which
forms the gist of the next chapter.
The Conflict.
To the extent that men have believed in invisible, ex
ternal, personal wills, to that extent have they adapted
their conduct thereto, in the same manner that they have
adjusted their actions to visible external personalities.
These invisible beings have been supposed to possess
likings and antipathies, and to have required propitiation
and deference. They have been regarded as taking an
interest in human affairs and in the conduct of indi
viduals
; to be capable of displeasure and vindictiveness,
and susceptible to persuasion. The character of these in
visible beings has depended for the most part upon the
intellectual calibre and moral advancement of different
peoples, but in all cases they have been regarded as sus-&quot; THE UNKNOWA jBLE.&quot; 1 8 1
ceptible to pleasure and displeasure, and in accordance
therewith to have dealt with the fates of individuals and
nations.
It is obvious that the non-recognition of this authority
on the part of any individual or individuals would natu
rally cause displeasure on the part of the rest of the
community in much the same manner as high treason
against the head of the state. A defiance of the power
of the invisible personalities would shock the educated
associations of awe and veneration
; it would render a
defence of their invisible friend or ruler urgent, the fear
of involving the community in the offences of the one,
the fear of others being led away into similar dangerous
courses, would all combine to resist and condemn any in
novations of thought which would largely bring the course
of events into the class of scientific order, and remove
them from the domain of external personal power.
And this has been the nature of any conflict there has
been between science and religion.
It is true that the conflict has been rendered more
dignified, and perhaps, at the same time, made more in
tense, when the invisible external will has been regarded
as possessing universal power, and as being related to
humanity as a moral lawgiver, more particularly when
associated with the doctrine of eternal damnation as the
consequence of the merited displeasure of that being.
But the conflict has always been essentially of the same
character, viz., as to the extent to which events are attri
butable to natural orders of sequence, and the extent to
which they are amenable to a Divine interference.
Nor has the conflict been uninfluenced by collateral
considerations. Grave and serious persons could not
view without alarm any innovations which might do182 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
away with the groundwork and authority of good con
duct. Without a lawgiver, without a system of rewards
and punishments, where would be the majesty and the
imposing force of moral law ? and where would be the
incentives to a virtuous life and the deterrents from a
vicious one ?
Such has been the nature of the animus against the
advances of science. On the part of science there has been
no animus, but the simple advance of inevitable logic.
The result has been the continually increasing limita
tion of the area of activity of an invisible external will
and an increased recognition of the extent of a natural
order of sequences.
Any Reconciliation ? Statement of the Difficulty.
The question arises, How does religion view the Evolu
tion theory ? If we adopt the formula of Evolution,
then all events of the universe are accounted for by the
integration of matter and the concomitant dissipation of
motion, and there is no room left for an external will.
This notion is simply abolished. There is no religion
left at all in the sense in which we have been using the
term.
It is true that the sentiment which has attached itself
to the external personality may be transferred to some
other object, some abstraction called the universe or
humanity, and so afford satisfactory exercise for the natu
ral sentiment, but the intellectual function is totally
changed, and it is that only with which we have to do.
It is that which has been the essence of the conflict.
Mr. Spencer s Solution of it.
But Mr. Spencer advances a hypothetic reconciliation.&quot; THE UNKNOWABLE: 183
Every religion is regarded by Mm as a theory of the
origin and order of things.
Page 44.
&quot; Now every theory tacitly asserts two things ;
firstly, that there is something to be explained ; secondly, that such
and such is the explanation. Hence, however widely different
speculators may disagree in the solutions they give of the same
problem, yet by implication they agree that there is a problem
to be solved. Here, then, is an element which all creeds have
in common. Religions diametrically opposed in their overt
dogmas are yet perfectly at one in the tacit conviction that the
existence of the world with all it contains and all which sur
rounds it is a mystery ever pressing for interpretation. On this
point, if on no other, there is entire unanimity.&quot;
This soul of truth underlying the grossest superstitions
is found to be
&quot; the constituent which may be claimed
alike by all religions,&quot; and in every respect answers to
proper requirements.
It is
&quot; the vital element in all religions,&quot; for it is the
element which survives every change, and thus is capable
of including even atheism within the definition of religion.
The vital element of religion is, however, very variously
expressed, as thus :
Page 44, line 6
&quot; A problem to be solved.&quot; \
44, ii
&quot; A mystery ever pressing for interpretation.&quot;
45&amp;gt; I4 &quot;Inscrutableness of creation.&quot; (&quot;Thus, while
other constituents of religious creeds one
by one drop away, this remains and ever
grows more manifest, and sojis^shown to
be the essential element.&quot;)
45) 2 3
&quot;The omnipresence of something which
passes comprehension
&quot;
(&quot; that most ab
stract belief which is common to all re
ligions &quot;).
46
} 6&quot; A far more transcendent mystery, ... not
a relative but an absolute mystery
&quot;
(what
ever an absolute mystery may be).1 84 SPENCER &amp;gt;S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
Criticism thereof.
Now, if this is to be accepted as the essential element
of religion, a reconciliation with science is easy and ob
vious. For what are the pursuits of science but an en
deavour to ordinate and systematise knowledge, leading
up in the end to an endeavour to embrace all knowledge
in a comprehensive formula, and then to ask what beyond
that?
In fact, all through the chapter on ultimate religious
ideas religion is only science in disguise. What is treated
of is the scientific or knowing element in religion ; the
only speciality about it being that it is concerned with
the wrong end. It occupies itself with the beginnings of
the universe. It is scientific speculation. It endeavours
to explain the universe, and, separated from the religious
sentiment, its hypotheses are simply and purely intellectual
speculations, as is the Evolution theory.
Taken in this point of view, religion and science are
identical and require no reconciliation. In fact, they have
in this respect never been in conflict.
It is as if two people going to law may be said to be
fundamentally agreed in that they both admit that there
is a problem to be solved
; they only differ in the minor
point as to the possession of a certain amount of property.
So any two people having any dispute may be said to be
agreed in this, that there is a problem to be solved, and
thus anything can be reconciled to anything.
But it may be well asked what is the value of such a
reconciliation ?
But a different basis of reconciliation is adduced,
viz. :
&quot; If religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis&quot;THE UNKNOWABLE.&quot; 185
of this reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, and
most certain of all facts : that the power which the uni
verse manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.&quot;
This idea is worked out in chapter v.
In the first place, the absolute is asserted to be a neces
sary datum of consciousness. This is the basis of agree
ment we set out to seek. Various modes of science agree
in the assertion of a
&quot;
reality utterly inscrutable in nature,&quot;
and in it
&quot;
religion finds an assertion essentially coincid
ing with her own.&quot;
Eeligion from the very first has always acknowledged
a mystery. It has constantly done battle for the doctrine
&quot; that all things are manifestations of a power that trans
cends knowledge.&quot;
Science is obliged to acknowledge the same ultimate
truth, in that, however much it may succeed in formu-
larising knowledge, and thus succeed in affording explana
tions of sequences, it can never get beyond a certain
point. If from the homogeneous, made up of matter and
motion, it can explain the universe, it cannot explain the
existence of that matter and motion nor the fact of the
mutual relations of matter and of motion, and, therefore,
it is obliged to suppose an initiatory power that transcends
knowledge.
We do not ourselves see the practical value of such a
reconciliation. What is the value of a mystery, of a pro
blem to be solved, of an inscrutable power that only mani
fests itself to us in the formula of Evolution as applied
to the homogeneous ? It is of no scientific value. If
we ask, Has it a religious value ? then, since in Mr.
Spencer s view this question would mean, Has it any value
in explaining the origin of things
? we would reply, It
has no value in this respect. But if we mean religion as1 86 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
heretofore defined by ourselves, then again we would
reply, It has no value. It is no item of knowledge ; it
is no item in our emotional nature
; it is no item in our
environment to which it is necessary to adapt ourselves.
Its interest to us is ml.
It is only of value when we begin to attach to it any
definite ideas of personality, or regard it as possibly con
taining such an idea. Then indeed it becomes a matter
of interest to us, and resumes its place as an object of
religious importance, taking religion as defined by us.
Possible Modes of Reconciliation.
It would not be difficult to enumerate the possible
modes of reconciliation between the identification of the
Inscrutable Power with personality, and the ultimate
conclusions of science as expressed in the formula of
Evolution. And this is the reconciliation that is asked
for by the mass of mankind permeated by religious ideas.
The very abstract agreement proposed by Mr. Spencer is
regarded as a reduction to vacuity.
Such modes of reconciliation would divide themselves
into classes.
1 . Theories of personal origin, with intention and fore
thought, with an ultimate relation to human personalities.
2. Pantheistic theories, in which, in some way, the
original personality is related to some or all human per
sonality.
3. Theories of an original constitution of the cosmos
and of its order, according to the formula of Evolution,
and subsequent Divine communion with human person
alities.
4. Theories similar to the last, with the addition of
more or less Divine intervention in the natural order of&quot;THE UNKNOWABLE? 187
things, going even so far as to give a revelation of the
Divine will and purposes.
It is not, however, our business to consider these. We
mention them only as indicating the kind of reconciliation
that is required in respect of a settlement of the actual
conflict that has taken place throughout all ages in the
names of science and religion, and to show how far off is
Mr. Spencer s solution from solving the difficulty as it
exists and has existed in the minds of men.
Dynamism.
But if we are to exclude from our consideration alto
gether any belief in an invisible external will, either at
the beginning, the present, or the end, and if we are to
take consciousness as itself but a mode of matter and
motion, then we have to accept the formula of Evolution
as the all in all.
Such a result would most profoundly affect the hopes,
the aims, and the conduct of mankind.






tion, although their nature can to some extent be fore
seen. But it would seem, prima facie, that the work
will fundamentally alter the grounds of moral obliga
tion.
If, as we surmise, conduct will be regarded as the ad
justment of organisation and environment, then the com
pleteness of this adjustment is the aim of individual
endeavour. To this aim all others must be subordinate.
All the old notions of conscience, duty, &c., must give
way. They themselves will derive their only authority
therefrom as part of a social organism.
One is naturally inclined to ask, What will be the1 88 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
result on individuals of the promulgation of this doctrine,
and, in the course of time, what would be the result on
society at large?
In this matter I am but expressing the vague fear of
an unknown future. I must own also that in doing so
I am departing from the main theme of my criticism,
which is the formula of Evolution as accounting for the
cosmos, as we know it.
Conclusion.
Our task of criticism may now be considered as com
plete. It might have been made longer, and it is not
out of any disrespect that the many important points
have been treated so summarily. It has been our object
to be as concise as possible. The criticisms are such as
came up in our endeavour to understand and master the
full scope of Mr. Spencer s book. We submit them for
the consideration of the students of the new philosophy.1 89
PART VI.
THE FOREGOING AS AFFECTED BY MR. SPENCER S
&quot;REPLIES TO CRITICISM.&quot;
ON the completion of the foregoing criticism I read





vol. iii.), in order to see if any of the points had been
already discussed, and I find that the question as to The
Absolute and one or two other matters call for a few
further remarks.
The Absolute.
The question as to The Absolute seems to ine all
verbiage I say it with due respect to be a discussion
of no practical application or value to savour too much
of old metaphysical treading out the chaff.
The discussion seems to arise from the proposition
&quot; All knowledge is relative.&quot; Now this is no doubt true
enough. It is the realisation of a certain truth in our
own minds in its enunciation, but it does not seem to
lead to anything else except in the hands of mystics.
It simply asserts the fact of a correspondence between
the knower and the known the subject and the object
and presumably of relations amongst the items of the object.
But immediately thereupon the mystic calls The Known
and its interrelations The Eelative. After all, it is know
ledge that is being spoken of and its relativity, not TheIQO SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
Eelative or The Known. But if we admit The Relative,
it is so from the fact of its being known, and its cor
relative is The Knower.
But if we say The Relative implies the Non-relative, here
it seems to me we have a something an entity actually
growing out of a word. We have an entity to which we
give a name, and out of this name we construct another
entity of which we had no idea beforehand
; a piece
of word-jugglery that I cannot understand. It can be
replied to by similar verbal ingenuities; for if The
Absolute another name for the Non-relative is made
correlative with The Relative, it is put into a relation
and ceases to* be absolute, i.e., non-related.
But the question really seems to be, Is there an
&quot;inscrutable Force&quot; of which all things are manifesta
tions ? If so, why call it by such a name as the Abso
lute and rely upon verbal subtleties for its proof ? But
Mr. Spencer thinks, upon other grounds, there is such an
&quot;inscrutable Force.&quot;
His argument is this. We are able to account for
and ideally construct the whole universe on the applica
tion to the homogeneous of the formula of Evolution,





These are the ultimate scientific i.e., knowable, com
prehensible ideas, otherwise the formula would be
valueless as an unification of knowledge. This matter
and this motion are fixed quantities, and work out all
subsequent developments purely from interrelations and
combinations due to primal gravitation or motion towards
each other.
But after all, he says, we cannot understand matter
and motion
&quot; in their ultimate natures
&quot;
(Essays, vol. iii.
p. 258^. I must say that I do not know w
That this&quot;REPLIES TO CRITICISM.&quot; 191
means. It seems to me that, if I understand the inter
relations of matter and motion and their combinations, I
understand their natures. I know their value as factors
in Evolution, and it is quite gratuitous to say that they









Mr. Spencer says, &quot;Essays,&quot; vol. iii. p. 262: &quot;I
have contended . . . that the consciousness of that
which is manifested to us through phenomena is positive
and not negative! I truly admit with him that that of
which we are conscious is positive and not negative.
But of what are we conscious ? Nothing but motion, or
matter in motion, or matter and motion, whichever is the
best way of putting it. The modes of consciousness
differ, for the combinations and modes of matter and
motion are so varied, but our consciousness is limited to
these. Even if we take consciousness of our own bodies,
it is only consciousness of matter and motion, according
to the formula of Evolution. Why must we say they
are something else, or manifestations of something else ?
Surely it is most gratuitous. If they are manifestations
of something else which we choose to call an
&quot; inscrut
able Eorce,&quot; then, since this Eorce is limited in its mode
of manifestation by matter and motion, the quantity
of which is fixed, and the whole series of cosmical
sequences is a resultant of the original quantity without
any guidance or interference, then the inscrutable Eorce
amounts to nothing in the course of things, and is not
immediately conscious to us is but a device of the intel
lect with respect to the far-off primal constitution of things.
But if it is a present factor in the universe as it
may be then it is an incalculable, unknowable element,192 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
and no formula of philosophy is possible, and Mr. Spencer s
synthetic philosophy no use.
And certainly it is to that far-off primal constitution
of things that we are forced by the Evolution philosophy
to relegate that
&quot; inscrutable Force.&quot;
The mind naturally seeks backwards for the set of
activities which produced the later sequences, and so on
back to the beginning. And what are we to say of that?





? That is the
only place left for it by Mr. Spencer. But Mr. Spencer
has examined every possible theory of the beginning of
things, and finds that there is no conceivable hypothesis
only Nescience.
Why, then, should we not content ourselves with Ne
science to start with, and the formula of Evolution to go
on with ?
If this is insufficient, then Mr. Spencer s Evolution
philosophy is insufficient.
On Mind and Matter.
The charge of materialism comes up several times in
Mr. Spencer s replies to critics. Can we wonder at it ?
His formula of Evolution only comprises matter and
motion, and the subsequent Evolution only recognises
them. When he says that we only recognise matter
and motion as modes of Force or manifestations of Force,
which is itself inscrutable, the explanation does not do
away with the charge, for all that is then meant by the
charge, accepting the interpretation, is that all the cosmos,
including humanity, are modes of these manifestations of
Force called matter and motion. All sequences, including
life and mind, are, firstly, modes of matter and motion, and&quot;REPLIES TO CRITICISM.&quot; 193
are included in the synthesis of the formula of Evolution
;
and secondarily are, from the fact of matter and motion
being modes of something called Force, modes of that
Force which we call inscrutable, because we predicate its
existence, although we have no reason for doing so.
Twice in the course of his replies to critics, Mr.
Spencer quotes the following passage as a reply to the
charge of materialism :
&quot;
See, then, our predicament. We can think of matter only
in terms of mind. We can think of mind only in terms of
matter. When we have pushed our explanations of the first to
the uttermost limit, we are referred to the first for a final
answer ; and when we have got the final answer of the second,
we are referred back to the first for an interpretation of it.
We find the value of x in the terms of y ; then we find the
value of y in the terms of x
; and so we may continue for ever
without coming nearer to a solution.&quot; Prin. of Psy., 272.
This is true enough, but what we want to know is
is mind included in the formula of Evolution ? That
formula is supposed to embrace everything, for it is
advanced as the unification of all sequences from The
Homogeneous ; and, amongst others, it is supposed to
account for the corning into existence of those feelings and
modes of consciousness which constitute
&quot;
Mind.&quot; We
may be in the puzzle described, but, as regards the validity
of the Evolution philosophy (Evolution meaning concen
tration and its effects, and not unfolding), we want to
know if mind is included in it. Evidently in a complete
synthetic philosophy it must be, and can only there
fore be a mode of motion of matter. The charge, there
fore, against the Evolution philosophy on the ground of
being materialistic seems to hold good.
Mr. Spencer speaks of
&quot; the inscrutability of the rela-
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tion between subjective feeling and its objective correlate
which is not feeling an inscrutability which meets us
at the bottom of all our analysis.&quot;
This is indeed the great stumbling-block. This in
scrutability, as well as the action of the &quot;inscrutable
Force,&quot; seems to preclude the possibility of a synthetic
philosophy which shall unify all knowledge. Amidst so
many inscrutabilities how can we hope for an intelligible
synthesis ?
The objective world we may know, and the subjective
world we may know, and Evolution or Development we
may darkly recognise, but of a formula that is capable of
reducing them all to one explanation we despair.
But this passage requires a little more examination:
&quot; We can think of matter only in terms of mind. We can
think of mind only in terms of matter,
. . . and so we may
continue for ever without coming nearer to a solution.&quot;
What are the terms of matter, and what are the
terms of mind ? We presume the terms of matter
include the terms of motion. We presume that matter
and motion are never disassociated, for they are the two
factors recognised in the formula of Evolution. The
terms of matter are extension, and the terms of motion
are relations of movement, both capable of representation
geometrically and mathematically. The terms of mind
are feelings or consciousness of some of these combina
tions of matter in motion. Therefore, when Mr. Spencer
says that we can only think of matter in terms of mind,
he means that that combination of matter in motion
which is called a human organism can only think of
matter and motion in terms of its own consciousness of
matter and motion, either internal or external
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Mr. Spencer says that we can only think of mind in
terms of matter, he means that without this combina
tion of matter and motion which constitute the human
organism there could be no thinking, and that as this
thinking is only the consciousness of matter in motion,
therefore we are obliged to describe it in terms of matter,
i.e., in terms of geometry and mathematics. It is not
meant, I suppose, that the consciousness can be so
described, but that everything of which we are conscious
can be so described.
And this brings us again to the inquiry, Was there
anything in the primary homogeneous more than matter
and motion ? There is nothing else recognised in the
formula of Evolution. So we presume Mr. Spencer
means to imply that life and all its developments, in
cluding consciousness, are merely modes of matter and
motion. If so, the charge of materialism is valid.
As to how we think and the terms we use, that
brings us back to the subject of the Relativity of Know
ledge. Terms are names we give to items of Knowledge.
Properly speaking, there are no
&quot; terms of matter.&quot; All
terms are mental. There are terms relating to subjective
facts, and there are terms relating to objective facts.
Some of the latter may be called
&quot; terms of matter
;
&quot;
properly speaking they are terms of our consciousness of
matter. And in any case, the discussion as to our modes
of thinking and difficulties of language does not affect the
question of fact as to whether the formula of Evolution
is not materialistic, i.e., capable of explaining all things,
including life and mind, as temporary combinations of
extension and motion capable of being represented geo
metrically and mathematically.196 SPENCER S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
EECAPITULATION.
To recapitulate, I will remind the reader of the plan of
this criticism.
First, I asked &quot;What is the Problem of Philosophy
according to Mr. Spencer ?
&quot; and I found that it was
&quot; To
state an intelligible formula, which, ly its application to the
homogeneous, will explain and enable us to construct, ideally,
all the changes of the universe&quot;
I then gave the formula advanced by Mr. Spencer,
which, although intelligible, proved to be utterly inade
quate, inasmuch as its two factors, Matter
(i.e., extension)
and Motion do not explain Life and Mind.
I then attempted to amend the formula by the intro
duction of the term Force a term largely employed by
Mr. Spencer, but omitted from the formula and I found
the result unintelligible.
I next endeavoured, from a study of Mr. Spencer s
exposition, to frame a formula that should be a true repre
sentation of it, which formula proved to be so vague and
unsatisfactory that it was really useless for our purpose.
From this I have concluded that Mr. Spencer has failed
in the task he set himself, and that the Problem of
Philosophy remains, so far as our studies have extended,
unsolved.APPENDIX.
AX ACCOUNT OF THE PRINCIPAL CRITICISMS
OF ME. SPENCER S PHILOSOPHY.
HAVING thus completed our own study of Mr. Spencer s main
theses, we naturally turn to a consideration of the manner in
which his work has been regarded by other minds. TTe know
the high estimation in which Mr. Spencer s labours are deservedly
held by most thoughtful men, and especially by men of
science. We know that there is sufficient justification for this
in the more scientific and detailed labours of the later volumes
of his work, quite irrespective of the large claim set up for his
philosophy in the first volume, and of the particular formula we
have just disputed.
I have therefore searched around on all sides to enlarge my
judgment, and for the use of the student of Spencer s works I
append the result of my reading. I must acknowledge my surprise
at the absence, so far as I can ascertain, of a thoroughly exhaus
tive criticism of
&quot; First Principles,&quot; although the main deficiencies
of the theory propounded have been vigorously handled by several
eminent thinkers in articles contributed to reviews.
I first referred to some of the critics to whom Mr. Spencer has
himself replied. As a rule, I find that the term
&quot; evolution
&quot; has
not been used in any very definite sense. It seems to have been
understood generally as an orderly progress of some sort. Some
writers, however, have accepted it in the very restricted sense as
defined by Mr. Spencer, viz., the concentration of matter and
concomitant dissipation of motion. Others, again, have admitted,
as Mr. Spencer himself does sometimes, an additional indefinite
factor called &quot;force.&quot; On the whole, the criticisms have recog
nised the main characteristic as being deterministic and non-198 APPENDIX.
teleologies!, and as actually dealing with matter and motion,
whether ultimately they are manifestations of something else
or not.
I then looked up a variety of notices of
&quot; First Principles
&quot; and
of the theories contained in it. My abstracts and remarks
will be found very scanty and inadequate, for to discuss the
subjects treated of in an exhaustive manner would make a large
book. They must be taken as they are intended, namely, as
short notices to assist the student in his consideration of the
main theses under our review.
Modern Physical Fatalism and the Doctrine of Evolution,
including an Examination of Mr. H. Spencer s &quot;First
Principles.&quot; By T. E. BIRKS, M.A., Professor of Moral
Philosophy, Cambridge. Macmillan & Co., 1876.
I mention this book on account of its being one of the very
few direct detailed criticisms of Mr. Spencer s
&quot; First Principles.&quot;
The very startling title implies that the writer does not distin
guish between melodramatic &quot;fatalism&quot; and respectable &quot;deter
minism.&quot; The writer, holding a strongly orthodox position, is not,
in any case, capable of accepting Mr. Spencer s conclusions, and his
criticisms are to be taken as a wholesale attack upon an adver
sary rather than as the discriminative judgment of an impartial
critic. The title, preface, and introduction are all very theo
logical, and the peroration at the end of most of the chapters
marks them as having been lectures composed with a certain
intention to produce an effect upon an audience. This circum
stance is somewhat against the utility of the book, and, as a
matter of fact, we find several cases of injustice to Mr. Spencer ;
as, for instance, on p. 154, where Mr. Birks speaks of the con
tinuity of motion, and represents motion as being conceived by
Mr. Spencer as a substance a liquid capable of being poured
from one vessel into another ; whereas the transference of motion
is simply this, viz., that if you have a wheel going round at a
given rate, and another wheel is put into gear with it, the latter
will move faster and the former more slowly. Now although
there are numerous differences in cases of the transference of
motion, yet they are all changes of relative rates of motion, and
not the transference of a substance, liquid or otherwise.BIRKS. 199
There are many other misunderstandings as to which the
reader must be on his guard.
On the other hand, the book is worthy of the attention of stu
dents from the number of valid criticisms made against the
&quot; First
Principles,&quot; more particularly in pointing out the confused and
unsatisfactory manner of the exposition, and in adducing quite a
number of incompatible statements. Whether or not these are
minor errors capable of correction, and not affecting the validity
of the main argument, is a matter for consideration.
Chap, v., on the
&quot;
Reality of Matter,&quot; calls attention to con
trary definitions of reality, which is said in one case to be an
external object, the antecedent of impressions, and afterwards is
defined as
&quot;
persistence in consciousness.&quot; And the writer, with
some justice, complains that
&quot; consciousness or states of con
sciousness, phenomena or appearances, relative realities, abso
lute realities, the absolute reality, and the unknowable are
named in such a way that it is impossible to know which are
meant to be the same, and which are distinguished from each
other&quot; (p. 113).
On p. 120 we find manifestations of the unknowable ob
jected to on the ground that the former term destroys the latter.
And attention is called, p. 122 et seq., to a passage (and there
are many such in Spencer) which we have ourselves endeavoured
to understand with patient assiduity, but without success. It is
only by detailed examination, such as Professor Birks here gives,
that the radical faultiness of Mr. Spencer s style of exposition is
fully appreciated, and the apparently systematic and methodical
treatment of his subject, together with his loftiness of abstraction,
are found to be illusive. We attempted ourselves to make an
index of the definitions and propositions contained in
&quot; First
Principles,&quot; but we were not able to succeed.
There is no important item of criticism in chap, vi., on the
&quot;Indestructibility of Matter,&quot; and the remarks on the &quot;Con
tinuity of Motion&quot; in the next chapter seem to me to be totally
wrong, and even unfair. Mr. Spencer says of neither matter nor
motion that they are self-existent; he declines to make any
supposition.
The section on the
&quot; Conservation of Force
&quot;
(p. 159) is, how
ever, deserving of study as exhibiting the indefiniteness and
confusion of Mr. Spencer s statements, say from pp. 161 to 1672co APPENDIX.
and p. 171. The passages are too long for quotation. The
persistence of force being the mainstay of Mr. Spencer s philo
sophy, renders a clear meaning of the term &quot;force&quot; very im
portant ; but the writer s search for it, like mine, appears to have
been in vain.
The chapter on &quot;Evolution&quot; is not worthy of much attention
as valid criticism. The chapter on
&quot; Force and
Life,&quot; however,
brings out in the discussion on the definition of &quot;life&quot; the difficulty
of framing a merely dynamic physical formula which shall cover
the assimilative and disintegrating processes of animal and vege
table life, by which, for instance, the incoming molecules are
endowed with the memories and predispositions of their pre
decessors (p. 281), so as to result in growth and nutrition,
special structure, and reproduction. Without assenting to the
author s positions, his remarks deserve consideration. The term
&quot;organic polarity&quot; is very properly questioned as having any
very definite meaning. The writer here also discusses potential
energy. I differ both from him and Mr. Spencer in the validity
of the use of this word, except as applied to unforeseen effects,
the unforeseeingness being due to our want of knowledge of all
the antecedents. As applied to entities, as applied to activities
supposed to be in abeyance as, for instance, potential energy,
potential force, potential motion I should suppose that they do
not exist at all while they are not in action. When the motion
of any object ceases, it may be revived
; but until it is revived
there is no motion, and to speak of it as being in existence as
potential motion seems to me to be a mistake
; and so of potential
energy and force. If force and motion are constant quantities,
they are always actual and never potential. As well might one
speak of potential matter. Motion locked up or not going on,
and force or energy in abeyance, are much the same as matter
going out of existence for a time.
Chapter ix. contains an interesting account of the various
theories of the primal factors of the universe.
A perusal of the first four chapters in this book will assist the
reader stiU further into the confusion and bewilderment natural
to the discussion of The Eelative, The Absolute, and The Un
knowable. He will make up his mind to avoid this controversy
as much as possible. He will be confirmed in the belief that
there is a limit to human knowledge and speculation, and inFISKE. 201
the opinion that a philosophy is futile which undertakes to
account for every change from the homogeneous.
The value of this book is not so much in its direct criti
cisms as in its suggestiveness of the need of careful study
on the part of the student himself. Perhaps I rather under
rate its value
; it would be very useful but for a quantity of
objectionable matter which creates confusion.
Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, based on the Doctrine of
Evolution, with Criticisms on the Positive Philosophy.
By JOHN FISKE, M.A., LL.B., Harvard University. Mac-
millan & Co., 1874.
This book is not so much a criticism of Mr. Spencer s works
as an exposition of them with additional original matter. It is
Evolution done into readable English. It does not aim at great
elaboration of details nor complete accuracy. It is of great
assistance in the study of Spencer, where the mind is apt to
get lost in the monotonous wealth of illustrations. The work
gives one the impression of great conscientiousness of thought,
together with a certain fondness towards the Cosmic theories. It
is a well-written book, exhibiting a mastery of the subject, and
altogether pleasurable and instructive. The author handles the
great problems of his study well and carefully. He has nothing
but praise for Mr. Spencer, and entertains a great admiration for
his abilities and successful accomplishments. We must not look
here for what is to be said against Mr. Spencer s theories ; but
perhaps we may look for some strengthenings of deficiencies, some
obscurities done into defmiteness, or perhaps, on the other hand,
some errors made more manifest. In any case, Mr. Eiske s
work may be recommended to candid consideration. We can
not pretend to do the book justice. It extends over nearly a
thousand pages ; our remarks must be limited to half a dozen.
I first ask of the author what he means by philosophy. And I
get my answer, vol. i. pp. 39-44
: &quot;It is only when the deepest
truths respecting physical, chemical, vital, psychical, and social
phenomena come to be regarded as corollaries of some universal
truth some truth common to all these orders of phenomena
that such a body of doctrine becomes possible. Such a body of
doctrine is what we call philosophy, in distinction from science.202 APPENDIX.
While science studies the parts, philosophy studies the whole.
While science, in its highest development, is an aggregate of
general doctrines, philosophy, in its highest development, must
be a synthesis of all general doctrines into a universal doctrine.&quot;




upon the all-important truth that philosophy is simply a higher
organisation of scientific doctrines and methods, he fell into the
error of regarding philosophy merely as a logical Organon of the
sciences, and he never framed the conception of philosophy as a
universal science, in which the widest truths obtainable by the
several sciences are contemplated together as corollaries of a
single ultimate truth&quot;
What, then, is the universal truth from which all others are
to be regarded as corollaries ?
Chap. xi. asks how we are to set about the task of finding it.
By induction and subsequent analysis ? &quot;Or, on the other hand,
we might begin by searching directly for this ultimate axiom ;
and, having found it, we might proceed to deduce from it that
widest generalisation which interprets the most general truths
severally formulated by the concrete sciences. . . . The latter, or
synthetic method of procedure, is much better adapted for our
present purpose than the former or analytic method.&quot; See
p. 265 et seq. Where is this search to be made? Not in the
abstract or the concrete sciences (p. 268), but in the abstract-
concrete; and we find that &quot;the widest theorems, therefore,
which the three abstract-concrete sciences can unite in affirming,
must be universal propositions concerning matter and motion.
Obviously it is in this region of science that we must look for
our primordial theorem.&quot;
The question then arises, What is matter and what is motion ?
Evidently they are, in the first place, terms applied to mental
ideas, images, symbols, and as such stand for feelings resultant
from objective existences, and thus mediately they stand for those
objective existences.
These are found (p. 280) to be continuous, i.e., &quot;matter is in
destructible&quot; and &quot;motion is continuous;&quot; and if these twin
theorems are considered, they imply a yet deeper truth (pp.
281-283), viz., that &quot;force is persistent.&quot;
If we again ask, What is force ? we find again that it is a
mental term ; but it is not so easy to refer it to its origin nor toFISKE. 203
say what it means. All our experiences of matter and motion
are said to be experiences of Force, which, I presume, is the ex
perience of the resistance or motion of the matter of which we
are composed in relation to external matter and motion, and of
the self-consciousness of that matter of which we are composed.
Our knowledge of Force is thus limited to its manifestations,
viz., a quantum of matter, i.e., resistance and extension, and a
quantum of motion, F = M + Mn, but since it does not add to
our knowledge nor explain anything, it seems superfluous and
misleading to introduce the term at all.
What is the Force of which he asserts the persistence ?
Mr. Spencer says, &quot;First Principles,&quot; pp. 189, 190, 192,
&quot;It
is not the force we are immediately conscious of in our mus
cular efforts ; for this does not persist. Nor can we predicate
it of those objects to which our muscular efforts are opposed.&quot;
Therefore
&quot; we are compelled to admit that force as it exists out
of our consciousness is not force as we know it. Hence the
force of which we assert persistence is that absolute force of
which we are indefinitely conscious as the necessary correlate of
the force we know.&quot; We know no force of which we are con
scious but the force to which it is opposed ; we do not know it,
but it is a correlate, and being a correlate it cannot be called
absolute or non-related, although it may be called inscrutable
particularly if the force of which we are conscious and have
knowledge is also one of its manifestations. But that force is
more than the summation of matter and motion is not made
apparent
The author then considers the question (p. 204), What warrant
have we for the fundamental axiom that force is persistent
1
? When
this axiom is established as the primordial truth from which all
others are corollaries, we naturally ask, What are the corollaries ?
When we are asked to deduce corollaries from the persistence
of force, we inquire whether the force referred to is knowable or
unknowable. If the former, then the only force we know may
be ist, Consciousness, but this does not persist; or it may be
matter and motion ; or it may be all three. But if the persis
tent force we know is indestructible matter and continuous
motion, we are asked to make these latter corollaries of them
selves when we are asked to deduce them from the persistence
of force. But if, again, it is the unknowable force from which204 APPENDIX.
we are asked to deduce the corollaries of the indestructibility of
matter and the continuity of motion, we naturally ask, How can
we get corollaries from what we do not know ? How can we
deduce knowledge out of ignorance ?
Is it too much to ask if the existence of matter is a corollary
from the persistence of force 1 or if the existence of motion is a
corollary from it? or if, vice versa, the existence of force is a
corollary from the existence of matter and motion 1 A good deal
will depend upon whether we are speaking of our consciousness
of force or of something external independent of consciousness.
If the latter, then we do not see that matter and motion are
corollaries from force
; if the former, then they may be corol
laries from force. Then, again, is consciousness itself a corollary
from the &quot;fundamental axiom&quot; of the persistence of force?
I may say that the author does not deal with these corollaries,
and the presumption is that there is more than one fundamental
axiom. The corollaries adduced by him are the persistence of
relations amongst forces, the correlation of forces, the transference
of motion, the rhythm of motion, and so we get on to the law
of Evolution (p. 350), which, of course, is Mr. Spencer s formula.
Now there is no attempt to show that Evolution is a corollary
from the persistence of force, given a quantum of matter and a
quantum of motion and predicating homogeneity.
Mr. Eiske starts, p. 360, with a nebula containing hetero
geneous constituents and heterogeneous motion, and calls that by
implication a corollary from the persistence of force.
After completing the planetary evolution and the evolu
tion of the earth, he reaches eventually the beginning of life.
This difficulty our author deals with boldly. He makes the most
of Dr. Bastian s experiments, which, after all, he has to confess
are merely of a suggestive value. And (p. 430)
&quot; For the present, in representing to ourselves how life may
have originated upon the earth, we are reduced to a few most
general considerations. However the question may eventually
be decided as to the possibility of archebiosis occurring at the
present day amid the artificial circumstances of the laboratory,
it cannot be denied that archebiosis, or the origination of living
matter in accordance with natural laws, must have occurred at some
epoch in the past. That life has not always existed upon the
earth s surface is certain
; and the following considerations willFISKE. 205
show that in its first appearance there need not have been any
thing either sudden or abnormal&quot;
Now to say that archebiosis must have occurred because there
is life now and once there was not, is a very different thing from
saying that it must have occurred because it is an inevitable
corollary from the persistence of force. This is the task that
the author next sets himself, and there can be no dispute about
it that he fails.
The general considerations he refers to are a combination of
the elements of organic bodies in a cooling world (p. 433).
&quot; Here we obtain a hint as to the origin of organic life upon the
earth s surface. In accordance with the modern dynamic theory
of life, we are bound to admit that the higher and less stable
aggregations of molecules which constitute protoplasm were built
up in just the same way in which the lower and more stable aggre
gations of molecules which constitute a single or double salt were
built up. Dynamically&quot; (notice the limitation)
&quot;the only dif
ference between carbonate of ammonia and protoplasm which can
be called fundamental is the greater molecular complexity and
consequent instability of the latter. We are bound to admit,
then, that as carbonic acid and ammonia, when brought into
juxtaposition, united by virtue of their inherent properties as
soon as the diminishing temperature would let them; so also
carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen, when brought into jux
taposition, united by virtue of their inherent properties into
higher and higher multiples as fast as the diminishing tempera
ture would let them, until at last living protoplasm was the
result of the long-continued process.&quot;
I ask, should not the adjective &quot;living&quot; be substituted by the
adjective &quot;chemical&quot;? The introduction of the word
&quot;living&quot;
seems to be begging the question.
Page 434.
&quot;In view of these considerations, it may be held
that the evolution of living things is a not improbable concomi
tant of the cooling down of any planetary body which contains
upon its surface the chemical constituents of living matter.&quot;
Pursuing our logical course of deducing corollaries from the
persistence of force as applied to matter and motion, we find the
result attenuated into a &quot;not improbable concomitant.&quot;
This failure is confessed in the preceding section, viz. :
&quot;It is at the same time true that the ultimate mystery the206 APPENDIX.
association of vital properties with the enormously complex
chemical compound known as protoplasm remains unsolved,
. . . and very likely we shall never know.&quot;
I ask the author candidly to say, if any mystery is left un
explained i.e., any fact or truth that is not capable of being
included in a corollary from the persistence of force if that
fundamental axiom really is the Organon or instrument of syn
thesis which he claims it to be ?
If there are other mysteries, so much the worse for the
Organon ; but I think he is mistaken in saying that there are
similar mysteries. He says that
&quot;
it is equally mysterious that
starch or sugar or alcohol should manifest properties not displayed
by their elements.&quot; Now, since these elements are composed of
certain units having definite shapes, sizes, modes and rates of
motion, they are capable, under given conditions of medium and
motion, of entering into specific combinations with other elements
which shall have shapes, sizes, modes and rates of motion, the
resultant being different from those of the two or more which
entered into the combination. These resultants, if we had the
requisite knowledge of the original mechanical factors, we could
calculate. It is true we could not calculate our altered sensa
tions, e.ff. 9 taste
; but that is another question.
On p. 430 the author also refers to acquired tendencies and
heredity, but he does not endeavour to account for these as
corollaries from the persistence of force.
Yet, notwithstanding these admissions, he winds up the chapter
very complacently (p. 435)
:
&quot; In this account of the matter we have completed, so far as
is needful for the purposes of this work, our exposition of the
evolution of the earth. . . . We have witnessed . . . resulting
at last in the genesis of compounds manifesting those properties
which we distinguish as vital.&quot; &quot;It is only for reasons of con
venience that the formation of .primeval protoplasm is assigned
to a different science from that which deals with the formation of
limestone or silica.&quot; But again, on the other hand, he says
:
&quot;It is not pretended, however, that these considerations fulfil
all the requirements of a scientific explanation of the genesis of
life.&quot; In this respect he follows Mr. Spencer and alternately
says, Ah ! now I have it see how plain it is ! And then again
Mystery ah ! !FISKE. 207
The next chapter, on
&quot;
Special Creation or Derivation ?
&quot;
is
of very secondary importance as a step in the advancement of the
synthesis, since it is dependent altogether upon the preceding
one. Yet granted life, feeling, or consciousness in vast masses
of almost formless protoplasm, combinations and definite forms
might ensue
; still the mystery of the acquirement of tendency,
reproduction, and heredity would remain unexplained as a corol
lary from the persistence of force.
And even the formula of Evolution would be difficult of appli
cation, as already indicated in our criticism of Spencer, more
particularly with respect to memory, the establishment of intel
lectual correspondences, the classification of cases, things, and
relations. For under what clause of the formula of Evolution do
they come? The formula recognises only
&quot;the integration of
matter and the concomitant dissipation of motion,&quot; and what are
these that we wish to include in the formula ? Truly the cha
racteristics of mental evolution in respect of advancement from
indefiniteness to definiteness, complexity and heterogeneitv, are
similar to physical evolution ; but are they the physical evolu





is constantly used in the account of
the composition and evolution of mind, thus tending to give a
verbal similarity to the representation of its development with
that of the physical world
; but it means in this case definite
combination of feeling, and not the integration of mattermentioned
in the formula of Evolution. Thus we find, vol. ii. p. 119,
&quot; Under
its most general aspect all mental action whatever is definable
as the continuous differentiation and integration of states of
consciousness&quot; Page 155
&quot; There is an integration of the
present impressions with such past ones as they resemble, and
a differentiation of them from such past ones as they do not
resemble.&quot; Again, p. 373 &quot;The doctrine of Evolution . . .
represents also the most extensive integration of correspondences
that has yet been achieved.&quot; So, while there is a formula of
life, there is a formula of psychical evolution (p. 119), and a
formula of social evolution (p. 223). That there is some
difficulty in including these in the general formula of Evolu
tion is shown by the author s remarks, p. 162 : &quot;While steadily
refraining from the chimerical attempt to identify mind with
some form of matter or motion, it has nevertheless been shown208 APPENDIX.
that, owing to the mysterious but unquestionable correlation
which exists between the phenomena of mind and the pheno
mena of matter and motion, it is possible to describe the evolution
of the former by the same formula which describes the evolution
of the latter.&quot; This is true if the terms matter and motion
are omitted from the formula, and it is thus made to relate to pro
cesses only. In this case there might be any number of factors,
and the formula would only deal with definite combinations of
them.
Thus we come to the same conclusion as that to which our
examination of Spencer led us, viz., that as a System of Philo
sophy i.e., the establishment of a fundamental truth or axiom
from which all others can be derived as corollaries the Evolu
tion formula, and the axiom of the persistence of force, are
insufficient, and the attempt to establish a universal philosophy
is a failure.
In the body of our essay we discussed the question as to con
sciousness being a mode of motion. Here we suggest the ques
tion as to whether it is to be considered a mode of force. If
so, is it a constant quantity, the same as those other modes of
force called matter and motion ? We presume it must be, else
we have something coming into existence and going out of exist
ence, which, Mr. Spencer says, is inconceivable.
According to
&quot; First Principles,&quot; p. 169, &quot;matter and motion,
as we know them, are differently conditioned manifestations of
Force.&quot; A manifestation, properly speaking, means something
known to a conscious being capable of knowledge ; but Mr.
Spencer deals with real existences previous to the existence of






activity,&quot; and omit the phrase
&quot; as we
know them.&quot; At the same time, it seems better to retain the
word manifestation, as implying a power capable of transforming
itself into different modes, and by this means we retain the
unificatory idea, and avoid the application of the term
&quot; mode of
activity&quot; to matter. If this is justifiable, then the following
considerations occur to the student :
If matter and motion are the manifestations of force, then
force preceded both matter and motion, and was the sole exist
ence. For if matter and motion were coeval with force, then
they were conditions of force and not manifestations of it.FISKE. 209
The existence of a thing must precede its manifestation, otherwise
existence and manifestation must be words having the same
meaning, and the word manifestation will have no meaning be
yond existence, in which case force is merely a term, being the
summary of matter and motion
; and the phrase persistence of
force, a summary of the indestructibility of matter and the
continuity of motion. It is the total of an addition.
But if, on the contrary, it is stated that the existence of force
preceded the existence of matter and motion, and that the latter
are only manifestations of the former, then there was a time
when matter and motion did not exist, which Mr. Spencer
denies we can conceive, but which nevertheless we are hereby
bound to conceive.
Moreover, if matter and motion are only manifestations of a
primal existence called force, we want to know if this is not
the homogeneous from which all changes started. If so, how can
we apply to it the unproved principle of the instability of the
homogeneous, which instability we found to be due to external
influences, for in this case there would be no externality 1 And
again, if force is persistent, it means that it remains force, and
does not change to anything else, and its manifestations are not
differentiated. Again, can we apply to the sole existence of
Force the formula of Evolution, and deduce therefrom the dif
ferentiation of force into matter and motion ? Does the formula
of Evolution account for these manifestations of force ?
Again, if matter and motion are only different manifestations
of the same thing, it is to be presumed that they are interchano-e-
able one form of manifestations may be changed into another
form. Matter may go out of existence and become motion.
Motion may cease and become matter, so long as the quantum of
force remains the same. Thus an atom or ultimate unit may cease
to exist so long as the force of which it is the manifestation is
transferred to the acceleration of the motion of some other atom
or unit. And conversely one atom or unit moving very rapidly
may become two units moving slowly, for the quantum of force
remains the same.
It is to be presumed, also, that if force existed antecedent to
matter and motion, it could exist unconditioned by these mani
festations, and its quantum is not to be reckoned by the total
of the two, for there is no necessity for supj osing all or any of210 APPENDIX.
it becoming manifested in these particular ways. It is not
illogical, then, to suppose a part or quantum of force still un-
ranked with the manifestations of matter and motion, but
capable at any time, on conditions unknown, of becoming so.
This does away with the ideas of the permanently fixed quantum
of matter and the permanently fixed quantum of motion, which
may not only be changed from one to the other, as already seen,
but may receive accessions at any time.
It therefore does not follow from the persistence of force that
there is a fixed quantum of matter and of motion. And unless
there is any necessity shown why the whole of force should be
used up into manifestations of matter and motion, there may be
an unresolved quantum capable of adding to these manifestations
of itself at any time, and, for anything we know to the contrary,
may have other modes altogether of manifesting itself say, for
instance, in consciousness.
We come to the conclusion, then, that the indestructibility of
matter and the continuity of motion are not corollaries from
the notion of the persistence of force, but that this idea is built
up from the two former, of which it is merely the summation.
It is therefore erroneous to put it down as the fundamental
truth of philosophy. It is derived, and not fundamental. The
fundamental truths are the indestructibility of matter and the
continuity of motion, and perhaps the consciousness which
recognises them.
If, on the other hand, it is the fundamental truth, then the
conclusions follow that I have just enumerated, and the formula
of Evolution is utterly inadequate to represent it, as indeed it is
utterly inadequate to account for all the changes of the universe.
At the same time there is a greater correspondence between the
primordial truth, so escaping from the bondage of the formula,
and those facts of the universe which the formula strives vainly
to compass. Is it too much to say that there is in the universe
more than is contained in the formula, more than man can ever
put into words 1 that while he may know part and generalise
part, and predicate likenesses of processes, and recognise the
same characteristics of procedure throughout, it will never be
possible for him to comprehend all 1 that there are things which
elude his eager grasp, and abysses he cannot fathom 1
A notice of this book would be incomplete without a referenceFISKE. 211
to the author s emphatic repudiation of Materialism, his practical
acceptance of Spiritualism, his rejection of &quot;blind force,&quot; his
acknowledgment of a Divine power, and his advocacy of religion
under the term
&quot; cosmic theism.&quot;
This matter is fully stated vol. ii. p. 375 et seq. Indeed, the
consideration of it takes up the rest of the book to p. 508, and I
cannot attempt to do it justice. I quote a few passages merely
as indicating the line of thought.
Pag6 375-
&quot; We have already, in the earlier part of this work,
been brought to the conclusion that the phenomenal universe is
the manifestation of a Divine power that cannot be identified
with the totality of phenomena ; we have now to unfold some
what more fully what is meant by this theistic conclusion. We
have, at every fitting opportunity, declared that the phenomena
of mind can in no wise be explained as movements of matter,
while at the same time a law of evolution expressed in terms of
matter and motion is found to include the order of sequence of
psychical phenomena. We must now attempt to clear away the
difficulties which to many minds no doubt cluster around the
seeming paradox. We have also hinted that, beside the sphere
to be assigned to morality, there is a wider sphere to be assigned
to religion; it behoves us now to show what are the general
functions of religion, in accordance with our fundamental view
of life as an adjustment between inner and outer relations. . . .
The central problem which must first occupy us, and the decision
of which will affect the treatment of all the others, is the problem
of theism.&quot;
Page 377. &quot;While upon the time-honoured statical view of
things, any given group of phenomena was explained by a refer
ence to the direct creative action of a Divine power extraneous
to the cosmos ; on the other hand, upon the modern dynamical
view of things, any given group of phenomena is explained by a
reference to some antecedent group of phenomena, while all
phenomena alike are regarded as the sensible manifestations of a
Divine power immanent in the cosmos. ... As was clearly shown
in the first part of this work, and as will presently be still more
emphatically reiterated, our cosmic philosophy is based upon the
affirmation of God s existence, and not upon the denial of it, like
irreligious Atheism, or upon the ignoring of it like non-religious
Positivism. The question which we have now to answer concerns212 APPENDIX.
the existence of a limited personal God, who is possessed of a
quasi-human consciousness, from whose quasi-human volitions
have originated the laws of nature, and to whose quasi-human
contrivance are due the manifold harmonies observed in the uni
verse. Is this most refined and subtilised remnant of primitive
anthropomorphism to be retained by our cosmic philosophy, or
is it to be rejected ? And if it is to be rejected, what are the
grounds which justify us in rejecting it
1
?&quot;
Chap. ii. of Part iii. is against anthropomorphic theism, and
chap. iii. is a survey of the groundwork of cosmic theism.
We summarise the latter as follows, viz. (p. 412)
: &quot;The vast
synthesis of forces without us, which in manifold contact with
us is, from infancy till the close of life, continually arousing us
to perceptive activity, can never be known by us as it exists
objectively, but only as it affects our consciousness.&quot; Thus the
universe itself is inscrutable to us. (Page 413) &quot;Underlying
this aggregate of phenomena we have found ourselves compelled
to postulate an absolute reality a something whose existence
does not depend on the presence of a percipient mind, which
existed before the genesis of intelligence, and would continue to
exist though all intelligence were to vanish from the scene.&quot;
This something is called force, absolute force, the unknown
cause of these manifestations, an unconditioned reality, without
beginning or end, absolute Being, formularised thus :
&quot; There
exists a POWER, to which no limit in time or space is conceivable,
of which all phenomena as presented in consciousness are
manifestations, but which we can know only through these
manifestations.&quot;
This formula, arrived at objectively and subjectively, expresses
the fundamental truth of theism the existence of God. This is
contrasted with Comtism. The author states, p. 422
:
&quot; When,
summing up all activity in one most comprehensive epithet,
we call it force, we are but using a scientific symbol, expressing
an affection of our consciousness, which is yet powerless to ex
press the ineffable reality. To us, therefore, as to the Israelite
of old, the very name of Jehovah is that which is not to be
spoken.
. . . We shall never fathom this ultimate mystery, we
shall be no nearer the comprehension of this omnipresent Energy.
Here science must ever reverently pause, acknowledging the pre
sence of the mystery of mysteries. Here religion must ever holdF1SKE. 213
sway, reminding us that from birth until death we are dependent
on a Power to whose eternal decrees we must submit, to whose
dispensations we must resign ourselves, and upon whose con
stancy we may implicitly rely.&quot;
We have avoided criticisms by the way, though tempted much
to animadvert on the viciousness of all arguments in which the
word &quot;absolute&quot; is introduced. We pause here, however, to
remark upon the extraordinary result at which we have arrived,
when we consider that the author strenuously repudiates from
his religion every vestige of anthropomorphism, every trace of
intelligence. For he reminds us that we are dependent upon a
Power who has made decrees to which we must submit; to
whose dispensations, i.e., arrangements in relation to ourselves,
we must resign ourselves ; and upon whose constancy (faithful
ness to us, or persistence of decrees
?) we may implicitly rely.
It is said that a lover sees in his mistress a good many more
charms than she really possesses
: may it not be so with a philo
sopher and his formulas ? The author says,
&quot; Here science must
ever reverently pause, acknowledging the presence of the mystery
of mysteries.&quot; I do not know at all why I should be reverent
before the mysterious, i.e., that which I cannot understand. The
savage worshipped the white man s watch, and fell down in awe
before a paper which had carried a written message. I have no
reverence for a cosmic or for a solar system. If a stellar system
in the galaxy of the sky has no life and mind in it, it may be
obliterated from the face of the heavens and leave me uncon
cerned. I have no reverence for the whole cosmos itself if it
manifests nothing but a force which has no intelligence in it,
anthropomorphic though such a notion may be. My reverence
is not excited by vastness of chemical processes. I am no more
in awe of a volcano or a thunderstorm than of the fire in my
grate or the galvanic battery on my table. Nor do I tremble
when gazing upon the scattered fires of the primal furnace, nor
that burnt-out cinder the moon ! How many tons of lime
stone, how may cubic feet of oxygen and hydrogen, excite the
reverence of our author ? But the savage was right when he
worshipped the watch and reverenced the scroll, for a higher
intelligence was manifested there !
While sympathising with the author in his religious aspira
tions, I cannot approve of this attempt to palm off an empty2i 4 APPENDIX.
abstraction upon my sympathies, and of this wresting of religious
language from its proper application towards an intelligence to
do service for an abstraction. However, the difficulty is cer
tainly great to have a God who is not a personality endowed
with intelligence.
This difficulty the author proceeds to consider in his remarks
on Pantheism (pp. 423-425). The result is that God must be
considered as a power or force, about which (not whom) nothing
can be known, and from which must be disassociated both in
telligence and volition ; and even, if we come to that, which we
must not regard even as force, for the very terms matter and force
(p. 430)
&quot; are mere symbols, which stand tant Uen que mal for
certain generalised modes of Divine manifestation : they are no
more real existences than the x and y of the algebraist are real
existences.&quot; So also the word
&quot; divine
&quot;
is a mere symbol of a
something, we really cannot know what ; and the wedding ser
vice of science and religion, like that of the Church of England
ritual, ends in blank
&quot; amazement
&quot;
! We are afraid the prayer
for a fruitful progeny is of doubtful hope.
Chap. iv. treats of matter and spirit, at p. 434. &quot;What
concerns us is the initial non sequitur that every attempt to in
terpret mental manifestations by a reference to material structure
involves the assertion of Materialism. This is the non sequitur
which lies at the very bottom of the theological misrepresentation,
and its utter fallaciousness needs to be thoroughly exposed.&quot;
After saying that matter is merely a symbol, and is not a real
existence, we are at a loss how to appreciate the term mate
rialistic here. However, I suppose matter must be accepted as
a manifestation of the inscrutable force, but what we know of
matter, in so far as it is knowable, is, that it is resistant and ex
tended, and can be described geometrically and arithmetically,
and that it has motion. And when it is included in the formula
of Evolution, we have a definite notion that all changes are
changes of combinations of resistance, extension, and motion
which are capable of geometrical and arithmetical expression.
And since matter and motion are the manifestations originally
of an initial force, or the exponents of an existent force limited
by the limitations of the formula of Evolution, then all changes
occurring in the universe have to be ascribed to changes of com
binations of matter and motion, and are to be called materialistic ;F1SKE. 21 5
and since the facts of consciousness and mind are amongst those
changes, the theory which accepts the formula of Evolution,
notwithstanding its claim for an initial force which is not
materialistic, and an outcome of mind which is not materialistic,
is justly open to the charge, and must either accept it or abandon
its formula. Indeed, there is no other factor mentioned in the
formula than matter and motion ; and witness the futile attempt
made to galvanise chemical combinations into vital processes.
It would appear, however, that practically both Mr. Spencer
and his disciple abandon the formula of Evolution, and, there
fore, the unification of philosophy.
The author proceeds to considerations which show that the
materialistic hypothesis of mental phenomena is untenable. In
this interesting chapter there are many powerful and cogent
passages too long as well as too numerous for quotation. We
give one only
:
&quot; Henceforth we may regard Materialism as ruled out, and
relegated to that limbo of crudities. . . . The latest results of
scientific inquiry, whether in the region of objective psychology
or in that of molecular physics, leave the gulf between mind and
matter quite as wide as it was judged to be in the time of
Descartes. It still remains as true as then that between that of
which the differential attribute is thought and that of which the
differential attribute is extension there can be nothing like
identity or similarity. Although we have come to see that
between the manifestations of the two there is such an unfailing
parallelism that one group of phenomena can be correctly de
scribed by formulas originally invented for describing the other
group, yet all that has been established is this parallelism.
. . .
Rich as are the harvests which science has obtained from these
two fields, the fence which divides them has never been broken
down
; and until the insuperable distinction between subject and
object, between the conscious and the unconscious, can be tran
scended, it can never be broken down.&quot;
Chap. v. is on &quot;Religion as Adjustment,&quot; the principle of
which is stated on p. 465.
&quot;A philosophy of morality has for
its subject-matter the principles of action conducive to the right
living of the individual, so far as the well-being of the community
is concerned; so a philosophy of religion has for its subject-
matter the relations of the individual to the Inscrutable Power216 APPENDIX.
manifested in the universe, and the principles of action con
ducive to his right living, considered as a part and parcel of the
universe.&quot;
&quot; The religious sense is primarily based upon the aspiration
the noblest which any creature can entertain after complete
fulness of life
; and any thought or act, any sin of omission or of
commission, inconsistent with such aspiration, awakens the pain
ful consciousness of shortcoming, without any reference to those
lower considerations of pleasure and pain of which alone
Hedonism takes cognisance.&quot;
I do not know to what extent we should feel ourselves con
cerned with an Inscrutable Power which has no personality or
volition, or what regard we should pay to the harmony of the
universe beyond concern for our own happiness and the happi
ness of the community. There is no doubt that such a senti
ment might grow up naturally, for all sorts of correspondences
grow up in the mind between itself and externalities, and a cor
respondence between it and the whole course of the universe
might be established and cultivated, but then it might be shown
to be unreasonable. It is a mere sentiment towards an object of
the highest degree of abstraction.
The consideration of the work thus tends to show that the
formula of Evolution is insufficient to explain the universe, what
ever parallelisms may exist between it and any supplementary
formula that can be devised to make up for the deficiency.
It also shows that cosmic theism is a religion only affecting
the most highly cultivated, refined, and philosophic minds, quite
out of the reach of ordinary struggling humanity. It may be as
beautiful as a star in the heavens, to be seen only through a
powerful telescope by the astronomer who knows where to find
it, but it is as far away.
Dr. Martineau s Essays. 2 vols. London, Triibner & Co., 1879.
Essay, &quot;Science, Nescience, and Faith&quot; and &quot;The Place
of Mind in Nature&quot; a Lecture by Dr. Martineau. Lon
don, Williams & Norgate, 1872.
I might refer to almost all of Dr. Martineau s essays as eluci
dative of this faith in the existence of a Power that is more
than matter and motion. He is a teacher as well as a critic.. MARTINEAU. 217
But it is not now our province to examine his doctrine as to
the existence of a Supreme Mind in nature.* &quot;We shall only
examine the critical portion of his notices of the doctrine of
Evolution. And if one had to perish by the sword of criticism,
would one not choose to be slain by that keen Damascus blade
so sharp and yet so beautiful, so trenchant and yet so richly
wrought, and withal descending in its strokes with such dreadful
glitter and polish of steel 1
To dissect an article of Dr. Martineau s, to get at the structure
of the argument, is as bad as pulling to pieces a beautiful plant.
There is in each essay so much appealing to the feeling of beauty,
so much relating to our highest sentiments, that we have to out
rage these much in moving the elegancies aside in order to leave
bare the skeleton of firm structure. Not, however, that the
philosophic exposition gains by these elegancies of expression.
In the latter essay, Dr. Martineau regards the recognition of
mind as the essential object of religion, and rejects mere wonder.
&quot; In dealing with these three conceptions of creation, con
struction, evolution there is one thing on which religion insists,
viz., that mind is first, and rules for ever ; and whatever the pro
cess be, is its process, moving towards congenial
ends.&quot;
But an evolutionary process is quite consistent with religion
as thus regarded.
&quot; Let this be granted, and it matters not by what path of
method the Divine thought advances, or how long it is upon
the road.&quot;
Nevertheless, if the evolutionary process be accepted, it is apt
to foster a variety of illusions. These are, firstly, our altered feel
ings with reference to the authority of the moral sense, obligation
to a Divine ruler, our faith in the intuitions of conscience. For
&quot;
it usually treats as a superstition our natural reverence for the
rational moral and religious intuitions as sources of independent
insight and ultimate authority ; and, in order to estimate them,
translates them back into shorthand experiences of sensible ex
perience and social utility.&quot;
However, if Mind be granted at the beginning, and Evolution
be accepted as its process towards an end, we think confidence
should be restored however, this is what Mr. Fiske would say.
And, indeed, the solution of the problem is indicated by Mr.
* For this see specially &quot;Essays,&quot; vol. ii. pp. 185-189.218 APPENDIX.
Martineau himself in saying that we are to look for the functions
of our highest faculties in their last stage, not their first.
The second part of this essay deals with the origination of life
out of inorganic substances. Start, he says, with the homo
geneous, and you cannot advance the history one hair s-breadth
through an eternity. Again, present it with an object of hetero
geneous elements, and again you cannot advance beyond the
water and the air, the salts of the ocean, and the earthy or rocky
compounds that comprise the crust of the globe.
An argument advanced against the mere materialistic and
mechanical origin of the universe is thus expressed by Dr.
Martineau :
&quot; If all force is to be conceived as one, its type must be looked
for in the highest and all-comprehending term
; and mind must
be conceived as there. . . . Or, if you retain the forces in their
plurality, then you must assume them all among your data, and
confess, with one of the greatest living expositors of the pheno
mena of Development (Lotze), that unless among your primordial
elements you scatter already the germs of mind as well as the
inferior elements, the Evolution can never be wrought
out.&quot;
In the essay on
&quot;
Science, Nescience, and Faith,&quot; Dr. Mar
tineau deals, in the first instance, with the theory of The Absolute.
Keferring to the different moods of the scientific man and the
prophet, he brings out the distinction between the views of an
age in which science is predominant and an age in which reli
gion is predominant, and then proposes the question,
&quot; What can
we say, and on what warrant, respecting that invisible sphere of
Power behind phenomena ?
&quot;
The position gathered by Mr. Spencer from the critique of
opposite opinions is that the Supreme Cause is incognisable.
Thus we arrive at the Absolute. Upon this Mr. Martineau
says
:
&quot;The doctrine of religious nescience has been rendered so
familiar by Mr. Mansel as to belong to the common stock of
contemporary thought, and to make any full exposition of its
grounds unnecessary. It assumes that God, if acknowledged
at all, must be entitled to the epithets absolute and infinite
on the one hand, and cause on the other. Supposing this to
be admitted, several contradictions arise between the parts of
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petent altogether. To be absolute, for instance, means to be
out of all relations ; to be cause means to stand related to an
effect; and the same object cannot be both. Again, infinite
being is unexclusive being, to which nothing can be added and
no new predicate attached; causal being is transitive and
productive, passing to conditions not occupied before, and
adding to the stock of existence, or functions of existence,
chargeable upon it. The epithets are therefore incompatible.
Moreover, the very nature of thought itself imprisons us within
the circle of relative things ; for it carries in it a necessary
duality, and consists in marking off and distinguishing object
from subject, body from space, attribute from substance, prior
from posterior, and individuals, classes, and qualities inter se.
Apart from a field or term of comparison, cmy-thing proposed for
thought becomes wo-thing, and only a vacancy remains ; nor is
the vacancy itself appreciable but by standing over against the
self that looks into it. If then, to think is, on the one hand, to
note the confines of things, it can never pass beyond the finite ;
and if it is, on the other, to discriminate their contents and pro
perties, it can never pass beyond the relative. The absolute and
infinite cannot therefore present itself to the intellect at all. So
the warrant for the doctrine of religious nescience is simply this,
that God is absolute, and we can know nothing but the
relative.
&quot;Of one point, however, Mr. Spencer declares we may be sure,
and that upon the highest guarantee, the same a priori necessity
of thought which enforces the nescience itself, viz., that the abso
lute exists in reality, though denied to apprehension. For were
it&quot; otherwise there could be no relative, relativity itself being in its
term cognisable only by contrast with the non-relative, and forming
a duality with it. Take away its antithetic term, and the relative,
thrown into isolation, is set up as absolute and disappears from
thought. It is indispensable, therefore, to uphold the absolute
in existence, as condition of the relative sphere which constitutes
our whole intellectual domain. Be it so ; but when saved on
this plea to preserve the balance and interdependence of two
co-relatives the absolute is absolute no more ; it is reduced
to a term of relation ; it loses therefore its exile from thought ;
its disqualification
is cancelled; and the alleged nescience is
discharged.&quot;220 APPENDIX.
Then follows a long consideration of metaphysical terms, into
which it would be impossible for us to enter in a short notice
like this.
The principal point would be found, I think, to be the discus
sion of
&quot;Causation,&quot; Essays, vol. i. p. 197 et seq. :
&quot;Mr. Spencer freely allows that we are obliged to regard
every phenomenon as the manifestation of some Power; that
we are obliged to regard that Power as Omnipresent (p. 99) ;
that we are no more able to form a circumscribed idea of Cause
than of Space or Time, and we are consequently obliged to
think of the Cause which transcends our thought as positive
though indefinite (p. 93) ; that we have a right to trust this
demand for originating power ; and that on this reposes our in
destructible belief in an ultimate Omnipotent Reality. Here
already are several predicates assigned which hardly consist with
the proclamation that the Primary Existence is wholly unknown
;
that Being, it seems we may say, is One, Eternal, Ubiquitous,
Omnipotent, manifested as Cause in all phenomena. Is there
not more explicitness here than could be expected from an entity
absolutely latent? But this is not all. Our author further
identifies the First Cause with what appears in science under the
name of Force, and is tracked througli the metamorphoses of
physical, chemical, vital, and other phenomena. The dynamic
principles that we carry into our interpretation of nature, that
Force is persistent through all expenditures, and one under every
disguise are in truth but the transformed expression of the
axiom of ultimate Causation. The primary and secondary
agencies being thus merged into one, and conjointly made objects
of a priori apprehension, the next question naturally is what
in the last resort means this word Cause ? Pursued backward
to its native seat, as a form of the intellect itself, what type
does the thought present? Mr. Spencer truly s.ays, the force
by which we ourselves produce changes, and which serves to
symbolise the cause of changes in general, is the final disclosure
of analysis (p. 235); he admits that we cannot match our
own voluntary effort against an external force, and regard
them as susceptible of a common measure, without assuming
them to be like in kind (pp. 58, 254); and as no force save
that of which we are conscious during our own muscular efforts
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known, it is clearly the inner volition that serves as prototype
of all exterior power, and defines what the intellect intends by
the word Cause. Now combine these several propositions. One
power we immediately know. That power is Will. Others, if
assumed by us, must be assimilated to this. But behind every
phenomenon we must assume a power. And all such powers
are modes of one and the same. And that one is identical with
the First Cause and Ultimate Keality of Being. The inference is
irresistible, that by a fundamental necessity of thought we are
constrained to own an ever-living Will, a Personal Agent, as
Author and Administrator of the universe. This is precisely
what the Theist maintains
; and includes all that he can gather
from the bare contemplation of physical nature, apart from the
moral experiences and the spiritual history of humanity. Col
lected from so limited a ground, the ground too least rich in
phenomena of the highest expression, it is but a meagre and
imperfect form of faith. But still it dissipates the theory of
nescience. It vindicates some distinct apprehensions of the
Supreme Reality. And drawnas it is directly fromthe statements
of an author who controverts it, it is a matter of some curiosity
to see how he evades the apparent cogency of his own premises.
&quot; He forsakes the line of proof by a very simple device. The
likeness between our own force and that which operates around
us, though a necessity, is also, he conceives, an illusion of
thought ; and so we must give up our first natural belief that
the universe is at the disposal of a Mind, the Divine counterpart
of ours. There is no other conception open to us in our appre
hension of outward causality ; and yet this conception fails, and
betrays us into absurdity. How so ? Because it implies that
the weight which I lift with my muscles must, in order to pull
against me, be furnished with muscles too j and whatever teaches
me that the objects about me are not alive destroys the assumed
resemblance between the inner and the outer world. The case
is thus stated :
&quot; On lifting a chair, the force exerted we regard as equal to
that antagonistic force called the weight of the chair ; and we
cannot think of these as equal without thinking of them as like
in kind ; since equality is conceivable only between things that
are connatural. The axiom that action and reaction are equal
and in opposite directions, commonly exemplified by this very222 APPENDIX.
instance of muscular effort versus weight, cannot be mentally
realised on any other condition. Yet, contrariwise, it is in
credible that the force as existing in the chair really resembles
the force as present to our minds. It scarcely needs to point
out that the weight of the chair produces in us various feelings,
according as we support it by a single finger, or the whole hand,
or the leg ; and hence to argue that as it cannot be like all these
sensations, there is no reason to believe it like any. It suffices
to remark that since the force as known to us is an affection of
consciousness, we cannot conceive the force existing in the chair
under the same form with endowing the chair with conscious
ness. So that it is absurd to think of force as in itself like our
sensation of it, and yet necessary so to think of it if we realise
it in consciousness at all (p. 58).
&quot;There would be something in this reasoning if the muscles
were the Personal Agent disposing of the chair, and their sen
sations the power he put forth. The causality, however, does
not lie in them, but behind them
; they are themselves obedient
to a mandate from within ; and their sensations, which occur
only in the execution of the act, do not even begin till that
mandate has given the signal. Were the muscles altogether
insensible, the power at headquarters would not on that account
be disqualified for action, or be unconscious of itself. &quot;We may
entirely discharge out of the account the whole of this merely
ministerial apparatus, with all its supposable varieties. It is
not this which even the simplest individual be it that small
child so much dandled by the psychologists, or the everlasting
peasant preferred by bachelor philosophers, or the fetish-
worshipper in favour with Mr. Mill attributes to the external
objects acting upon him ; and his discovery that they do not
possess it disabuses him of no previous idea. What he plants
in idea behind the phenomena that strike him is similar, not to
his muscles which obey, but to his Will which bids
; and of this
idea, though it has a history to go through in correspondence
with his culture, no progress of reason, we feel assured, will ever
disabuse him. At last, as at first because by a necessity of
thought which runs through all experience he has to think of
Causality as meaning Will, and to borrow all his dynamic lan
guage attraction, repulsion, tension, percussion,
*
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instances and conditions of Will. If not, there must be some
point and some process for unlearning his original postulate, and
substituting some other idea of power. Yet this can never be.
For, confessedly, it is beyond the competency of experience,
however refined, to disclose anything but laws ; the mystery of
force evades the penetration of the observer, and therefore has
no presence among the materials of inductive generalisation ;
science did not give it, and science cannot take it away ; it lies
on another field, where the correction or corroboration of pheno
menal knowledge can never meet it. Born as a pure intellectual
datum, it remains among our intellectual reserves, withdrawn
not only from every actual, but from every possible contradic
tion an indestructible and unalterable postulate, inherent in the
very organism of reason itself.&quot;
Then follows an identification of cause or force with mind and
the unification of philosophy into the unification of one original
mind.
The article terminates by an examination of Mr. Spencer s
position as between that of the theist and that of the positivist,
the conclusion arrived at being that it is untenable and incom
prehensible.
To revert to the commencement of the essay, there is, it seems
to me, a very valid criticism with respect to Mr. Spencer s attempt
to find a common formula for the propositions of the theist and the
atheist viz., that a Being exists and that a Being does not exist.
The principal question as between Dr. Martineau and Mr.
Spencer seems to me to be this. Is the Inscrutable Power of Mr.
Spencer an intelligence or not 1 Now, if Mr. Spencer had suc
ceeded in showing that the universe was capable of explanation
in the terms of his formula, the verdict would have been with
him ; but as we have found it to be utterly insufficient for such
an explanation partly admitted by himself, and wholly con
fessed by his disciple Mr. Fiske we have to assert in the uni
verse something more than matter and motion
; and if there is an
original Inscrutable Power, of which these are but manifestations,
then it has other modes of manifestation, and the only other
mode of manifestation we know is consciousness, which is the
basis of mind. Of this we can say next to nothing it is to us
a mystery. But in so far as it is to be regarded as a manifesta
tion of force or power, it is to be regarded as included in the224 APPENDIX.
notions we attach, to those ideas. With any interpretations or
corollaries therefrom, we have in these pages, which are merely
critical, nothing to do.
There are several difficulties and criticisms adduced by Dr.
Martineau which are satisfactorily answered by Mr. Spencer
in his &quot;Keplies to Criticisms&quot; without affecting the force of
the above.
Martineau and Tyndall.
It is not our province to discuss all the modern controversies
that have arisen respecting the subject-matter of our studies, but
we would recommend the student to a perusal of the controversy
between Dr. Martineau and Professor Tyndall as of great assist
ance in a consideration of the questions under our review. It
is comprised in the following
:
Fragments of Science. By JOHN TYNDALL, F.E.S. Long
mans & Co.
Religion as affected by Modern Materialism. By JAMES
MARTINEAU, LL.D., D.D. Williams & Norgate.
Modern Materialism : its Attitude towards Theology. By
JAMES MARTINEAU, LL.D., D.D. Williams & Kor-
gate.
The controversy relates principally to the value to be attached
to the factor called &quot;force,&quot; Professor Tyndall advocating the
enlargement of the definitions of matter and force so as to com
prehend all subsequent developments, but failing to give suffi
cient definitions ; and Dr. Martineau contending that our only
experience of force being that of the exercise of our own will,
the force manifested in the universe must be that of a Divine
will. On both sides the discussion is maintained in a very able
manner, and should receive the attentive perusal of the student
of &quot;First Principles.&quot;
Professor Tyndall.
The papers contributed to the various Eeviews by Professor
Tyndall upon Dr. Bastian s experiments, and giving an account
of some of his own, are also a valuable addition to the subject,TYNDALL. 225
as showing experimentally the failure of the attempt to pro
duce the organic from the inorganic. See
Nineteenth Century, January 1878 and November 1878.
This brilliant writer and careful thinker has at various times
expressed his views upon the principal theses of the doctrine of
Evolution. The most recent expression of his opinions is to be
found in the Nineteenth Century for November 1878, article
&quot; Virchow and Evolution.&quot;
With respect to the main problem of philosophy as pro
pounded by Mr. Spencer viz., the validity of a formula which
shall furnish the required unification of knowledge, Professor
Tyndall says
: &quot;In 1867 I told the working men of Dundee,
that while making the largest demand for freedom of investiga
tion, while considering science to be alike powerful as an in
strument of intellectual culture and as a ministrant to the
material wants of men
; if asked whether science has solved, or
is likely in our day to solve, the problem of the universe, I
must shake my head in doubt. I compare the mind of man to
a musical instrument with a certain range of notes, beyond which
in both directions exists infinite silence. The phenomena of
matter and force come within our intellectual range, but behind,
and above, and around us the real mystery of the universe lies
unsolved, and, as far as we are concerned, is incapable of
solution.
&quot;
I understand this to be a repudiation of the formula of Evolu
tion as a sufficient solution of the problem of philosophy as set
out in Mr. Spencer s &quot;First Principles.&quot;
On the question of the origin of the organic from the inorganic,
and the impossibility of finding an explanation of consciousness
in any mechanical theory, there are many interesting passages.
Indeed, this incompetency of matter and motion is so repeatedly
and emphatically expressed, that there can be no mistake about
Professor Tyndall s opinions.
Page 8 1 8.
&quot; We may even take a step further and affirm that
the brain of man the organ of his reason and his sense with
out which he can neither think nor feel, is also an assemblage of
molecules acting and reacting according to law. Here, however,
the methods pursued in mechanical science come to an end ; and
if asked to deduce from the physical interaction of the brain
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molecules the least of the phenomena of sensation or thought,
we must acknowledge our helplessness.
. . . Between molecular
mechanics and consciousness is interposed a fissure over which
the ladder of physical reasoning is incompetent to carry
us.&quot;
Page 820. &quot;We cannot deduce consciousness from motion,
or motion from consciousness, as we deduce one motion from
another. Nevertheless, observation is open to us, and by it
relations may be established which are at least as valid as the
conclusions of deductive reason. The difficulty may really lie in
the attempt to convert a datum into an inference, an ultimate
fact into a product of
logic.&quot;
Page 821. &quot;On both sides of the zone here assigned to the
Materialist he is equally helpless. If you ask him whence is
this matter of which we have been discoursing who or what
divided it into molecules, and impressed upon them this neces
sity of running into organic forms he has no answer.&quot;
Page 827. &quot;Do states of consciousness enter as links into
the chain of antecedence and sequence which gives rise to bodily
actions? Speaking for myself, it is certain that I have no
power of imagining such states interposed between the mole
cules of the brain, and influencing the transference of motion
among the molecules. The thing eludes all mental presenta
tion. Plence an iron strength seems to belong to the logic
which claims for the brain an automatic action uninfluenced by
consciousness. But it is, I believe, admitted by those who hold
the automaton theory that consciousness is produced by the
motion of the molecules of the brain; and this production of
consciousness by molecular motion is to me quite as unpresent
able to the mental vision as the production of molecular motion
by consciousness. If I reject one result, I must reject both. /,
however, reject neither, and thus stand in the presence of two
incomprehensibles, instead of one incomprehensible.&quot;
&quot; Here I secede from the automaton theory, though maintained
by friends who have all my esteem, and fall back upon the avowal
which occurs with such wearisome iteration throughout the fore
going pages, namely, my utter incapacity to grasp the problem.&quot;
&quot;This avowal is repeated with emphasis in the passage to
which Professor Virchow s translator draws attention. What, I
there ask, is the causal connection between the objective and the
subjective, between molecular motions and states of conscious-TYNDALL. 227
ness ? My answer is : I do not see the connection, nor am I
acquainted with anybody who does. It is no explanation to say
that the objective and subjective are two sides of one and the
same phenomenon. Why should the phenomenon have two
sides 1 This is the very core of the difficulty. There are plenty
of molecular motions which do not exhibit this two-sidedness.
Does water think or feel when it runs into frost-ferns upon the
window pane ? If not, why should the molecular motion of the
brain be yoked to this mysterious companion consciousness?
We can form a coherent picture of all the purely physical processes
the stirring of the brain, the thrilling of the nerves, the dis
charging of the muscles, and all the subsequent motions of the
organism. We are here dealing with mechanical problems which
are mentally presentable. But we can form no picture of the
process whereby consciousness emerges, either as a necessary
link or as an accidental by-product of this series of actions. The
reverse process of the production of motion by consciousness is
equally unpresentable to the mind,&quot; et seq.
These passages confirm my impression that Professor Tyndall
does not accept the formula of Evolution as a solution of the
problem of Philosophy as stated by Mr. Spencer.
But can man rest contented with the position of nescience ?
Dr. Martineau cannot, and teaches the doctrine of a pre
existing mind. Professor Tyndall cannot, but is unable to advance
any doctrine He advocates patient waiting ; a Newton may
some day arise to prove that the principles involved in the con
struction of a butterfly s wing are qualitatively the same as those
brought into play in the formation of the solar system.
Page 8 1 8.
&quot; We may even take a step further, and affirm that
the brain of man the organ of his reason and his sense, without
which he can neither think nor feel is also an assemblage of
molecules, acting and reacting according to law.&quot; See also the
hopeful expression with respect to the philosophy of the future,
in an extract from an article of his in the Saturday Review,
quoted on page 819.
Notwithstanding this profession of nescience, Professor Tyndall
cannot but think favourably, even if he does not quite believe
in, the theory that all present existences, not excluding organism
and consciousness, are the natural results of the cooling of a
mass of nebulous vapour.228 APPENDIX.
&quot;
Supposing the molecules of the human body, instead of re
placing others, and thus renewing a pre-existing form, to be
gathered first-hand from nature, and placed in the exact relative
positions which they occupy in the body. Supposing them to
have the same forces (motions 1) and distribution of forces, the
same motions and distribution of motions would this organised
concourse of molecules stand before us as a sentient, thinking
being ? There seems no valid reason to assume that it would
not. Or supposing a planet carved from the sun set spinning
round an axis, and sent revolving round the sun at a distance
equal to that of our earth, would one consequence of the refri
geration of the mass be the development of organic forms ? I
lean to the affirmative.&quot; Belfast Address, quoted p. 820.
In the South Kensington Museum there is a collection of the
solid chemical constituents of a man with a cube on which is
marked the number of volumes of the gaseous elements that also
enter into his composition. Is Professor Tyndall inclined to
think that if all these were got together in suitable arrangement
to form a man, his Frankenstein would answer to Hamlet s
description of the paragon of animals ? Surely if feelings and
memories are registered in structure, if you get the structure you
get the feelings and memories. It may be a necessary course in
Evolution from the fire-mist that there should be stages of
development, but if the result is structure out of the chemical
elements, surely if we got the structure off-hand, without all the
precedent developments, we secure all the results just the same,
and we have a man fully equipped with a stock of fictitious
memories, and ready to take his place in society. Professor
Tyndall leans to the affirmative of this hypothesis.
What is the way, then, out of the apparent contradiction of
this affirmative leaning and the repudiation of the mechanical
doctrine of organism and consciousness ?
It is by a new definition of matter.
This amended definition is indicated by a quotation from
Ueberweg,
&quot; one of the subtlest heads that Germany has pro
duced&quot; (p. 812).
&quot; Take a pair of mice and a cask of flour. By copious nourish
ment the animals increase and multiply, and in the same propor
tion sensations and feelings augment. The quantity of these
latter possessed by the first pair is not simply diffused amongstTYNDALL. 229
their descendants, for in that case the last must feel more feebly
than the first. The sensations and the feelings must necessarily
be referred back to the flour, where they exist, weak and pale it
is true, and not concentrated as they are in the brain.&quot;
Tyndall adds :
&quot; We may not be able to taste or smell alcohol
in a tub of fermented cherries, but by distillation we obtain from
them concentrated Kirschwasser. Hence Ueberweg s comparison
of the brain to a still, which concentrates the sensation and feel
ing pre-existing, but diluted in the food.&quot;
We may remark that we do not see the comparison ; for alcohol
is merely some of the molecules separated by the mechanical
action of heat from other molecules, and recombined with some
others actually co-existing in the original mixture
; unless, in
deed, the feelings of the mice are to be regarded as molecules.
By a similar process of reasoning, the still more rudimentary
elements of feeling have been collected and concentrated by the
wheat ears out of the field in which they were grown. The
sensations and the feelings came out of the ground
!
Is it this we are to infer ? Are there molecules of feeling 1
and do they from some law (not of motion), not yet ascertained,
enter into combination whenever some law (not of gravitation)
brings them into contact with accidentally formed molecules of
chemical protoplasm ?
Or if this be repudiated ; if it be not accepted that there are
special separate units of feeling scattered throughout the pri
mordial nebula, then we must look for an amended definition of
all the ultimate units of matter.
This, it seems to me, is what Professor Tyndall looks to, since
if the primordial fire-mist only includes ultimate units of exten
sion and motion, and from these feelings and organisms cannot
be produced, then the ultimate units must contain more than
extension and motion. The definition of matter must be amended
so as to provide for the results.
Professor Tyndall justifies this view as against Dr. Martineau s
criticisms, and we think succeeds in making good his right in
fact, his duty to amend the definition of matter.
He does not, however, give an amended definition, and we do
not see how this can be done except by saying that all the ultimate
units are conscious. Then although this consciousness might be
unorganised, there might be a process of evolution by concen-230 APPENDIX.
tration of this consciousness (I confess the method or even mean
ing of this is incomprehensible to me), and thus organisms and
thought might be produced. This is the only interpretation I
can give to the only improved definition of matter, and I do not
see that it is superior in any way or more comprehensible than
Dr. Martineau s original Supreme Mind.
The Late Professor Clifford.
Virchow on the Teaching of Science. Nineteenth Century,
April 1878.
On the Nature of Tilings in Themselves. Mind, No. IX.
The same problem receives the same kind of treatment from
most of the eminent writers who favour the modern Evolutionist
doctrine. The consideration ruling their minds is thus ex
pressed by Professor Clifford
&quot;We know from physical reasons that the earth was once in
a liquid state from excessive heat. Then there could have been
no living matter upon it. Now there is. Consequently non
living matter has been turned into living matter somehow. We
can only get out of spontaneous generation by the supposition,&quot;
&c. Nineteenth Century, p. 729.
This somehow is suggested by an example adduced (pp. 726, 727)
of the formation of benzine in a red-hot tube from acetylene.




&quot;pre-existing life,&quot; and then an explanation is rendered upon a
mechanical basis. This benzine is one of the products of organic
bodies, and is therefore called organic; therefore we have a
mechanical explanation of organic molecules, without, however,
being endowed with any other than mechanical properties.
&quot;
Now, those persons that believe that living matter, such as
protein, arises out of non-living matter in the sea, suppose that
it is formed like all other chemical compounds. That is to say,
it originates in a coincidence, and is preserved by natural selec
tion&quot; (p. 728).
Here living matter is regarded merely as a chemical com
pound. Why, then, is it called living
1 We have the answer
in the next sentence.
&quot; Still the coincidence involved in the formation of a mole
cule so complex as to be called living,&quot; &c.CLIFFORD. 231
Hence a living molecule is only a highly complex molecule.
But
&quot;
Possibly, however, the molecule has from the beginning that
power which belongs to other chemical bodies, and certainly to
itself when existing in sensible masses, of assisting the forma-
tion^of its like. Once started, however, there it is ; the spon
taneous generation believed in as a possibility by the Evolu
tionist has taken
place.&quot;
Here it is well to stop and examine the nature of the assistance
given, say, by molecules of acetylene in the passage of benzine
through a red-hot tube to the formation of its like, to see if
there is any ground for calling such assistance spontaneous gene
ration. I presume the phenomenon to be purely mechanical, and
to be expressed thus : a number of complex molecules consisting
of atoms composed of ultimate units, being systems of shapes,
sizes, and modes and rates of motion, are subjected to the action
of heat, i.e., a mechanical appliance which alters the relations
of the component atoms by separation, which separation, freeing
some or all of the atoms, throws them into other relations of
position, and thus enables them to enter into other combinations.
This combination when effected becomes a factor itself in the
current, and even if only as an obstruction, or perhaps as an
active hammer may knock the original constituents about in
such a manner as to assist in the process of dissolution and re
combination. I do not derive any assistance here in trying to
solve the problem of spontaneous generation.
It is true that these explanations are always interspersed with
appeals to time to assist the explanation by the immensity of its
periods, as if in the course of a million of years a fly-wheel
would go of itself. Given minuteness so small as to elude sense
and puzzle the intellect, given complexity so great as to baffle
representation, given changes that are asserted to be insensible,
given time so long as to weary inert matter into consciousness of
itself, surely we can get life !
JSTo ! The only way out of the difficulty is, as indicated by
Professor Tyndall, to revise the definition of matter. How is
this to be done ? Professor Clifford attempts the problem in the
second essay quoted above. In the first place he describes the
correspondence and parallelism between mind-action and brain-
action (Mind, p. 63).232 APPENDIX.
&quot; We come, finally, to say, then, that as your consciousness is
made up of elementary feelings grouped together in various ways
(ejective facts), so a part of the action in your brain is made up
of mere elementary actions in parts of it, grouped together in the
same ways (objective facts). The knowledge of this correspon
dence is a help to the analysis of both sets of facts ; but it
teaches us in particular, that any feeling, however apparently
simple, which can be retained and examined by reflection, is
already itself a most complex structure. We may, however,
conclude that this correspondence extends to the elements, and
that each simple feeling corresponds to a special comparatively
simple change of nerve matter.&quot;
&quot; Can a feeling exist by itself without forming part of a con
sciousness 1
&quot; This question is answered affirmatively, and this
answer is required by the doctrine of Evolution.
&quot; For if that
doctrine be true, we shall have along the line of the human
pedigree a series of imperceptible steps connecting inorganic
matter with ourselves. To the later members of that series we
must undoubtedly ascribe consciousness, although it must, of
course, have been simpler than our own. Eut where are we to
stop ? In the case of organisms of a certain complexity con
sciousness is inferred. As we go back along the line the com
plexity of the organism and of its nerve action insensibly
diminishes
; and for the first part of our course we see reason to
think that the complexity of consciousness insensibly diminishes
also. But if we make a jump, say, to the tunicate molluscs,
we see no reason there to infer the existence of consciousness at
all. Yet not only is it impossible to point out a place where
any sudden break takes place, but it is contrary to all the
natural training of our minds to suppose a breach of continuity
so great. All this imagined line of organisms is a series of
objects in my consciousness
; they form an insensible gradation,
and yet there is a certain unknown point at which I am at
liberty to infer facts out of my consciousness corresponding to
them. There is only one way out of the difficulty, and to that
we are driven. Consciousness is a complex of ejective facts,
of elementary feelings, or rather of those remoter elements which
cannot even be felt, but of which the simplest feeling is built
up. Such elementary ejective facts go along with the action of
every organism however simple ; but it is only when the materialCLIFFORD. 233
organism has reached a certain complexity of nervous structure
(not now to be specified) that the complex of ejective facts
reaches that mode of complication which is called consciousness.
But as the line of ascent is unbroken, and must end at last in
inorganic matter, we have no choice but to admit that every
motion of matter is simultaneous with some ejective fact or event
which might be part of a consciousness. From this follow two
important corollaries.
&quot;
i. A feeling can exist by itself without forming part of a
consciousness. It does not depend for its existence on the con
sciousness of which it may form a part. Hence a feeling (or
an eject element) is Ding-an-sich, an absolute, whose existence
is not relative to anything else. Sentitur is all that can be said.
&quot;
2. These eject-elements which correspond to motions of
matter are connected together in their sequence and co-exist
ence by counterparts of the physical laws of matter. For other
wise the correspondence could not be kept up.&quot;
&quot; That element of which, as we have seen, even the simplest
feeling is a complex, I shall call mind-stuff. A moving mole
cule of inorganic matter does not possess mind or consciousness,
but it possesses a small piece of mind-stuff. When molecules are
so combined together as to form the film on the under side of a
jellyfish, the elements of mind-stuff which go along with them
are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of sentience.
When the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and
nervous system of a vertebrate, the corresponding elements of
mind-stuff are so combined as to form some kind of conscious
ness ; that is to say, changes in the complex, which take place
at the same time, get so linked together that the repetition of
the one implies the repetition of the other. When matter takes
the complex form of a living human brain, the corresponding
mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness having
intelligence and volition.&quot;
The conclusions reached in the paper are (p. 66)
:
&quot; Hence we are obliged to identify the thing-in-itself with
that complex of elementary mind-stuff which on other grounds
we have seen reason to think of as going along with the material
object. Or, to say the same thing in other words, the reality
external to our minds which is represented in our minds as
matter, is in itself mind-stuff.&quot;234 APPENDIX.
&quot; The universe, then, consists entirely of mind-stuff. Some
of this is woven into the complex form of human minds, con
taining imperfect representations of the mind-stuff outside them,
and of themselves also, as a mirror reflects its own image in
another mirror ad infinitum. Such an imperfect representation
is called a material universe. It is a picture in a man s mind of
the real universe of mind-stuff.&quot;*
&quot; The two chief points of this doctrine may be thus summed
up:
&quot; Matter is a mental picture in which mind-stuff is the thing
represented.
&quot;
Reason, intelligence, and volition are properties of a com
plex, which is made up of elements themselves not rational, not
intelligent, not conscious.&quot;
The question now arises, How are we to interpret this new
definition of matter, and how does it affect the formula of
Evolution ? One has a kind of feeling of having walked over
the edge of a precipice into vacuity, and it takes some little con
sideration to realise one s position. I do not think, so far as we
are concerned, we are called upon to explain the new term
&quot;
eject,&quot; nor to consider the process of reasoning which leads
to these conclusions, nor to discuss the nature of perception
and conception ; we need only note the conclusions arrived
at. These I cannot quite understand. Suppose I consider
* This passage is very difficult to understand. The worst of it is, that
the professor of philosophy sitting at his desk is as hard to get at as the
preacher in his pulpit. We have continually to ask, What does he mean ?
and this occasionally seems extremely impertinent, and yet we cannot get
along without a clear understanding. Here we have
1. An universe consisting of mind-stuff.
2. Part of this universe is woven into human minds.
3. The disposal of the other part is not described, except that
4. These human minds contain representations of the mind-stuff outside
them.
5. This outside part so represented is called a material universe.
6. The material universe as so represented is a picture of the real universe
of mind-stuff.
But this throws no light on the mechanical combinations of size, shape,
and rates of motion, nor upon different modes of consciousness of them,
viz., radiance, colour, touch, smell, odour, &c.
The whole article suggests numerous questions which would have to
be answered before it could be understood.CLIFFORD. 235
matter to be a mental picture, in which mind-stuff is the thing
represented, then I first ask the meaning of these words which ex
plain what matter is. I find, in the first place, that (p. 66),
&quot;there
is a perception in the man s mind, which we may call the mental
image.&quot; Matter, then, is a mental image or picture, which is a per
ception, for they all seem to be identified. This perception or
mental image or picture relates to some external reality, and this
external reality, which we call matter and motion, is to be called
mind-stuff. The reason for this seems to be (p. 65),
&quot; That every
motion of matter is simultaneous with some ejective fact or
event which might be part of a consciousness.&quot; And again,
&quot;A moving molecule of inorganic matter possesses ... a
small piece of mind stuff.&quot; If we accept the new reading of
matter, I suppose we should say,
&quot; a moving molecule of inor
ganic matter is a mental image in which mind-stuff is the
thing represented.&quot; What then is mind-stuff? That which is
capable of being organised (concomitantly with some organisa
tions of inorganic matter) into consciousness or mind, but other
wise not capable of being described. It is an unknown element
utterly incapable of being described, and not known to be
possessed by inorganic molecules, but only inferred. By it, how
ever, we are called upon to understand a definition of matter.
We only know a candlestick as a combination or arrangement
of molecules of mind-stuff (inorganic matter) having definite
shapes, sizes, modes and rates of motion. But, as recently
quoted, inorganic molecules are said not to be mind-stuff but
to possess a small piece of it, thus making a distinction between
them. A variety of questions then arises. How does a moving
molecule of inorganic matter possess a small piece of mind-stuff
1
?
What is the nature of the co-relation 1 is it variable in corre
spondence with the integration of. matter and the dissipation of
motion ? or, again, does it go with the latter or stop with the
former ? If some matter transfers all its motion to some other
matter, does it lose its piece of mind-stuff? Is there a trans
ference of mind-stuff the same as there is a transference of
motion ? is there also a fixed quantum of mind-stuff the same
as there is a fixed quantum of matter and of motion ? But then,
after all and there is the puzzle matter itself is nothing but
mind-stuff ! and we do not know what mind-stuff is except that
it is not rational, not intelligent, not conscious.236 APPENDIX.
It seems to me that this definition of matter throws all the
preceding part of the essay into confusion. If I start to read it
again, and transform the word matter, wherever I meet with it,
into the meaning arrived at in the conclusion, I find myself
in an ocean of verbal troubles. And what is the use of a defi
nition so laboriously arrived at if we are not to make use of our
discovery in the practical application of it ?
For instance, one of the main arguments of the paper is the
parallelism between the organisation of inorganic molecules of
matter and the organisation of mind the complexity of the
one going with the complexity of the other. With the new
definition the parallelism would be between the increased
complexity of molecules of mind-stuff and the increased com
plexity of the element of consciousness, which seems to me, so
far as I can understand it, to be mind-stuff also. &quot;What then is
the nature of the differentiation ? One set of combinations of
mind-stuff is as complex as the other. Why should one set be
said to be made up of molecules of matter if matter itself is
mind-stuff, and the other set be said to be made up of the
elements of mind-stuff?
Again, referring to the quotation commencing
&quot; The universe,
then, consists entirely of mind-stuff,&quot; &c., the human mind is
said to contain imperfect representations (i.e., pictures or images
or perceptions) of the mind-stuff outside them. Such a repre
sentation in the mind of the mind-stuff outside them is called




applicable not to an externality but to an internal representation
of it. But whence comes the representation ? Surely from an
externality ; and surely this externality must be the material
universe. But this material universe is only mind-stuff.
Again, what is the difference between a mental image and a
cerebral image. I can attach no meaning to the latter. I sup
pose the brain is composed of molecules of matter
(i.e., extension
and resistance) having shapes, sizes, modes and rates of motion,
and while I can understand a cerebral motion (throb, pulsation,
vibration, &c.), I cannot interpret image by any term of motion.
But, according to the new definition of matter, I must say that
the cerebral image is mind-stuff, so combined in the arrange
ment of inorganic molecules i.e., extension and resistance
only, and having also arrangements of motion, that theseCLIFFORD. 237
shapes, sizes, and motions produce that combination of them
which is a cerebral what? image? or simply a passing series of
motions ? The latter, I think, for I cannot understand a piece
of machinery so complex as to produce in itself an image of
itself perceptible to itself. I cannot express it in terms of
mathematics and geometry. Professor Clifford says that mirrors
may reflect each other. This implies a mechanical image. But
such an image is nothing more than the firing off of an immense
number of small shots on a hard surface, and they all glance off
according to the rate and the angle of incidence, and retain their
relative position on some other receiving plane. There is no
image of the object which cast off these shots ; there is no image
without a mental perception or consciousness.
To me it appears hopeless confusion, and Professor Clifford
adds in a note :
&quot; The question is one which is peculiarly diffi
cult to make out precisely what another man means, and even
what one means one s-self.&quot;
Clifford s theory seems to point to an attempt to identify the
supposed underlying substance of mind and matter, so as to
explain secondarily the nature of the connection and the
parallelism of their evolution. The term &quot;mind-stuff,&quot; then,
applies to a something which manifests itself partly in the evo
lution of organised mind which takes the mode of conscious
ness, and partly in the evolution of organised mind which takes
the form of aggregates of matter in motion. Both are mind-
stuffs, but differentiated in their modes. Thus, after all, it
seems only a dressing up like so much new philosophy is
of old notions under new names. In this case it is Noumenon,
Absolute Force, The Absolute, an Inscrutable Power over again
under the idea of a primordial mind-stuff. And we have the
old questions over again Is it a fixed quantum, and are its
conditions as modes necessary conditions 1 or else how did the
differentiations into modes how did the evolution of it into
complex forms take place ?
Clifford s theory must be taken as a realistic and not as an
idealistic theory that is to say, he evidently conceives of a
universe of real existence prior to percipient mind, but he
affords no explanation of those evolutions by which some por
tions of it became self-conscious. Would he have applied Mr.
Spencer s formula of Evolution ?238 APPENDIX.
Keverting to our main study of Mr. Spencer s formula of
Evolution, we may remark that some such theory as this seems to
be tacitly implied in the working out of the processes of the Evo
lution of Biology and Psychology, as treated of in those special
volumes of Mr. Spencer s work. Of course it will be seen that
such an assumption is not warranted by the formula of Evolu
tion, which only comprises the two factors of matter (taken as
extension and resistance) and motion. And the insufficiency of
these appears to be universally acknowledged by all the Evolu
tionist philosophers, and by the scientific men who accept their
doctrines.
Hence the necessity for a new factor or a new definition of
matter. For our part, we do not think it wise to foist the extra
agent into a definition of matter. This appendage to the defini
tion of matter is so powerful and important that it would
entirely alter the import of the word, and reminds one of Dun
dreary s reflection,
&quot;If the tail had been stronger, I make no
doubt the tail would waggle the dog;&quot; for the addition to the mean
ing of the word would be of more importance than the original one.
There is more than enough confusion of terms already, and to add
to the definition of matter, which we consider merely as exten
sion and resistance, capable of being described mathematically
and geometrically, is not to produce definition but undefinition.
Besides, unless it is an universal and uniform adjunct of exten
sion and resistance, it is not essential to the idea of matter.
If, like motion, it is transferable, like motion also it can be
wholly transferred, and thus wholly lost to some portions of
matter.
To define the meaning of a substantive word is to describe that
which is permanent to the thing described, to include in it all
that appertains to its permanent constitution, and to omit from
it all that can be taken away from it, and yet it shall remain
what it is. Thus motion is not essential to the definition of
matter, because it can be transferred from one particle of matter
to another, so that one particle moving faster than another does
so by receiving from another some part of its motion, or even all
its motion ; for we can imagine, and have reason to believe in,
the existence of matter which has thus lost by transfer all its
motion (ether). It is still matter, since it possesses extension
and passive resistance ; and thus motion is not part of the defini-CLIFFORD. 239
tion of matter, although it is universally the accompaniment of
matter, but is to be regarded as a separate factor. Motion is
capable of concentration i.e, more motion in some aggregations
of matter; and of dissipation by equalisation; and we are entitled
to speak of it as a separate factor from matter, and not as a part
of the definition of it. The factor of consciousness is to be
regarded in a similar manner. For if it is capable of concentra
tion, as seems to be claimed for it byUeberweg and Clifford, it must
be that some matter parts with it, and other matter receives an
accession of it
; and thus, similarly to motion, it is not essential
to matter, and, similarly to motion, it is to be regarded as a
separate factor. And we have to add to our cosmic stock in
trade
&quot; a fixed quantum of consciousness,&quot; and derive it also
from the
&quot; Persistence of Force
&quot;
?
It would then follow that it is a third factor in the initial
starting-point of Evolution, and it would have to take its place
in &quot;the homogeneous.&quot; We have already considered the homo
geneous as containing two terms, matter and motion, if not
three, viz., matter and motion and force. Now we have to add
mind-stuff, bearing in mind that this mind-stuff is not rational
nor intelligent nor conscious.
If we ask whence this differentiation into matter, motion, force,
and mind-stuff, Evolution fails to respond.
If everything is a corollary from the persistence of force,
whence the necessary inference of mind-stuff? We have before
asked the question as to matter and motion.
It seems to me that there is no more nonsense in supposing
the one initial agent (for philosophy, according to Mr. Spencer,
requires such an unification) to be mind-stuff than to suppose it
to be force. Indeed, may we not ask ourselves, Are they not
the same ?
However, our object in this study is not discovery but criticism,
and the result of our criticism so far has been to discredit the
possibility of an unificatory synthetic philosophy; to invali
date the formula of Evolution; to exhibit the inadequacy of
force, taken as the totality of matter and motion, in the expla
nation of the cosmos, and to show the necessity for a third
factor in the universe containing something of the nature of
mind.240 APPENDIX.
British Quarterly Review, October 1873 and January 1877.
It would be an interesting but too laborious a task to compile
an account of the valid criticisms contained in all the magazines
and reviews with reference to the Evolution theory since the
publication of
&quot; First Principles,&quot; and there is no doubt that
this work and the works of Mr. Darwin have given rise to a
great amount of careful thought. I call the attention of the
student to the above, because I am informed that they have had
considerable influence in the formation of an unfavourable esti
mation of the work under review in certain circles.
The article in the British Quarterly Review for October 1873
is written in a very irritating manner, which the student cannot
but consider a great nuisance, as it is perpetually distracting his
attention, and makes him suspect an animus, which in itself is
detrimental to the value of the work undertaken by a critic.
The contents of the paper are as under : i. Difficulties of a
commensurate criticism, owing to the wide scope of the work and
the indistinctness of the propositions. The writer undertakes the
task of an examination from the point of view of the physicist.
2. Objections to Mr. Spencer pronouncing so many things incon
ceivable. 3. Asserted errors and false notions in physics. 4.
The persistence of force not a datum of consciousness, and the
assigned corollaries not corollaries. 5. Many different renderings
of the term
&quot; Persistence of Force.&quot; 6. Mechanical difficulties.
7. The a priori proof of the great generalisations of physics
criticised and opposed. This occupies the most considerable
portion of the essay. 8. Objections to some of Mr. Spencer s
inductions. 9. Concerning the limitations of the criticism, and
objecting to Mr. Spencer s perpetually changing the signification
of his terms.
This article should not be read except in connection with Mr.
Spencer
7
s reply, published in the third volume of his Essays.
The number for January 1877 contains some apposite criticism,
but it should be perused with a just and careful attention. The
main points seem to be : i. A charge against Mr. Spencer that
he holds by the visible and that which can be mentally seen and
embraced, and that he rejects whatever cannot be conceived.
2. That those objects which transcend our powers of conception
can only produce in us symbolic conceptions, which do notMOULTON. 24 r
represent, but only stand for, the realities.
&quot;
Conceivableness
or comprehensibility, in truth, in the sense of possible conscious
representation, rigorously applied as a criterion of the limits,
and consequently of the character, of thought, would almost
seem to exclude reasoning altogether.&quot;
&quot; Our mental picture of
a pebble or a shell is as imperfect, as symbolic, as that of the
earth itself.&quot; 3.
&quot;In what sense can Mr. Spencer s ultimate
ideas be said to be ideas at all, since they are pronounced to be
inconceivable, or, according to the title of the division of his
subject in which he treats of them, unknowable ?
&quot;
&quot; If force
motion, personality, are ultimate ideas, and yet are unknown
and unknowable, then ultimate ideas do not enter or belong to
our minds at all, and can neither support, limit, nor otherwise
affect our reasoning or
thought.&quot; 4. A criticism I do not under
stand, viz., that Evolution presupposes time and space. It seems
to me that Evolution presupposes matter and motion, of which
space and time are merely the interrelations. 5. Criticism of
that positive element of consciousness which persists notwith
standing the negation of limits the raw material of definite
thought. On this point I cannot but think that Mr. Spencer
is substantially correct, but that it is to be interpreted in the
manner indicated in my criticism of the Unknowable. The
writer of this article concludes, that
&quot;
it would thus appear that
Mr. Spencer means by unknowable, not what cannot be known,
but what cannot be definitely known known under limits.&quot;
Granted that writers may have the right to use words in any
given meaning, there is always the danger both of the writer and
of the reader forgetting the arbitrary assigned meaning and
reverting to the ordinary one.
&quot; No one is likely to dispute the
truth that we cannot have a definite or limited knowledge a
consciousness with limits of that which is itself indefinite and
without limits.&quot; 6. An examination of force as the ultimate of
ultimates. The criticism amounts to this
&quot;
JN&quot;o consciousness
no force.&quot; This criticism appears in my examination, and is
very forcibly expressed in Dr. Martineau s essays, as previously
indicated.
This notice of Mr. Moulton s really important criticisms may
be deemed very inadequate by the admirers of them, but a long
notice would have necessitated a valuation of the merits of a
long, subtle, and acrimonious controversy, a task which one does242 APPENDIX.
not feel disposed nor competent to
- undertake. If the writer
would revise his papers, deleting all the bitterness, he would
contribute something valuable to the literature of Evolution.
The rest of the paper deals with Sociology, and is beyond the
present scope of our studies.
G. H. LEWES Problems of Life and Mind. Two vols.
Triibner & Co. London, 1875.
G. H. LEWES The Physical Basis of Mind. Triibner & Co.
London, 1877.
I feel that I cannot omit a reference to the above volumes,
for although I have only partially read them, I find that
the writer deals in a clear and masterly manner with many of
the problems which we have been considering in the course of
our studies. They are, however, dealt with in such a detailed
and methodical manner, and the work itself is so large, that they
require a special study and examination.
An Article by Mr. James Sully in the
&quot;
Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica.&quot; Vol. VIII. Ninth Edition, 1879.
All students of Spencer should read this article, as it gives a
very wide review of the subject of Evolution theories, and enables
the reader to form a better idea of the general scope and bearing
of any individual work. It assists the reader, by giving him a
general summary of the whole of the matters under consideration,
and in assigning to any particular writer his place in the battle.
He sees not only with the eyes of the fighter, but with the eyes
of the onlooker. He understands better the position of the
author, his aims and endeavours, and is enabled to adjudge to
him more readily his proper place and weight.
I quote a few passages
:
Page 751.
&quot; The most general meaning of Evolution may be
defined as follows : Evolution includes all theories respecting the
origin and order of the world which regard the higher or more com
plex forms of existence as following and depending on the lower
and simple forms, which represent the course of the world as a
gradual transition from the indeterminate to the determinate,
from the uniform to the varied, and which assume the cause of
this process to be immanent in the world itself that is thusSULLY. 243
transformed. All theories of Evolution, properly so called, re
gard the physical world as a gradual progress from the simple to
the complex, look upon the development of organic life as con
ditioned by that of the inorganic world, and view the course of
mental life, both of the individual and of the race, as correlated
with the material process. This definition covers roughly the
principal historical systems bearing the name of Evolution, as
well as others which have hardly as yet been characterised by
this title.
&quot; It is clear by this definition that we cannot now press the
etymological force of the word. Evolution has no doubt often
been conceived as an unfolding of something already contained
in the original, and this view is still commonly applied to organic
evolution, both of the individual and of the species. It will be
found that certain metaphysical systems of Evolution imply this
idea of an unfolding of something existing in germ, or at least
potentially in the antecedent. On the other hand, the modern
doctrine of Evolution, with its ideas of elements which combine
and of causation as transformation of energy, does not necessarily
imply this notion. It may be remarked that some of the argu
ments brought against the modern doctrine rest on the fallacious
assumption that the word is still used in the etymological sense,
and that consequently that which evolves must contain in some
shape what is evolved (e.g., inorganic matter must contain life
and consciousness).
&quot; Evolution is thus almost synonymous with progress, though
the latter term is usually confined to processes of development in
the moral as distinguished from the physical world.&quot;
The writer goes on to give a very instructive resume of the
forms of doctrine of Evolution.
i.
&quot; How far is the process a real objective one?&quot; For very
different views may be taken of the reality of the process of be
coming, generation, and transformation.
&quot; On the one side we have the extreme view of the Eclectics,
that there is no such thing as change or individual object, that
real being is one and unchangeable, and that what appears like
the formation and destruction of things is an illusion of the
senses. At the other extreme, we have the view that all reality
consists in the process of becoming, or self-realisation, and that
nothing persists save this law of Evolution itself. Between these244 APPENDIX.
two extremes there lie a number of intermediate conceptions, as
that of a varying and progressing activity, of a persistent force,
or of a gradual manifestation of an unchanging substance.&quot;
2.
&quot; What is the nature of that reality which makes the content,
so to speak, of the process of Evolution ?
&quot;
&quot; First of all, the material and the mental may be regarded
from a dualistic point of view as perfectly distinct kinds of reality.
According to this view, physical evolution as taking place in the
inorganic world, and mental evolution as unfolded in man s
history, are two unconnected processes. Further, the fact of
their correlation in organic development must either be left unex
plained altogether or can only be referred to the arbitrary action
of some supernatural power.
&quot;
Opposed to this dualistic conception of reality there are the
monistic conceptions, which conceive of all parts of the process
of evolution as homogeneous and identical. Of these, the first
is the materialistic, which assumes but one substance, and regards
mind as but a property or particular manifestation of matter.&quot;
&quot;The next monistic conception is the spiritualistic, which
assumes but one substance mind, and resolves the reality of
the material world into a spiritual principle. According to this
way of looking at the world-process, material and mental evolu
tion are but two continuous phases of one spiritual movement.
From the operation of inanimate nature up to human history it
is the same spiritual reality which manifests itself.
&quot;Finally, there is the monistic conception in the narrow
modern sense, viz., that which views the material and the
mental as two sides of one and the same reality. According to
this view, physical evolution as manifested in the material world,
and mental evolution as seen in human life, may each be regarded
as a two-sided process.&quot;
3.
&quot; How is the process effected ?
&quot;
The replies to this question are too long for quotation, and I
must refer the student to the article itself. Their substance is
this :
&quot;There are two strongly-contrasted modes of viewing all
action or change. The first is drawn from the region of physi
cal events, and views the change as conditioned by antecedents
or efficient causes. This way of looking at change gives the
mechanical view of Evolution. The second is drawn from theSULLY. 245
region of our conscious volitions regarded as themselves unde
termined by antecedent causes, and conceives of change as re
lated to and determined by some end or purpose. This gives
the teleological view of Evolution.&quot;
&quot;
Adopting this distinction between the mechanical and teleo
logical conception of Evolution as the essential one, we may
roughly classify the various systems of Evolution under three
heads (a) those in which the mechanical view predominates ;
(b) those in which the teleological view predominates; and (c)
those in which the two views are combined in some larger con
ception.&quot;
Then follows a description of the mechanical interpretation
and its difficulties with respect to conscious life and of the
modifications (three) adopted in order to obviate them.
This is succeeded by an account of the principal teleological
theories, in which appears
&quot;the element of purpose,&quot; and in
which
&quot; nature is personified as a worker who aims unconsciously
and instinctively at some dimly descried end.&quot;
And finally, we have a description of the systems which seek
to combine the teleological and the mechanical view of Evolution.
It will thus be seen that when any man speaks or writes for
or against Evolution without defining what he means, his deliver
ances are of no effect, and his hearers or readers, naturally in
terpreting the term according to their own notions, are confirmed
or shaken in their belief in a vague, varying sort of way, and
there is a great deal of hazy assent or dissent without any very
clear conception on the part of speaker or hearer. Thus we
have heard Evolution accepted in sermons in the orthodox pulpit
and in the Unitarian pulpit, but the preachers have not stated
which kind of Evolution they referred to. So in discussions in
learned societies the same lack of definiteness is to be found.
The writer of the article next gives a long history of the pro
gressive recognition of Evolution, in which the part of the
greatest interest to the students of Spencer will be found to be
the &quot;Modern Doctrine of Evolution&quot; p. 763.
&quot; We now approach the period in which the modern doctrine
of Evolution in its narrow sense has originated. This doctrine
is essentially a product of scientific research and speculation.
It is a necessary outcome of the rapid advance of the physical
sciences. Its final philosophic form cannot yet be said to be246 APPENDIX.
fixed. It may be defined as a natural history of the cosmos,
including organic beings, expressed in physical terms as a
mechanical process. In this record the cosmic system appears
as a natural product of elementary matter and its laws,&quot; &c.
This is followed by a short notice of Darwin, Wallace, Spencer,
Clifford, Lewes, &c.
I notice with regard to Spencer that he says,
&quot; He excludes
all consideration of the question how life first arose, though it is
clear that he regards the lowest forms of life as continuous in
their essential nature with sub-vital processes.&quot;
Also I notice,
&quot; that just as he does not seek to explain the
first appearance of life as a whole, so he does not seek to explain
the first dawn of mental life.&quot;
It seems to me that here the writer is in error, for he goes on
immediately to give Mr. Spencer s explanation of the gradual
development of mental life, and it will be seen by a reference to
my criticism that Mr. Spencer also endeavours to explain the
development of organic life and consciousness.
The writer gives a very just summary of the biology, psycho
logy, and of the ethical and sociological developments of Mr.
Spencer s theory of Evolution.
The following passage is deserving of notice :
&quot; Mr. Spencer makes little use of his metaphysical conception
in accounting for the evolution of things. He tells us neither
why the unknowable should manifest itself in time at all, nor
why it should appear as a material world before it appears under
the form of mind or consciousness. Indeed, Mr. Spencer s
doctrine of Evolution cannot be said to have received from its
author an adequate metaphysical interpretation. The idea of the
unknowable hardly suffices to give to his system an intelligible
monistic basis. In truth, this system seems in its essence to be
dualistic rather than monistic.&quot;
The final section of the article is an excellent and impartial
consideration of the
&quot;
Interpretation of Modern Scientific Doc
trine&quot;
It is the outcome of scientific research of the positive method,
and is of a mechanical rather than of a teleological character.
But it still awaits its final philosophic interpretation.
The universal applicability of the doctrine to physical and
mental phenomena may be allowed. But there are wide gaps inSULLY. 247
our knowledge of both orders ; as, for instance, as to the neces
sity of the process from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.
Again, the transition from the inorganic to the organic is far
from conceivable. Again, in spite of Mr. Spencer s brilliant
demonstration of the general continuity of mental life, much
remains to be done before all the steps in the process (e.g., from
particular to general knowledge, from single feelings to self-con
sciousness) are made plain.
&quot; As a unifying generalisation it is clearly limited by the fact
of the correlation of mental and physical evolution. These two
regions of phenomena may be seen to manifest the same law,
yet they cannot be identified. All the laws of physical evolution
can never help us to understand the first genesis of mind
; and
this difficulty is in no way reduced by Mr. Spencer s conception
of a perfect gradation from purely physical to conscious life.
The dawn of the first confused and shapeless feeling is as much
a mystery as the genesis of a distinct sensation.&quot;
The writer then discusses the theory of vibrations of indivisible
atoms accompanied with a mode of feeling, as the basis of a
theory of mind evolution. He also assigns a limit to the explana
tion to be effected by such a hypothesis.
&quot; Such being the limits set to the scope of explanation by the
idea of Evolution, the question arises whether these apparently
permanent gaps in our scientific knowledge can be filled up by
extra-scientific speculations.&quot; The attempt to do so leads us
back to a consideration of that ultimate nature of matter, force,
and mind.
&quot; What, it may be asked, are the realities correspond
ing to these terms, and how are we to conceive of their mutual
relations?&quot; The result of the consideration of the matter is
found to be
&quot; No one of the metaphysical doctrines which are
at our command is so plainly and completely adapted to trans
form it into a final doctrine of existence, that it must of necessity
be accepted at once and by
all&quot; Thus the question as to the
possibility of filling up the gaps in our scientific knowledge
speculatively is answered in the negative.
The bearing of Evolution upon moral and religious ideas is
then discussed.
The article winds up with a list of the best works upon the
different branches of the subject of Evolution, which the student
would do well to consult.248 APPENDIX.




of his System. By B. P. BOWNE,
A.B. New York : Nelson & Phillips, 1876.
&quot; Professor Bowne, of the New Boston University, has elabo
rated his strictures of Herbert Spencer into a small volume,
which is one of the most subtle and forcible criticisms of the
First Principles and the Psychology that have ever pro
ceeded from an essentially evangelical standpoint.&quot; Mind, No.
13 ; article,
&quot;
Philosophy in the United States.&quot;
In consequence of this remark I procured the work referred
to, and after its perusal I am able to recommend it as a sub
stantial and sound criticism. The evangelical standpoint is not
discernible, although a theism is indicated and maintained.
The criticism is fundamental, and not of odds and ends. It is
not a mere tossing about of details, but a disjointing of struc
ture, whereby the system should fall into an ineffective heap.
The abuse is mainly polite and pleasant. The sarcasm is properly
measured and well directed, sufficient to give zest without dis
tracting the reader with bad feelings. Each part is very well
handled; but the summary and conclusion, forming chapter vi.,
though starting well, falls off into weakness of construction and
feebleness of statement. The writer has evidently been a diligent
student of Dr. Martineau, whose influence is markedly dis
cernible, both in the lines of thought and in detail of expression
and illustration.
The positive teaching of the book is weak and incidental, and
I cannot but think it a mistake on the part of any writer who
undertakes the task of a criticism to mix up with his examina
tion of another man s work any positive teaching of his own
that is to say, if his object is a pure and impartial consideration
of a theory propounded for public acceptance. It distracts the
student, by raising up far other lines of thought for which he is
not prepared, and leaves the critic open to a counter-attack, in
which, if he is discomfited, all his valid criticism is apt to
perish. In reading this book, let us then draw our pencils
through the positive teaching, and see how the criticism of
Mr. Spencer stands on its own merits.BOWNE. 249
CHAPTER I. Wliat is Evolution ?
The theist will accept evolution if it is granted that Mind is
the primal cause and the eternal ruler of the universe. The
writer says, however, that the new philosophy only recognises
matter and force. This is not quite correct, as the student will
remember, for matter and motion are the factors of the Formula
of Evolution. The strict Evolutionist, however, does not grant
the above-stated position of the theist, but either from force
or from matter and motion would deduce the universe. The
task of Evolution, as understood by the critic, is to explain the
cosmos as it exists now, including all the facts of life and mind,
as results of a process of condensation of a cloud of atoms. The
writer well remarks,
&quot; It may even be questioned whether many
of the Evolutionists themselves properly appreciate the task they
have to perform.&quot;
CHAPTER II. Laics of the Unknoiuable.
It is unsatisfactory to give an account of an unsatisfactory
subject, and strange that people should have so much to say
about that which is unknowable. The writer, treating of the
reconciliation of Science and Eeligion, coincides with many
other critics, and considers that a denial of the personality of
God destroys the object of Keligion.
He next gives an account of the doctrine of
&quot; unknowable-
ness,&quot; and, after many examples have been considered, he thus
characterises some of the speculations
:
&quot; There seems to be a
kind of intellectual shuffling going on, a playing fast and loose
with words, as the absolute, infinite, conditioned, uncon
ditioned, &c. There is an air of conjuring and thimblerigging
over the whole.&quot; This amounts to a charge of indefiniteness
and the loose employment of terms a charge which is often
brought against Mr. Spencer.
The next criticism is p. 30, where the writer advances as Mr.
Spencer s opinion that
&quot; the test of the knowable is its ability
to come before the representative faculty,&quot; and asks if all the
terms and many of the facts which are the bases of science are
capable of mental representation. If not, then science is impos
sible. The converse rather is true, he considers, viz., that there250 APPENDIX.
are many knowables that are not capable of mental representa
tion consequently the latter cannot be the test of knowable-
ness. If Mr. Spencer adheres to that test, he says, it does away
with the foundation of his own philosophy. Is
&quot;
force,&quot; as an
instance, capable of mental representation? All the funda
mental notions of science are incapable of mental represen
tation.
On p. 36 appears an examination of the
&quot; fundamental
reality,&quot; the object of which is to show a contradiction of reason
ing on the part of Mr. Spencer, as thus expressed
:
&quot;Whatever involves the idea of &quot;Whatever involves the idea of
self-existence is an untenable hypo- self-existence is an untenable hypo
thesis, thesis.
&quot;God involves the idea of self- &quot;The fundamental reality in-
existence. volves the idea of self-existence.
&quot; God is an untenable hypothesis.
&quot; The fundamental reality is not
an untenable hypothesis.&quot;
Again, p. 38, &quot;As the result of his criticism of scientific and
religious ideas, Mr. Spencer concludes that a fundamental
reality underlies the universe, and that this is
* unknown and
unknowable.
&quot; The writer, after a consideration of Mr. Spencer s
argument, thinks that it
&quot;
proves an unexplainable, but not an
unknowable
; for though we cannot give the rationale of that
final fact, by the supposition we know it as a fact. To return
to our illustration, the essential nature of gravitation is a pro
found mystery ; but gravitation as a fact, the law of its varia
tion, the truth that it includes all the particular facts mentioned,
all these things science regards as beyond question. Clearly the
incomprehensible may be known as a fact, and its laws and rela
tions may also constitute a part of our most assured knowledge.
Mr. Spencer s conclusion is an extremely commonplace one, that
argument and all explanation postulate something for their
foundation and support. I admit most cheerfully that explana
tion must assume the unexplainable or independent ; but I
deny that this unexplainable is the unknowable&quot; (p. 41).
Then follows, p. 45, an examination of the doctrine of
&quot;Relativity,&quot; including a consideration of
&quot;
pure being,&quot; with
respect to which latter he says
&quot;
Again, the doctrine sometimes reads : We cannot know pure
being that is, being without attributes but only the attributesBOWNE. 251
of being We cannot know pure being, for the sufficient
reason that there is no such thing to know. All this talk about
pure being arises from a pernicious habit into which thinkers
fall of thinking that whatever can be separated in thought can
be separated in
fact,&quot; &c.
On p. 48 commences a review of the Idealism and Kealism
of Spencer, the conclusion of which is thus stated on p.
S^:-
&quot; Thus far Mr. Spencer has established nothing which could
not have been admitted beforehand he has laboriously proved
two truisms : first, that all our knowledge must be related to
our faculties ; and, second, that being without attribute or power
or manifestation of any kind is unknowable ; both of which may
be admitted without at all impairing the fact that what know
ledge our faculties do give us is objectively real. If, however,
he chooses to deny this, then, as we have seen, his only landing-
place is absolute Idealism, which Mr. Spencer says is insanity.
As between Eeligion and Science, his argument thus far tells with
equal force against both. Religion involves unthinkable ideas,
which fact Mr. Spencer looks upon as sufficient warrant for
banishing it to the outer darkness of the unknowable. But
Science also involves equally unthinkable ideas, and must, there
fore, go along with Religion.&quot;
Then follows (pp. 57-76) a long examination of Hamilton,
Mansel, and Spencer on The Absolute, concluding thus :
&quot; My excuse for this long and dry discussion is the religious
importance of the question. The only important bearing of the
nescience doctrine is the religious one. Science would go on in
just the same way as at present, collecting and co-ordinating its
facts, though the facts were proved to be phantoms. Common
life would experience no change. The most thoroughgoing
know-nothing would be as eager to get bread as the realist
; he
would be as careful to keep out of a relative fire or a relative
river. . . .
&quot;But it is not so in morals and religion. There we are not
forced to act
; there we are constantly seeking some excuse for
inaction. Even the suspicion that our religious ideas are delu
sions leads to a speedy relaxation of moral effort, as they
know too well who have at any time made nescience their
theology.&quot;252 APPENDIX.
CHAPTER III. Law of the Knowable.
We now come to the most essential portion of the criticism.
As we have before remarked, Part I. of &quot;First Principles&quot; is
non-essential to the work. In fact, it is rather misleading, for
it directs the attention of the student into the mysterious,
and takes away his discernment of the Problem of Philosophy
and the Formula of Evolution as the main object of the
work.
The first section of this chapter is taken up with a con
sideration of the fundamental ideas of science, and of their
validity as a priori truths, the writer asserting that they have
really been discoveries by the inductive process. Mr. Spencer s
fundamental reasoning is severely criticised, as thus :
&quot;
]S&quot;o possible amount of experiment and induction would avail
to prove these doctrines for all time and space ; and unless they
can get some a priori support, they must present a sorry figure
in so great a field. Indeed, these doctrines, as Mr. Spencer
points out, are incapable of inductive proof. Matter can be
proved indestructible only by assuming the persistence of force,
and force can be proved indestructible only by assuming matter
to be indestructible. The argument is circular, and hence worth
less
; one or other of these doctrines must be based upon
a priori considerations.&quot;
The writer goes on to show that Mr. Spencer,
&quot;in one
place
. . . tells us that a necessity of thought is no sign of a
necessity of fact
; and then he offers us a necessity of thought
as the best possible proof of an external fact&quot; (p. 85). &quot;This
reasoning, which is repeated in proof of the persistence of force,
amounts to this : what we cannot conceive is impossible. We
cannot conceive either creation or annihilation
; hence they are
impossible&quot; (p. 86). This the writer proceeds to answer by
adducing from Mr. Spencer a number of instances of incon
ceivabilities which, nevertheless, are accepted by the intellect
;
in addition to which is brought forward Mr. Spencer s own
test of truth, namely, the inconceivability of the negative ;
whereupon he remarks :
&quot;
Inconceivability is an ambiguous term. Some statements
violate the law of our reason, others transcend our reason.
To the first class belong all contradictions ; ... to theBOWNE. 253
second belong all inquiries about the inner nature of
things,&quot;
&c.
&quot; Yet Mr. Spencer uses this mental impotence as a sufficient
test of objective reality.
&quot;We cannot explain how a thing can
be
\ hence it cannot be. Part I. loads our mental faculties with
opprobrium ; Part II. constitutes them the measure, not merely
of knowledge, but of existence. Part I. declares inconceivability
worthless as a test of reality; Part II. makes it the test of
proof.&quot;
The second section, commencing at p. 90, deals with the
correlation of forces. The writer first speaks of the confusion




&quot; Heat is a mode of motion and a mode of force at the same
time. Motion produces magnetism, magnetism is motion,
magnetism is force, motion is force. The same is said of light
and electricity ; both are motions and both are forces. Yet the
universal definition of force describes it as the hidden cause of
motion or change. When pressed for a definition, there is no
scientist who would view them in any other relation. To use
cause and effect as interchangeable and identical involves a most
remarkable confusion of ideas. But Mr. Spencer is not alone in
this error. I do not know a single scientist who has maintained
the proper distinction between force and motion. It would be
easy to fill pages with quotations from the writings of the most
prominent scientists all illustrating the same confusion. In
truth, the majority of scientific men do not understand the
doctrine of correlation. Heat, light, electricity, &c., are not
forces, but modes of motion, any one of which can produce all
the rest. This passage of one mode of motion into another
mode is its correlation ; but this correlation is the correlation of
motions, and not of forces.&quot;
I do not know that the writer mends matters in the next
passage by stating what is requisite to prove the true corre
lations of forces. Nor do I understand him when he goes on
to consider the question as to the correlation of vital forces
with physical forces.
&quot; What is the proof that vitality is a
function of material forces ?
&quot;
It would have been well first to have considered if vitality
was a correlation of motion, and took its place as life254 APPENDIX.
mind consciousness in the circle of the changes of
motion :
Heat = Consciousness =
II W
making a quantum of motion of matter, each mode of which
is interchangeable with any other.
However, the writer pursues his argument on the lines laid
down by Mr. Spencer, viz., on the basis of the correlation of
forces, and finds that
&quot;
all that is really made out is that heat
and light are necessary conditions of vital action; but surely
the conditions of the action and the power acting need not
be the same.&quot; The writer adduces long arguments to show
that vitality is not a mode of force transformed from the
physical forces. The value of this criticism I am unable
to understand until I understand the meaning of the term
&quot;force.&quot;
In the third section the writer asks, &quot;Let us see whether he
succeeds any better in proving the identity of the physical and




Disengaged from swelling statement it reads thus : Physical
forces, such as light and heat, excite sensations ; therefore sensa
tions are transformed light and heat.
&quot;
Sensations, being pleasant .or painful, are followed by
motion either toward or from the object of sensation; hence
mechanical motion and its equivalents are the correlates of
sensation.
&quot;
Again, mental action is attended by certain physical condi
tions ; hence they are one.
&quot; Indeed the whole argument may be summed up in this :
Physical states excite mental states ; hence each is a form of the
other.BOWNE. 255
&quot; Now, looking at this merely with a logician s eye, it must
be confessed that it falls far short of proof. It establishes re
lation, not identity,&quot; &c.
But the writer has more to say than this (p. in)
:
&quot; But psychology has yet another aid to offer to the
&quot; New
Philosophy.&quot; It demands the authority for the belief in force
at all. It summons the Evolutionist to tell where he discovered
this force with which he conjures so mightily. And just here
every system of mechanical atheism is speechless. For it is
admitted now by all that force is not a phenomenon, but a
mental datum. Hume did philosophy a good service in show
ing that nature presents nothing but sequence, and this is
rigidly true. The keenest eye, looking upon the armies of
phenomena which manoeuvre in the physical world, could detect
nothing but succession. Regiment after regiment might march
by us in time-order, but they could give us no hint of power.
This idea is home-born, and born only of our conscious effort.
It is only as agents that we believe in action; it is only as
there is a causation within that we get any hint of causation
without. Not gravitation, nor electricity, nor magnetism, not
chemical affinity, but will, is the typical idea of force.&quot;
It would follow from this that science should either accept
force as a manifestation of will or reject it from its system
altogether. The writer says, with what justice I know not,
that some rigorous Baconians, as Comte and Mill, have tried
the latter plan, and fell into ridiculous contradictions. But
upon this matter I am not able to offer an opinion. The posi
tive doctrine here adduced by the writer we leave out of con
sideration, as not being a criticism of Mr. Spencer. The con
clusion of the section will be acceptable to many Evolutionists,
viz. (p. 126)
: -
&quot; This idea of force, which is as much the necessity of science
as it is of religion, makes an honourable reconciliation possible,
because it enforces on the one hand the need of an originating
and controlling mind, and on the other leaves the method of its
working undetermined. Science discovers laws, but is forced
to provide an ever-active Administrator
; this satisfies religion.
Religion proves an ever-living Will, but is compelled to grant
its steady method
; this satisfies science. Thus each can look
without aversion on the claims of the other.&quot;256 APPENDIX.
This passage shows the thought that is uppermost in the
writer s mind, for he diverges from his negative criticism of
Spencer to advance positive doctrines. It is very well to ad
vance positive doctrines, but it has led us off our study of
Spencer s main theses.
The fourth section is an extension of the same argument
:
&quot; Let us grant that he assumes the existence of a universal
impersonal force, and inquire how he accounts for the intelli
gence which the universe seems to manifest&quot; (p. 127).
This is found to be in the chances of One Force of infinite
differentiations, the statement and examination of which is the
weakest piece of critical examination in the book.






33)&amp;gt; which is much to the point, and he very justly questions
the identity of the process of segregation of masses under action
of a medium with the segregations of organisms and of organic
and mental processes.
&quot; All these are instances of segregation,&quot;
and
&quot; Mr. Spencer has a way of using the vaguest and most far
fetched analogies as identities, which often make it impossible
to get at any denned meaning.&quot;
The writer then questions the explanation of organic develop
ment on the basis of Mr. Spencer s theory, on which he aptly
remarks that
&quot; Mr. Spencer seems to have forgotten that he is engaged
in proving the doctrine of evolution, and cannot be allowed
to assume it. The force of his reply lies entirely in the assump
tion that evolution is an established fact. This, however, is
not the only time that Mr. Spencer has done this. Many
of his arguments, as we shall hereafter see, assume the point
in dispute, and are worthless without the assumption.&quot;
This is something to be borne in mind in reading the
&quot; First
Principles.&quot; In many passages of this chapter I find that the
writer s indignation has exceeded the proper bounds of expres
sion, which is very regrettable. Has not Mr. Spencer under
taken and performed his task in good faith and with a con
scientious effort to arrive at the truth? Both the eminence
of the author and the dignity of the subject should exercise a
restraining influence upon the critic. Besides, the judicious
critic is content to leave the logical inferences of his criticisms to
the reader.GREEN. 257
CHAPTER IV. Principles of Psychology.
This is a long chapter, extending from p. 146 to p. 217,
and deals with matters highly important and not inapposite
to the main and fundamental object of our study in this volume,
but an account and criticism of it would be apt to carry us too
far. The general bearing of it is to show the insufficiency of
the explanation of mental facts upon the theory of Mr. Spencer,
as expressed in his Formula of Evolution. The critical part
is cogent and strong; the positive doctrine taught, or rather
indicated, is weak. The writer notices Mr. Spencer s acknow
ledgment of a unit of motion and a unit of feeling having
nothing in common, and his admission that
&quot; the antithesis of
subject and object is never to be transcended while conscious
ness lasts,&quot; and very properly criticises the attempted explanation
of the nexus. A variety of other difficulties seem very well
treated, but are in advance of our present studies.
CHAPTER Y. The Theistic Argument.
The first section discusses the teleological argument. The
second section considers the theory of the construction of the
cosmos out of the homogeneous and the Darwinian theory
of development of organisms. The third section contains a
discussion of Pantheism.
CHAPTER YI. Summary and Conclusion.
I might have given this chapter instead of the foregoing
summary, but that I wished to emphasise some portions of the
criticism more than others, and to introduce some critical
remarks.
Articles in the Contemporary Review, December 1877, March
1878, July 1878, 011 &quot;Mr. Herbert Spencer and Mr. G. H.
Lewes : their Application of the Doctrine of Evolution to
Thought.&quot;
As Professor Green possesses a considerable reputation and
influence, it is well that we should acquaint ourselves with his
views. His thought seems somewhat laborious, but very clear
and careful. Would it not be well if those who belon to the258 APPENDIX.
school of thought which pre-eminently claims the title of
&quot;
scientific&quot; should sometimes step outside their circle and view
things from another point of view altogether
? This is what
Professor Green invites us to do. The study of our subject
hitherto has been of the following nature, viz., Accepting Mr.
Spencer s statement of the Problem of Philosophy, can we,
by the Formula of Evolution, account for the cosmos as it
is 1 Professor Green would seem to dispute the correctness of
the problem. To him the fundamental problem is not the
construction of the universe, but
&quot; How is knowledge pos
sible]&quot;
He thinks that modern philosophy was brought to a crisis by
Hume ; that his professed followers in this country have really
ignored him, but that the problems he laid down have been truly
followed and worked out by Kant and HegeL He therefore pro
poses to himself the task in these essays thoroughly to over




Only by a direct examination of that psychology itself, as re
presented by our ablest writers, can we expect to produce the
conviction that this primary question of metaphysics still lies at
its threshold, and is finding nothing but a tautological or pre
posterous
answer.&quot;
The writer justifies this manner of putting the question, and
shows that the Positive philosophy, while repudiating, really
accepts a metaphysical basis. &quot;It is unaware of the assump
tions which it unintentionally makes in order to its own justi
fication.&quot; Beyond certain limits the alliance between psychology
and physiology is simply illusive. &quot;It has merely served to
give a semblance of scientific authority to what is, in fact, a
crudely metaphysical answer to questions which, rightly under
stood, it has nothing to
say.&quot;
After re-stating the question, &quot;How is knowledge possible?&quot;
the writer gives the supposed reply of his reader. &quot;This
seems to be an uncouth way of asking how I and other men
have come by the knowledge we possess. The answer is,
that we have been taught most of it, but that ultimately,
as our best physiologists teach, it results from the production
of feeling in us by the external world and the registration
of feeling in experience.&quot; Mr. Green says that no true disciple
of Kant or Hegel will dispute this, but only its sufficiency.GREEN. 259
&quot;It is not to the purpose to tell him that consciousness is
a simple ultimate fact. Knowledge is quite other than mere
consciousness, and, being so, admits of and requires explana
tion. The fact just stated is not an explanation of it, but
a summary of what requires explanation. It either merely
amounts to the fact that we know because something makes us
know,
. . . or it is only more than this because the something
is determined as a world, as
{
real, and as external, and as
in some way reflecting itself in our experience. It is the
analysis of these further determinations and of all which they
imply that is the proper task of the metaphysician.
. . . The
question before him is thus one relating to the object of know
ledge. What are the conditions implied in the existence of such
an object ? And an answer to this question forms the neces
sary prolegomenon of all valid psychology. Till this is fairly
dealt with, an inquiry into the subjective process through which
the individual comes by his knowledge can only have an illusive
result, for it will be assuming an answer to a question of which
the bearings have not been considered, and will therefore be at
the mercy of crude metaphor and analogy in its assumption. It
is this question which it is Kant s great merit to have clearly
raised, and which he fixed in the formula, How is nature
possible ?
&quot;
It is then shown how this formula was forced upon
Kant by the previous historical development of philosophical
thought, and it is asserted that the object-matter of all philosophy,
physical or metaphysical, has been fixed by Locke once for all
as in some sort consciousness. To enter into the true meaning
of this is the true baptism into philosophy.
&quot; If from the proposition, which all admit, that knowledge is
of appearances, we go on to inquire into the nature of appear
ances, we find the natural man summoning in an explanation of
them which neutralises the admission that they are appearances,
or that they are relative to consciousness at all. They are ex
plained as molecular changes of a nervous organisation. Begin
ning with a doctrine which, if it means anything, means that only
in a world of consciousness can any material relation be known,
we are asked to explain consciousness itself as one sort of such
material relation.
&quot; In Locke himself, the determination of the object of know
ledge as lying in ideas is virtually cancelled on almost every260 APPENDIX.
page where it occurs.&quot; Then follows an examination of Locke,
which is a launching out into the general question of the meaning
of
&quot;subject&quot; and of &quot;object&quot; and of their relations.
We pause here to inquire as to the duty of the student of
philosophy, who has been brought up so far under the so-called
scientific training, when in his study of Mr. Spencer, who is
supposed to be the outcome of the modern scientific spirit, he is
thus met by the assertion that he must explore metaphysics as
a necessary prolegomenon of all study when he is thus led
up within view of those vast fields of metaphysical explora
tions which he has shunned and dreaded all his lifetime ? The
thought presents itself, If he takes the plunge into that sea of
troubles, will he ever come out of it again ? He recalls Bacon s
characterisation of metaphysical studies as vermicular, where
the mind wanders about amongst old worm-eaten passages
studies in which positions remain positions still, and ques
tions remain questions in which one teacher comes up after
another with new phraseologies, but the eternal question remains
unsolved. Metaphysics, a toothless Sphynx, going through the
centuries with his riddle, and threatening to devour, but im
potent in a busy and unheeding world.
However, upon consideration, the student feels bound to lay
aside his prejudices, and to endeavour to form for himself some
estimate of the position as advanced in the foregoing quotations.
Does Mr. Spencer s statement of the Problem of Philosophy
meet the case as therein stated ? Does it include the problem as
given by Professor Green? Does Mr. Spencer show &quot;How is
knowledge possible?&quot; and, by implication, &quot;How is nature
possible
?&quot;
We recall at once that Mr. Spencer s statement of the problem
is obscure, for it reads, firstly, as an unification of knowledge ;
and again as a problem of construction, by which existence, in
dependent of and antecedent to consciousness and knowledge,
came to be organised, including amongst its results our own
selves, with our consciousness and knowledge. It is the latter
statement of the problem which we have accepted as correct and
criticised, and it would seem to us that if Mr. Spencer had suc
ceeded in his attempt, Professor Green s necessary prolego
menon would have been ruled out of court, since it could have
been shown how knowledge is possible ; but since he has notGREEN. 261
succeeded, he has not shown how knowledge is possible. Can
Professor Green, or Kant, or Hegel ? I must ascertain if they
undertake this task, and, if so, how they have succeeded ?
The problem appears to be the same in both cases one ap
proaching it from the physical side, the other from the side of
consciousness ; but philosophy does not seem yet to have been
able to bridge the gulf between them ; the problem of the order
of the universe is yet to be solved.
It would appear, from what I can judge, that the school of which




to that which forms part of consciousness and know
ledge. Even when they speak of &quot;material&quot; and
&quot;nature,&quot;
they only refer to terms or items of knowledge and conscious
ness. Because we can talk of nothing but of our knowledge of
things as related to ourselves things have no relations amongst
themselves independently of our knowledge whereas the
records of geology show an age of physical activity long before
there was any consciousness. The difficulty appears to be in an
ambiguity of the term
&quot;
reality.&quot; Realities would seem to be of
two classes : the primary realities such as are in direct relation
to our consciousness ; and the inferred realities, which are not
present in consciousness. The inferred order of the universe and
the inferred relation of things to each other in co-existence and
sequence seem to me just as much realities to us as those of which
we are immediately conscious. It is possible that the meta
physicians do not mean anything different from ordinary men
in the net result, and that ordinary men could agree to their
explanations after proper study ; but is any real progress made ?
It would seem that the metaphysicians, in the position
they take up of insisting upon the preliminary study of the
question, &quot;How is knowledge possible?&quot; hold up a perpetual
bar to any answer to their own question, if they do not admit
independent existences and interrelations of things independent
of consciousness.
So far, both from the side of the metaphysicians and from
the side of the physicists to use these terms rather broadly
there is no explanation of the mutual relations of conscious
ness and knowledge, on the one side with matter (taken as
extension and resistance), and motion on the other. The phy
sicist cannot account for mind ; the metaphysician or ontologist262 APPENDIX.
cannot account for matter, nor, for the matter of that, for mind
either. Neither of these can explain the connection between
them. The metaphysician can explain the law of knowledge,
but he cannot show, any more than Mr. Spencer or the physio
logists, how knowledge is possible and how nature is possible.
One remarkable feature in the writings of metaphysicians of
the school of Professor Green is their acceptance of a normal
mind for the basis of their studies, and the apparent excision
from their study of all relations or rather of all inconvenient
relations with other sciences. They do not often refer to the
records of geology, to the Darwinian theory of development, to
the development of the individual from the germ, to varia
tions of mentality, to comparative mentality, nor do they ever
seem to seek a theory which shall unite the whole. Yet all
these are studies that cry loudly to the metaphysician for affilia
tion not to be left relationless in the cold. Unless accepted
and explained, we always doubt lest, in place of these legitimate
children, metaphysics is nursing the offspring of some cherished
but unlawful illusion.
To resume our account of Professor Green s criticism. Assum
ing that Mr. Spencer accepts the theory that all knowledge must
consist or be founded upon consciousness, then, speaking of
Hume s doctrine, he says
:
&quot; He can recognise no unity of the ivorld, no uniformity of
nature, but the regularity, varying in every individual and every
age, with which one idea suggests another in memory or ima
gination. Hence the peculiar difficulty of adjusting his system,
so far as it is faithfully maintained, to the procedure of the
physical sciences a difficulty which the modern experien-
tialist saves himself by assuming both the reality of an objective
order, and an elementary consciousness of it, as antecedents of
the process by which knowledge is attained. He cannot, how
ever, claim any superiority over Hume for so doing. He is
merely ignoring the previous question which Hume was trying
to meet. Given a world of intelligible relations, it is easy to
account for knowledge. The modern experientialist is taking
the reality of such a world for granted, along with a theory of
reality which excludes it. Hume was trying to explain it
away, in order that the same theory of reality the theory that
identifies it with feeling might be consistently maintained.&quot;GREEN. 263
And as Hume is misapprehended, so Kant is supposed to be






&quot; If the alternative really lay between experience and ready-
made, unaccountable intuition as sources of knowledge if the
point in dispute were whether theories about nature should be
tested merely by logical consistency or experimentality verified
whether subjective beliefs should be put in the place of sub
jective facts, or brought into correspondence with them the
experientialists would be entitled to all the self-confidence
they show. That the question does not so stand, they can
scarcely be expected to admit till their opponents constrain
them to it
; and in England hitherto, whether from want of
penetration or under the influence of a theological arriere pensee,
their opponents have virtually put the antithesis in the form
which yields the experientialists an easy triumph. Both sides
are, in fact, beating the air till they meet upon the question,
What constitutes the experience which it is agreed is to us the
sole conveyance of knowledge ? What do we mean by a fact 1
In what lies the objectivity of the objective world 1
&quot;
We can scarcely be expected to give Mr. Green s replies to
these questions, nor to give his full criticism of Mr. Spencer.
We must refer the student to the articles themselves
; but the
reader must bear in mind that Mr. Spencer has two theories
of Evolution one without, and one with, the factor of
&quot;
feeling.&quot;
The subjects dealt with in the papers are mainly those of
object and subject, reality, the independence of matter, and the
nature of experience all of which, the writer undertakes to
show, are not properly or satisfactorily dealt with by Mr. Spencer
and Mr. Lewes. And since they form the necessary prolego
menon of the study of philosophy, it is to be presumed that
the Evolution philosophy cannot be accepted. The primary
questions of philosophy, as stated by Professor Green, viz.,
&quot;How is knowledge possible
1
?&quot; and &quot;How is nature possible
1
?&quot;
remain unanswered by the doctrine of Evolution.
In any case, it would seem that Professor Green makes out a
good case for the attention of the honest and painstaking student
to the views of the metaphysicians, and gives a valid challenge
to his opponents to meet him on his own ground.264 APPENDIX.
GEKEKAL SUMMARY.
The general conclusions to which our studies have brought
us appear to be these :
First, as regards Mr. Spencer s workmanship, it would seem
to be the general opinion that it is not executed in that clear
and well-ordered manner that is to be expected in a philo
sophical work. The terms employed are not properly denned
;
the propositions are indistinct; words are used in different
senses in different places without any indication of a change
of meaning; some words are used which have no definable
meaning at all. It is even said that, in consequence of these
deficiencies, the results are not merely confused and nebulous,
but absolutely contradictory. These complaints are not made
by adversely prejudiced minds only, but by men who have every
desire to understand and to accept an explanation of an orderly
development of the universe. All this would seem to demand
from Mr. Spencer a rewriting of his &quot;First Principles,&quot; for
although he may hold in his own mind a clear and complete
theory, yet he cannot fail to recognise the difficulties experienced
by so many of his readers with the very best desire to appreciate
and understand him. And when we consider the difficulties
and incompetencies of language, no blame is to be attached to
a writer upon a difficult subject if he does not always make
himself understood
; yet, when the difficulties are stated, blame
may justly be attributed to the author who does not seek to
remove them. Indeed, considering that the preface to a book
is generally written last, when the subject is complete in the
author s mind, may we not claim that the
&quot; First Principles
&quot;
should at least receive a revision from the author when his
work is complete? Should we not regard it as a &quot;workin^
hypothesis,&quot; a tentative theory, and at the end of his elabo
ration of it should the test of the results not be applied to it 1
and, if necessary, should it not receive some modifications
according to the exigencies of the case ?
I advance these remarks with due and great respect to Mr.
Spencer s high position in the literary and philosophical world,
and I mean no disparagement to those great intellectual suc
cesses which are sound and good work ; but these great accom
plishments should not absolve the author from just stricturesSUMMARY. 265
upon imperfect work, nor from the necessity of rendering more
clear the exposition of the more ambitious scheme propounded
in the &quot;First Principles&quot; to which we have more especially
directed our studies.
We have also found that the religion indicated by Mr.
Spencer is of no value or efficacy in influencing human action,
and although something else may be substituted in its place,
viz., a kind of
&quot; cosmic emotion,&quot; yet it is not likely to be of any
efficacy in the affairs of the world. Comtism recognises nothing
beyond the Knowable
; Spencer recognises the Unknowable as
a positive. Nescience implies unknown possibilities, and dis
turbs the self-complacency of Comtism. Mr. Spencer even goes
further, and recognises a Power, although it is an Inscrutable
Power, and regarding this Power there are many possibilities.
How should our lives be influenced by the possibilities of this
Inscrutable Power ?
But we have also found that too much stress has been laid
upon this portion of Mr. Spencer s theories. We have found
that this subject, so attractive to the imagination and so im
portant to the interests of mankind, has led the mind off from
the main line of Mr. Spencer s argument, and tended much to
confuse the consideration of it. For after all, from a merely
logical point of view, the book on the Unknowable is non-
essential to Mr. Spencer s philosophy. If it were excised
from the book, it would leave the mind free to examine on its
own merits the real and substantial theory of the work as con
tained in the part on the Knowable.
This theory is found to be, firstly, a claim for philosophy ;
and, secondly, a formula which shall satisfy that claim.
With respect to this essential portion of the work, the
general opinion of critics seems to be that Mr. Spencer has
failed. His theological opponents not merely those that are
thoroughly ingrained in orthodox prepossessions, but those who
manifest unbiassed and careful thought advance objections
which Mr. Spencer has not yet met, and which the student may
fairly demand shall be replied to. His purely philosophical
and scientific critics also argue his failure to accomplish the task
he has set Evolution to fulfil.
It is considered, also, that Mr. Spencer and his disciples
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life and mind, and that it is inconsistent to hold on by the
soundness of the theory when these incompetencies are allowed.
Again, those amongst the eminent scientists of the day who
most favour Mr. Spencer s theories appear to be in a state of
puzzle. They would like to accept them if they could. The
study of the world and the cosmos points to unity, and it also
indicates orderly development, and they naturally search for
some mode of expressing this unity and order with a natural
bias towards that physical science which is the most perfect
exhibition, in the present state of human knowledge, of that
order. But the most candid and careful of them feel bound to
express the incompetency of science to include in any formula
certain facts of life and mind, and by implication reject Mr.
Spencer s Formula of Evolution as
satisfying the requirements of
philosophy.
One positive result of our studies has been the recognition
of the insufficiency of a materialistic and mechanical theory of
the universe. This conviction grows upon the mind the more
deeply the matter is studied. Does, then, nature disclose an
original mind ? Perhaps we cannot say in any positive and
certain manner that she does so, but the balance of probabilities
is in favour of that theory. We cannot say that that mind is
like ours ; we cannot attribute to it from a study of nature
like passions or thoughts to our own
; but, as between two rival
theories, the presumption is strongly in favour of that which
recognises in some form or another the existence of mind in
nature.
If the mechanical and materialistic hypothesis is clearly found
insufficient to account for some of the facts of the universe, the
mind naturally asks What are the alternative hypotheses?
The only alternative hypothesis is one founded upon the nature
of the facts that are unresolved by the other, viz., the facts of
life and mind. Although the inference is obscure, yet the
general nature of the explanation is indicated. Or there may
remain an unknown hypothesis, taking the form of an Unknow
able or Inscrutable Power or Force
; but even then it seems
clear that it must contain within it that which comes out of it,
that it implies in its constitution the elements of feeling and
mind as we know them, and if it differs from them it does so
by transcending and comprehending them.SUMMARY. 267
The only escape from this preponderance of probabilities is
by Agnosticism. But there is no pure nescience logically
acceptable. It may be used as a condoner of logical idleness
and intellectual superciliousness ; it may cover pride or stifle
the cry of despair ; it may be a mental anaesthetic ; but to
the earnest thinker there can be no pure nescience. Nescience
admits all sorts of possibilities. The Agnostic cannot say that
any explanation is not the right one ; his position demands that
he should say
&quot;It may be,&quot; as well as &quot;It may not be.&quot;
Nescience does not confer quiescence of thought. It gives no
rest. Behind the veil are all sorts of possibilities. What are
our relations to these unknown possibilities
?
The nescience of Mr. Spencer accepts the positive belief in
the inadequacy of the mechanical and materialistic hypothesis.
This is a valid definite result. It recognises an all-producing
though Inscrutable Power. Other interpreters infer from its
results something of its nature.
THE END.
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